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LOSERS, FOOLS & PROPHETS: JUSTICE AS
STRUGGLE
Jules Lobelt
Legal scholarship lavishes its attention on the successes of law re-
form litigators. Brown v. Board of Education,' Roe v. Wade,2 and a host
of other successful efforts to change the law have been celebrated,
analyzed, and critiqued. Losing efforts, such as Plessy v. Ferguson,3
Bradwell v. llinois,4 or Minor v. Happersett-all critical test cases litigat-
ing African-Americans' and women's rights before their time-are
generally ignored.6 Americans like winners.
The legal community likewise has tended to ignore the efforts of
lawyers who might be viewed as prophets or fools. In fact, lawyers are
generally "confined from molar to molecular motion," as Justice
Holmes once put it, 7 and do not indulge in tilting at windmills in the
service of losing causes.
Yet virtually hopeless test cases brought to challenge unjust poli-
cies have been recurring threads in the tapestry of American law
throughout our nation's history. Radical abolitionists challenged as-
pects of slavery in American courts in the 1840s and 1850s, to no
avail.8 Members of the post-Civil War women's movement advocated a
broad interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and litigated wo-
men's rights in a series of 1870s~cases that were uniformly unsuccess-
t Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School. I want to thank Michael
Ratner, David Cole, Jody Amour, Welsh White, Rhonda Wasserman, Chris Biancheria,
Staughton and Alice Lynd, Ruth Colker, Susan Koniak, MaryJo Pisano, andJohn Markoff
for their helpful comments and suggestions. My research assistants Olabomi Anise, Alex
Gruskos, Coleen O'Brien, and Teresa Williams provided invaluable research aid. I also
want to thank LuAnn Driscoll and the Word Processing staff at the University of Pittsburgh
Law School, for without their aid I could never have completed the manuscript.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See infra notes 277-307 and accompanying text.
4 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). See infra notes 237-41 and accompanying text.
5 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874). See infra notes 242-52 and accompanying text.
6 There has been a recent revival of scholarly interest in Pkssy v. Ferguson, which is
the subject of a recent book by Charles A. Lofgren. CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLasYCASE
(1987). However, this mini-revival pales before the mainstream interest in Brown v. Board
of Education, which has been the theme not only of scholarly books and articles, but also of
several docudramas shown on prime time television in the past five years.
7 Quoted in Michael E. Tigar, Beyond Civil Liberties, in RAticAL_ LAwYms: ROLE IN THE
MOVEMENT AND IN THE CouRTS 43, 44 (Jonathan Black ed., 1971).
8 See ROBERT M. COVER, JuSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICLL PROCESS
149-58 (1975) (describing abolitionist constitutional theories and litigation).
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ful.9 Plessy v. Ferguson was a test case brought by several civil rights
lawyers who had strong doubts about their chances for success in that
period of reaction. 10
In our era, labor activists have proposed innovative theories of
employee property and contract rights to avert plant closings,
although courts thus far have given these theories short shrift."1
Countless lawsuits challenged the constitutionality of the U.S. war in
Indochina, with meager results. 12 Lawyers for Haitian refugees sought
to enjoin the Coast Guard's interdiction and return of Haitians, know-
ing that the Supreme Court was likely to uphold the government's
policy.' 3 Gay rights lawyers are litigating the military's policy on
homosexuals, despite their unlikely prospects for success in the
Supreme Court. 14
Why study these losing efforts? Of course each case or campaign
has some historical significance. But more importantly, these losing
cases illuminate a radical perspective on the relationship between law,
politics and history.
Traditional public interest litigation relies on political action to
create a favorable climate for court victory and to implement that vic-
tory. Politics is thus a necessary predicate to the courtroom drama. In
many losing efforts, however, the relationship is reversed: the primary
point of the cases is to inspire political action. Litigation may serve to
legitimate a political movement, to publicize the issues raised by that
movement, and perhaps to spur political action. These cases thus il-
lustrate the role of law not merely in adjudicating disputes between
parties, but also in educating the public.15
9 See Ellen C. DuBois, Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights, Woman Suf-
frage, and the United States Constitution, 1820-1878, in A LESS THAN PERFECr UNION 104, 120-
29 (Jules Lobel ed., 1989).
10 See OTro H. OLsEN, THE THIN DISGUISE: TURNING POINr IN NEGRO HISTORYA Doc-
UMENTARY PRESENTATION 61, 6M-64 (1967).
11 See STAUGHTON LYND, THE FIGHT AGAINST SHUTDOWNS: YOUNGSTOWN'S STEEL MILL
CLOSINGS (1982); see also Local 1330 United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 492
F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd, 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980); Charter Township of
Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). These cases are
discussed infra at Section III.D.
12 See generally ANTHONY A. D'AMATO & ROBERT M. O'NEIL, THE JUDICIARY AND VIET-
NAM 11, passim (1972) (chronicling "the persistent reluctance of the courts to reach and
decide constitutional challenges to the Indo-China War").
13 Discussions with Michael Earner and Harold Koh, counsel for the plaintiffs in Sale
v. Haitian Ctrs. Council Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
14 See Stephen Labaton, No Easy Path for Legal Assault on New Gay Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
July 25, 1993, at A22 (describing conviction that chances of winning the military cases are
not as great as in other areas, but that challenges still had to be made). Of course, the
religious right has also sought to litigate very difficult cases against what they see as unjust
and even murderous governmental policies, most prominently in the abortion arena.
15 Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, The United States, and the World Court, 85 COLUM. L. Rv.
1445, 1479-82 (1985).
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Litigators of certain losing cases challenge the typical conception
of a lawyer. Even the public-interest, law-reform variety of lawyer ordi-
narily aims to win her cases. The traditional lawyer seeks to win some
judgment for her client, the law reform litigator to achieve some struc-
tural change through a successful court challenge. But many of the
litigators in these losing efforts understood from the outset, or at least
by the time they reached the Supreme Court, that winning would be
difficult if not impossible. They believed they had justice and the law
on their sides and hoped the courts would agree. However, the social
and political contexts of these challenges made success highly improb-
able. They persevered because their purposes were broader than vic-
tory alone. They were speaking to the public, not just to the Court.
Even more importantly, they were speaking to history.
The fundamental significance of these aspirational cases lies not
in their inversion of the roles of law and politics, but in their radically
different view of the meaning and nature of law. They represent a
prophetic vision of law, stemming from the Old Testament prophets
such as Amos who viewed justice as "a fighting challenge, a restless
drive."'16 To understand this genre of litigation one must regard law
as a process of struggle rather than a collection of substantive rules or
"mere norm[s]."17 Law, under this view, arises from the clash between
the state seeking to enforce its rules and the activist communities seek-
ing to create, extend, or preserve an alternative vision ofjustice.'8
The key prophetic legal symbol is not the traditional scales ofjus-
tice, connoting the calm, detached, and neutral balancing of legal
principles, but Amos's imagery of a turbulent, cascading river. 19 The
prophetic vision is dynamic; it is not a stagnant snapshot of present
normative principles. The mobility of this vision allows law to move
towards an imagined ideal. As Robert Cover put it, law links "a con-
cept of a reality to an imagined alternative."20
My interest in these losing cases was inspired by my participation
in a quixotic effort, undertaken by the Center for Constitutional
Rights21 in conjunction with other legal groups, to litigate U.S. mili-
16 ABRAHAM HESCHEL, THE PROPHETS 212 (1962).
17 Id.
18 See generally Robert M. Cover, Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narra-
tive, 97 H.Aiv. L. REv. 4, 9 (1983) (describing the world of law or "Nomos" as "a present
world constituted by a tension between reality and vision").
19 "But letjudgment run down as waters, and righteousness as a mighty stream." Amos
5:24 (KingJames).
20 Cover, supra note 18, at 9.
21 The Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) was created in the 1960s by several
nationally prominent civil rights lawyers and maintains offices in New York and Mississippi.
The organization has litigated a broad array of civil rights, voting rights, civil liberties, and
international human rights cases over the past two decades. Some of the CCR's important
cases include: Eichman v. United States, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (successfully challenging
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tary and economic intervention abroad during the Reagan and Bush
presidencies. These public interest lawyers challenged the U.S. gov-
ernment's dispatch of military advisors and aid to the El Salvadorian
government, 22 covert war against Nicaragua, 23 prohibition of travel to
Cuba,24 embargo against Nicaragua,25 invasion of Grenada, 26 and, fi-
nally, President Bush's threat to use U.S. troops against Iraq without
first obtaining congressional authorization.2 7 Many of the lawyers
who worked on these cases saw themselves as the legal arm of a
broader political movement to oppose U.S. intervention abroad and
to support Third World revolutions.28
Our legal team employed a variety of strategies. At times we re-
lied on narrow, legalistic arguments. 29 Other challenges raised much
broader claims.30 Some lawsuits requested declaratory relief not di-
rectly impinging on U.S. foreign policy.31 In other cases, we asked the
flag-burning statute); Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (same); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980) (challenging denial of medicaid funding to poor women for medically
necessary abortions); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (establishing prin-
ciple that torture committed by foreign governmental official violates international law
and is actionable in U.S. courts).
22 Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479
U.S. 361 (1987); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff, 720 F.2d 1355
(D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denieA 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
23 Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir.
1988); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.D.C. 1985); Dellums v. Smith, 573 F.
Supp. 1489 (N.D. Cal. 1983), revd, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986).
24 Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
25 Beacon Prods. Corp. v. Reagan, 814 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1987).
26 Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
27 Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990); Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509
(D.D.C. 1990).
28 Martha Minow has suggested that a tension exists between the role of legal advisor
and the position of a comrade. Martha L. Minow, Breaking the Law: Lauers and Clients in
Struggles for Social Change 52 U. Prrr. L. R:v. 723, 747 (1991). But see David Luban, Consci-
entious Lawyers for Conscientious Lawbreakers, 52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 793, 800 (1991) (arguing
that a lawyer can serve as both comrade and legal advisor). My colleagues at the CCR and I
functioned as both members of and lawyers to the anti-interventionist movement and felt
the same conflicts about the restraints of the legal system that our clients did.
29 See, e.g., Beacon Prods. Corp. v. Reagan, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987) (technical chal-
lenge to Nicaraguan embargo); Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (separation
of powers challenge to President Reagan's pocket veto of human rights certification), va-
cated sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987). See infranotes 433-40 and accompany-
ing text.
30 See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.D.C. 1985) (discussed infra
notes 384-96 and accompanying text); Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua
(CUSCLIN) v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (discussed infra notes 469-94 and
accompanying text).
31 See, e.g., Dellums v. Smith, 573 F. Supp. 1489 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (requesting prelimi-
nary investigation pursuant to Ethics in Government Act), reuld, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir.
1986).
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courts to enjoin U.S. threatened or ongoing military adventures
abroad.3 2
We were spectacularly unsuccessful in court. With a few excep-
dons,33 we lost every case we litigated. We did come close to winning
several major cases. A panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals
unanimously enjoined the Reagan Administration's prohibition on
travel to Cuba, but the Supreme Court reversed in a five-to-four deci-
sion.3 4 A district court ordered a preliminary investigation of the Pres-
ident, Secretary of State, and CIA Director to determine whether
these individuals had violated criminal laws by aiding the contras at-
tacking Nicaragua.3 5 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on
jurisdictional grounds.3 6 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals struck
down President Reagan's pocket veto of a statute requiring a presiden-
tial certification that human rights in El Salvador had improved
before U.S. aid could continue, but the case became moot while pend-
ing before the Supreme Court. In the end, judicial power was never
exercised to prevent U.S. intervention against a foreign nation.
Rethinking whether these cases served any useful purpose has led
me to fluctuate between self-congratulatory optimism and despair.
One hundred years ago, Albion Tourgee, the lawyer who argued for
Homer Plessy before the Supreme Court, agonized over the same is-
sues. In a best-selling autobiographical novel entitled A Fool's Errand,
Tourgee argued that an individual is often both a fool and a genius,
with only history's thin line separating the two.3 7 A fool differs from
his fellow humans in that "he sees or believes what they do not, and
consequently undertakes what they never attempt."38 However, social
acceptance of the fool's vision alters his status: "It is success alone that
32 See, e.g., CUSCLIN v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See infra notes 469-94
and accompanying text.
33 Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1452 (S.D. Fla. 1990), rev'd, 963 F.2d
332 (11th Cir. 1992); Veterans Peace Convoy, Inc. v. Schultz, 722 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Tex.
1988). The Veterans Peace Convoy, Inc. case presented a relatively narrow issue of whether
certain shipments to Nicaragua were humanitarian supplies that did not require a license.
In Linder v. Calero Portocarrero we did not sue the U.S. government, but the leaders of the
contras attacking Nicaragua. The district court nevertheless dismissed the case as present-
ing a non-justiciable political question, but the court of appeals reversed on a fairly narrow
issue. We are currently involved in pre-trial discovery.
34 Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1983), rev'd, 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
35 Dellums v. Smith, 573 F. Supp. 1489 (N.D. Cal. 1983), rev'd, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir.
1986).
36 Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986).
37 ALBiON W. TOuRGEE, A FOOL's ERRAND (John Hope Franklin ed., 1961). Tourgee
was not originally identified as the author of the book, but chose to identify the writer as
merely "One of the Fools." Tourgee's book was one of the bestsellers of its day. Id. at xxi
(Total sales may have reached 200,000 copies, a "remarkable" figure for the 1880s.).
38 Id. at 5.
1995] 1335
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
transforms the credulity of folly into acknowledged prophetic
prevision." 39
I have used the term prophetic litigation to describe the class of
litigation represented by Plessy v. Ferguson or Bradwell v. Illinois. But
perhaps a more apt description would be foolhardy litigation. This
Article attempts to explore the tension between these two descrip-
tions. This tension reflects a basic conflict between human aspiration
and current reality: in psychological terms "between what one is and
what one should become,"40 or in a social sense, between what our
society is and what it might be.- As Robert Browning put it, "Man's
reach must exceed his grasp, or what's a heaven for?"4' Prophetic (or
foolhardy) litigation directly straddles the fault line between our
reach and our grasp.
Jack Greenberg and others in the law-reform community argue
that losing cases may be often counterproductive in that they expend
time and energy better spent elsewhere and result in bad legal prece-
dents.42 Over the last decade or so, I have at times thought that these
commentators may be right. My litigation experience led me to study
other losing efforts in American history in search of lessons to apply to
my own experience, as well as some responses to the arguments
Greenberg and others have raised. The main lesson I draw is that
nonfrivolous litigation that reflects and articulates the aspirations and
demands of significant political or social movements should generally
be pursued-even if the case is ultimately unsuccessful. Litigation is
but one means to aid political and social movements and to nurture a
culture of constitutional struggle. This Article examines the question
of how to litigate these cases, and not merely whether to do so.
The Article starts by defining prophetic litigation and discussing
generally both its importance and its contradictions. Parts I and II
present a general framework gleaned primarily from an analysis of
history. Part III contains narratives of prophetic litigation and pro-
phetic litigators in American history. Part IV seeks to apply the lessons
of the first three sections to the cases challenging U.S. intervention in
Central America in the 1980s. This section is more cautious and ques-
39 Id. at 6.
40 VIKTOR E. FRANK., MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING 127 (1984).
41 Robert Browning, Andrea del Sarto, in II THE OXFORD ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITER-
ATURE 1329, at 1. 97-98 (Lionel Trilling & Harold Bloom eds., 1973). I am indebted to
Victor Rabinowitz for directing me to this quotation by Robert Browning.
42 Jack Greenberg, Litigation For Social Change: Methods, Limits and Role in Democracy, in
29 RECORD OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITy OF N.Y. 320, 326, 349 (1974) ("Lawyers
ought to try to avoid creating a new Plessy v. Ferguson."); Deborah R. Gerstel & Adam G.
Segall, Conference Report: Human Rights in American Courts, 1 Am. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 137,
142 (1986) (commentators question "the propriety and effectiveness of bringing actions
where the probability of a positive legal determination is doubtful") [hereinafter Human
Rights Conference].
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tioning because I believe these cases had both Kafkaesque and pro-
phetic elements. Although I conclude that many of the losing cases I
helped litigate were useful, lingering doubts still remain. This Article
thus fluctuates between questioning and defending the cases it
describes.
The narratives of losing cases preserve the versions of legal mean-
ing created by groups outside the mainstream of American law. Re-
telling these stories is critical to "an outsider's jurisprudence,"4 3 which
locates justice not merely in certain substantive goals, but more impor-
tantly in the history of struggle against oppression and injustice. In-
deed, these "litigation narratives" are useful as one method-in
addition to personal stories, speeches, and pamphlets-of depicting
an outsider group's "law" and culture of struggle. This Article consti-
tutes a part of the recent, growing tradition in legal scholarship that
views narrative as essential to capture the legal meaning of cultures
and groups that have been excluded from traditional histories of
law.44
I
PROPHETIC LITIGATION
American political movements throughout the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries have often turned to constitutional and higher-law
arguments to articulate their deeply felt demands. The resulting lit-
gation is best described as prophetic, a term I use with some reluc-
tance. In part, my reluctance stems from the jarring juxtaposition of
litigation and prophecy, for objective, legal argumentation was alien
to the prophets of the Old Testament.45 Moreover, the central experi-
ence of the biblical prophets was their intense, personal engagement
with God, an experience not generally shared by the litigators I dis-
cuss here.46 My reluctance to use the term "prophetic" also stems
from the increasing usage of the term in modem parlance to describe
43 The expression comes from MariJ. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Consid-
ering the Vctim's Story, 87 MicH. L. REv. 2320, 2323-26 (1989) (describing outsider jurispru-
dence as relying on narratives); see also William N. Eskridge, Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 607, 608-09 (1994) (discussing outsider jurisprudence). Most narrative scholarship
focuses on stories about the people who make history, but are excluded from case reports.
This essay focuses on another form of narrative: narratives of litigation that have been
excluded from mainstream jurisprudence.
44 For examples of recent works employing narratives or discussing the growing narra-
tive literature, see DERRuCK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (telling a narrative of
racism in America); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. Rxv. 971 (1991);
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives,
45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993); Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989).
45 HESCHEL, supra note 16, at 24.
46 SeeJay M. Feinman, Priests and Prophets, 31 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 53, 57 (1986) (reflect-
ing upon a similar uneasiness in describing members of the Critical Legal Studies Move-
ment as acting in a prophetic tradition).
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a broad range of personalities and activities bearing only superficial
resemblance to the prophetic model of the Old Testament. For ex-
ample, Supreme Court justices and certain judicial decisions have
been called prophetic. 47 This contemporary proliferation of the term
associates it with a seer who peers into the future, a usage found in
Alan Barth's description of great dissenters as "prophets with
honor."48
My use of the term "prophetic" does not focus on this clairvoyant
aspect of prophecy, although some of the litigators I discuss in Part III
were eventually vindicated by history.49 Rather, I focus on the
prophet as a radical social critic, who appealsto tradition and exhorts
the population to replace the present unjust reality with a just and
equal future. The phrase "prophetic litigation" emphasizes the vision
of justice as a continual struggle-rather than as a set of legal norms
or procedures-and thus provides insight into the fundamental mean-
ing and significance of these cases. Moreover, the cases described in
Part III of this Article offer several analogies to the message and prac-
tice of the biblical prophets.
Prophetic litigation is defined by several important characteris-
tics. First, like the Old Testament prophets, the lawyers described in
Part III all harshly criticized the callousness and injustice of the social
order.5 0 They rejected the solution of minor improvement in favor of
total redemption:5' ending slavery, segregation, women's second-class
citizenship, or absolute managerial rights over employees. These liti-
47 ALAN BARTH, PROPHETS WITH HONOR: GREAT DISSENTS AND GREAT DISSENTERS IN
THE SUPREME COURT (1974); see also MICHAELJ. PERRY, MoR~A=r, PoCrrcs, AND LAW 139,
147-48 (1988). Perry's view here is somewhat more nuanced than in his early work, in that
he does not claim that judges are moral prophets. Rather, he sees them as occupying an
institutional position that allows them to play a "prophetic role." Id. at 147. For a view that
the term "prophetic" does not aptly describe Supreme Courtjustices, even those visionaries
on the Court, see Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture 37 STAN. L. REv. 1, 24
(1984), and Mark V. Tushnet, Legal Realism, Structural Review, and Prophecy, 8 U. DAYrON L.
REv. 809, 828-30 (1983). In addition, ProfessorJay Feinman's interesting and convincing
article argues that the critical legal studies movement's critique of mainstream legalism can
be analogized to the prophetic alternative to dogmatic religion. Feinman, supra note 46, at
54.
48 BARTH, supra note 47, at 3, 8 (Dissents were, "in a true sense of the term, prophetic,
foreseeing changes in the American political and economic environment.").
49 LVI A. OLAN, PROPHETIC FA=T AND THE SECULAR AGE xii (1982) ("The Hebrew
prophets were not soothsayers.... The validity of the prophet's message did not depend
upon the fulfillment of his [specific] prediction .. ").
50 See WALTER BRUEGGEMANN, THE PROPHETIC IMAGINATION (1978) (Old Testament
prophets raised fundamental criticism of dominant culture); HESCHEL, Supra note 16, at 17
("[The] purpose of prophecy is to c6nquer callousness.").
51 HESCHEL, supra note 16, at 181 ("Others may be satisfied with improvement, the
prophets insist upon redemption.").
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gators postulated the unredeemed character of their realities and the
fundamentally different orders of reality that should emerge. 52
Second, these litigators were-like the Israelite prophets-deeply
and passionately engaged in their communities.53 All were social ac-
tivists whose litigation arose out of crucial contemporary struggles:
"In a sense, the calling of the prophet may be described as that of an
advocate or champion, speaking for those who are too weak to plead
their own cause." 54 Prophets are not detached, impartial observers of
reality. The prophetic model "is characterized by the principle of soli-
darity."55 Indeed, the prophetic litigator's engagement and solidarity
with an oppressed community distinguishes him from a judge, whose
constitutional role requires more detachment from social activism.56
These litigators earned scorn in their communities as a result of
their passionate criticisms of injustice. They were regarded as mad,
deluded fools, a description also widely attached to the biblical
prophets. 57 That their voices were not heard by the elite or even a
majority of Americans and that their causes were likely to be defeated
in the courts did not dissuade these litigators, for a prophet's duty is
to "speak to the people, 'whether they hear or refuse to hear.' "58
Third, both the prophetic litigators and the biblical prophets de-
veloped their symbols, metaphors, or legal theories for the purpose of
exhorting and energizing the population. The prophets' "prominent
theme [was] exhortation, not mere prediction."59 The prophet em-
ploys an alternative consciousness that can cut through despair and
"energize the community to fresh forms of faithfulness and vitality. 6 0
52 See Cover, supra note 18, at 33-40 (describing redemptive constitutionalists).
53 See J. SEVERINO CROATrO, EXODUS: A HERMENEUTICS OF FREEDOM 40 (1981)
("[P]rophets place themselves in confrontation with the power structure and almost always
from within the community or the people."); MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SO-
CIAL CRrTIciSM 81 (1987) (Prophets are "rooted... in their own societies.").
54 HESCHEL, supra note 16, at 204-05.
55 J. LINDBLOM, PROPHECY IN ANCIENT ISRAEL 344 (1962); see also WALTZER, supra note
53, at 80 (the prophets are committed to the principle of solidarity).
56 But see William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law," 10
CAmozo L. REV. 3 (1988) (discussing ajudge's need to balance reason with passion and
extolling the human value of empathy in the judicial process).
57 The prophet is a fool,
the man of the spirit is mad,
Because of your great iniquity
And great hatred.
Hosea 9:7 (NEw OxFoRD ANNOTATED BIBLE (1977)).
Jeremiah lamented that he had "become a laughing stock all the day; every one mocks
me." Jeremiah 20:7 (NEw OXFORD ANNOTATED BIBLE (1973)); see also HESCHEL, supra note
16, at 18 ("'The prophet bears scorn and reproach.' He is stigmatized as a madman by his
contemporaries.") (quoting Jeremiah). The abolitionist litigators were often discussed as
extremists. COVER, supra note 8, at 213.
58 HEsCHEL, supra note 16, at 19 (quoting Ezekial 3:11).
59 HESCHEL, supra note 16, at 12.
60 BRUEGGEMANN, supra note 50, at 62.
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Although the prophets are probably most remembered for their
message of doom, they communicated hope as well.61 "What saved
the prophets from despair was their messianic vision . -.62 Similarly,
these constitutional litigators developed their legal theories in order
to inspire and galvanize the populace.
Fourth, both the biblical prophet and the "prophetic" constitu-
tional litigator appeal to tradition to mediate the tension between an
unjust present and a redemptive future.63 The prophet's task is to
"reactivate out of our historical past symbols that always have been
vehicles for redemptive honesty."64 So too, the constitutional argu-
ments of the abolitionists, the nineteenth century women's move-
ment, the anti-segregationists and the labor movement all appealed to
symbols culled from the American tradition. Interestingly, all four
struggles-with the possible exception of the labor movement-relied
on the same sources: the Republican tradition in American law, the
Declaration of Independence, and the jurisprudential concepts of nat-
ural law and natural justice.
That the radical constitutional lawyers and Old Testament
prophets relied on tradition might at first seem perplexing, for our
modem age identifies appeals to tradition with conservatism. Yet, as
Professor Comel West-who is usually associated more with the pro-
phetic tradition than with the legal one-notes, a "role of progressive
lawyers is ... to preserve, recast and build on the traces and residues
of past conflicts coded in laws." 65 The radical lawyer can be a "politi-
cally engaged narrator"66 who preserves the memory of progressive
victories of the past "in the law of a society whose link with the past is
tenuous."67 This prophetic legal practice fosters tradition not to
maintain social stability, but to facilitate threats to the legal order.
Memory can be subversive, as both the prophets of the Old Testament
and the legal prophets of the nineteenth century recognized.
Finally, prophetic litigation is an extremely creative enterprise,
involving the creation of new legal meaning out of an inspired inter-
61 HESCHEL, supra note 16, at 12.
62 Id. at 185.
63 Abraham Heschel argues that the prophets regarded the problem of history "as a
tension between what happens now and what may happen next." HFSCHEL, supra note 16,
at 173.
64 BRUEGGEMANN, supra note 50, at 49 (asserting that the biblical prophets did not
generally invent new symbols, but reactivated ancient motifs and ideals). Michael Walzer
argues that "[pirophecy aims to arouse remembrance, recognition, indignation, repen-
tance." WALZER, supra note 53, at 75. The term "repentance" derives from a Hebrew word
meaning "to turn, to turn back, to return." Id.
65 Cornel West, The Role of Law in Progressive Politics, in THE POLMTCS OF LAW 468, 473
(D. Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1990).
66 Id.
67 Id.
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pretation of society's traditions and symbols. 68 The prophetic litigator
functions like an artist, driven by a heightened sensitivity to reality and
an inspired vision of future redemption based on recapturing tradi-
tional ideals.69 The prophetic litigator strains to its breaking point the
tension between the world as it is and as it ought to be.70 Expressing
and grappling with this conflict is often at the heart of the creative
process for the artist, the poet, the prophet, and the prophetic
litigator.71
These analogies to the prophetic model pale, however, before a
crucial difference: at the core of the Old Testament prophet's experi-
ence was a direct, intense, passionate engagement with God.
Although none of the litigators discussed in this Article had that en-
gagement with God, each had a spiritual perspective that the "impossi-
ble must be imagined if it is to be realized."72 Spirituality resides in
the struggle against injustice and in the identification with the suffer-
ing of the oppressed.7 3 These litigators had faith in the righteousness
of their causes. Albion Tourgee, the lawyer for Plessy, was a deeply
religious man. He believed that both foolish lawyers and prophets are
motivated by a "simple undoubting faith"74 that leads them to believe,
in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that the commu-
68 Max Weber once noted that "[plrophets are the only ones who have taken a really
consciously 'creative' attitude toward existing law; only through them has new law been
consciously created." MAX WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY AND SociTy 320 (1954), quoted in
PERRY, supra note 47, at 295 n.112; see also David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in
the First Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE LJ. 857, 859 (1986) (analogizing "strong," creative
Supreme Court opinions to poetic "misreadings" of tradition).
69 LEvi OLAN, PROPHETIC FATH AND THE SECULAR AGE 9 (1982) (stating that artist and
prophet share an awareness of reality "deeper than that which our eyes and our capacities
to weigh and measure can grasp, the reality in back of the shadows").
70 I am indebted to the late Robert Cover for the insight that law is the bridge be-
tween what is and what ought to be. Cover, supra note 18, at 9.
71 Derrick Bell has noted that the main creative urge of both the artist and the indi-
vidual challenging injustice is the "expression of self through a medium that communi-
cates a view of what is against a background of what might be." Derrick Bell,
Commencement Address at the University of Pittsburgh Law School (May 28, 1994) (on
file with author).
72 JOEL KovEI, HISTORY AND SPiRIT. AN INQUIRY INTO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERATION
13 (1991). Kovel tells the story of an old Spanish anarchist who, when confronted with the
fact that his ideals were beautiful but unrealizable, stated: "Of course it is impossible to
realize them. But don't you see that everything that is possible today, is worthless." Id.
Lenn Goodman articulates a point similar to Kovel's: "Just as human strivings inform our
vision of the messianic future, so the conception of that future gives orientation to those
strivings and imparts a meaning to them even when they fail of their proximate goals."
LENN E. GOODMAN, ONJUSTICE: AN ESSAY INJEWISH PHILOSOPHY 165 (1991).
73 See KovEL, supra note 72, at 200-02 (discussing the spiritual appeal of Augusto Cesar
Sandino, the El Salvadoran revolutionary leader). Kovel, like Viktor Frankl, argues that the
"value of suffering is downgraded these days, in the feel-good culture of late capitalism."
Id. at 233. For him, soul is "the seat of suffering." Id.
74 TOURGEE, supra note 37, at 6.
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nity can mend its ways and be redeemed. 75 Both fools and prophets
live lives "full of the poetry of faith."76
Yet the prophetic litigator cannot draw legitimacy from God. His
or her reliance on a judicial forum to argue the case constitutes a
significant departure from the experience and practice of an Old Tes-
tament prophet. The litigator must convince the judge that the cur-
rent law supports his or her claim and yet also must articulate a vision
of a hypothetical, just world. This conflict is present to a much lesser
degree for the prophet whose pronouncements stem from an engage-
ment with God. The methods of working out the tension between the
impulse to make narrow legalistic arguments that might convince a
conservative court and the desire to argue a broad prophetic critique
of reality forms a central theme of the litigation narratives I describe
in Parts III and IV of this Article. To the extent that litigators focus
too strongly on narrow legal mechanisms for winning their cases, they
can lose their prophetic focus and get drawn into a Kafkaesque, legal-
istic maze. The anti-intervention litigators of the 1980s at times were
drawn down this path. On the other hand, if litigators eschew current
law and focus too heavily on prophetic critique, they may fade into
utopian irrelevance. Some of the abolitionist litigators faced this
problem.
Litigation containing the foregoing "prophetic" characteristics
represents an important tradition in American law; the historical cases
I discuss in Part III are but a subset of that broader tradition. The best
contemporary example of prophetic litigation is the recent Haitian
refugee litigation.77 That litigation radically critiqued U.S. policy to-
ward Haitian refugees, was directly connected to a community strug-
gling against oppression, was primarily aimed towards inspiring
political struggle, relied on an American and international tradition
of sheltering political refugees, and utilized creative tactics, strategies,
and legal arguments. 78
75 Id. In his book, Tourgee characterized white supporters of the anti-segregation
movement in three groups: "[Mlartyrs, who were willing to endure ostracism and obloquy
for the sake of principle; self-seekers, who were willing to do or be any thing and every
thing for the sake of power, place, and gain; and fools, who hoped that in some inscrutable
way the laws of human nature would be suspended, or that the state of affairs at first
presenting itself would be but temporary." Id. at 134-35.
76 Id. at 5.
77 Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
78 The litigation to establish substantive welfare rights of the late 1960s and early
1970s also fits the characteristics of prophetic litigation. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970) (equal protection challenge to upper limit on AFDC grant). For a
description of the attempt to establish a right to welfare, see Greenberg, supra note 42, at
320, 335-42, and Samuel Krislov, The OEO Lawyers Fail to Constitutionalize a Right to Welfare:
A Study in the Uses and Limits of theJudicial Process, 58 MINN. L. REv. 211 (1974).
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Although Brown v. Board of Education79 also meets the criteria set
forth above, the NAACP focused much more heavily on the court bat-
tle than on the educational aspects of the litigation. This focus might
be attributable to the winnable nature of that case. Indeed, most pro-
phetic litigators, like the prophets of old Israel, fight losing battles,
with redemption arriving only decades or even centuries later, if ever.
The fact that most of these cases lose raises the question whether this
litigation has justly been consigned by mainstream scholarship and
legal history to relative oblivion.
II
THE VALUE OF PROPHETIC LITIGATION: THE CULTURE OF
LEGAL STRUGGLE
Traditional legal scholarship has viewed the law as a set of norma-
tive rules and procedures adopted by the state to govern society.
From the perspective of the mainstream vision of the law, losing cases
are virtually insignificant. They do not change legal rules. The main-
stream attitude toward prophetic litigation parallels the critique of dis-
senting opinions proffered by some legal philosophers: "[It] has no
consequences within the system: no one's rights or duties are thereby
altered."8 0
Moreover, while initially creating public debate and controversy,
losing litigation ultimately may have a negative effect on public dis-
course: the court's decision legitimates the challenged policies in the
public's mind. Thus, it is easy to conclude that these cases have failed.
As one historian has noted, the heroic, ingenious efforts of constitu-
tional litigators have "failed frequently enough that historians may
wonder whether clients might not have sought better weapons in
struggles for respect and legitimacy.""'
These losing efforts sometimes provoke a negative reaction, even
among those sympathetic to the plaintiff's substantive goals. The ob-
jections within the law-reform community are twofold. Some com-
mentators have argued that the main result of these cases is to create
bad legal precedent, and therefore, such cases generally "should not
be brought if they are likely to be lost."82 The second objection de-
plores the time and energy wasted on these cases that could better be
spent on more productive political activities. 83
79 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
80 H.LAL HART, THE CONCEPr OF LAW 138 (1961).
81 Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and "The Rights that Belong to Us All,"
74J. AM. Hisr. 1013, 1027 (1987).
82 Greenberg, supra note 42, at 349.
83 Human Rights Conference, supra note 42, at 145.
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Litigators of losing causes are likely to feel morally and ethically
obligated to challenge injustice regardless of whether their actions will
be successful. The act of challenging injustice gives meaning to and
defines that litigator's life;84 she does not undertake the calculus of a
tort attorney as to the likely outcome of the case. 85 Litigation is
merely the lawyer's familiar medium for expressing outrage at soci-
ety's callousness.
Yet alongside this moral dimension lies a complex set ofjustifica-
tions for prophetic litigation. This Article proffers three main ratio-
nales for these cases. The first rationale-often the lawyer's primary
motivation for initiating the litigation-is instigation of political activ-
ity and influence upon public debate. The second justification-usu-
ally not actually motivating the lawyer-is that the litigation speaks to
future generations and that, although the case may lose in court, its
arguments may be recognized as law later on. The third rationale is
the least obvious yet most valuable contribution of this kind of litiga-
tion-the construction of a culture of legal struggle.
A. Litigation as Political Agitation
The tactic of framing radical demands in terms of established
rights in order to inspire political action has a long history. "[I]t is
often from within [the] very rhetoric" of law, wrote E.P. Thompson,
"that a radical critique of the practice of society is developed."8 6 The
belief in a minimal "right to subsistence" was a central factor in many
feudal peasant revolts.8 7 British radicals of the eighteenth century de-
veloped a critique of society that exploited the rhetoric of rights.88
"[O] ne of the most successful elementary forms of mobilization... is
the claim for the return of rights believed to have been illegally re-
moved or denied."8 9 History repeatedly has demonstrated the "im-
mense symbolic power of an emancipatory vision of natural rights."90
From this perspective, the appropriateness of a given legal strategy
84 Bell, supra note 71, at 10. For the noted psychoanalyst Viktor E. Frankl, the mean-
ing of life for many people lies in the dignity with which they confront injustice or tragic
situations. FRtANK., supra note 40, at 78, 114-17. Frankl deplores modem society's confla-
tion of being valuable with achieving one's goals and being successful and happy.
85 Justice William Brennan has proffered a similar explanation for his repeated dis-
sents on capital punishment. For Brennan, these dissents are repeated not for their useful-
ness but as expressions of his own conscience. These dissents state: "Here I draw the line."
William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 437 (1986).
86 EDWARD P. THOMPSON, WHIGS & HUNTERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACT 265
(1976).
87 SeeJAMES C. SCOTT, THE MORAL ECONOMY OF THE PEASANT 189 (1976).
88 THOMPSON, supra note 86.
89 J.P. NETrL, POLrrICAL MOBILIzATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF METHODS AND
CONCEPTS 247 (1967); see alsoJOEL E. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM
209-22 (1978); STUART S. SHIENGOLD, THE POLITIC OF RIGHTS 131 (1974).
90 Hartog, supra note 81, at 1016.
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should be assessed not solely by the likelihood of success in court, but
also by the role it plays in advancing a popular movement.91
In some of the cases I discuss, the litigation attracted significant
media attention and invoked a broad popular response. The women's
movement in the 1870s, and to a lesser extent the plant closing move-
ment over 100 years later, effectively energized people around the
country.92 Both cases were brought in political climates that were, if
not sympathetic, at least not totally hostile, and their invocations of
fights rang true to substantial sections of society.93
When, however, either the legal theory seems implausible to the
overwhelming majority of the population, or the political climate is
very hostile, litigation falls to provoke much reaction. The abolitionist
lawyers faced the first problem, Plessy's lawyers the second. 94
Some courts have questioned whether litigation brought for the
purpose of provoking public dialogue and debate is legitimate. For
example, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals imposed Rule 11
sanctions on the attorneys for fifty-five Libyan citizens and residents
who sued for damages resulting from the 1986 United States air strike
on Libya.95 Although the district court found that plaintiffs' counsel
"surely knew" that "the case offered no hope whatsoever of success,"
and that it had been "brought as a public statement of protest" against
President Reagan's actions,96 it declined to impose Rule 11 sanctions
because federal courts "serve in some respects as a forum for making
such statements, and should continue to do so."97 The court of ap-
peals, however, held that Rule 11 sanctions were warranted because
" [w] e do not conceive it a proper function of a federal court to serve
as a forum for 'protests.' "98
91 See ARTHUR KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL 71 (1983).
92 See infra parts Ill.B, D.
93 For example, in the case of voting rights, President Grant and a senator from New
York were sympathetic to Susan B. Anthony and her compatriots. See infra text accompany-
ing note 236.
94 At times, losing cases will promote political discourse that can affect political deci-
sions by government officials. When the case attracts significant public attention, public
officials are often forced to respond irrespective of the outcome in courts. See Harold
Hongju Koh, Transnational Publik Law Litigation, 100 YALE Lj. 2347, 2349, 2368-69 (1991)
(describing transnationa case that seeks to use litigation to spur the political process). For
example, the New Jersey Slave Case lost in courts, but promoted a public discussion that
resulted in the NewJersey legislature prohibiting slavery in that state. See infra notes 168-83
and accompanying text.
95 Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (Buckley, Ginsburg,
and Sentelle), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990).
96 Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319, 322 (D.D.C. 1988).
97 Id.
98 Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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Commentators have criticized the court of appeals' decision. 99
Yet even some forceful critics agree that courts do not exist as public
forums. 100 But as this Article demonstrates, from the early history of
the American Republic onward, courts have been utilized by political
movements to further public debate on important constitutional is-
sues. Indeed, as one commentator noted, a "considerable amount of
civil rights litigation" is in some sense a "public statement of pro-
test."10 Courts are not merely forums to settle private parties' dis-
putes, but can function, and have functioned, as forums in which
broad public issues are debated, as attested by the enormous press
coverage given to, and public fascination with, the Supreme Court.
The legitimacy of this type of litigation is thus not dependent on
whether it attempts to speak to a broader public and spark political
debate, but on whether the plaintiffs have a nonfrivolous legal
claim. 10 2 Although a party's motivation of provoking public debate
will not legitimize an otherwise frivolous claim, neither will such moti-
vation delegitimate a nonfrivolous lawsuit.
The parties in all the cases discussed in this Article had reason-
able legal claims.10 3 Indeed, in our Central American litigation, ex-
isting law was often on our side. The reason that many of the cases
discussed in this Article had little chance of success was the political
and social climate in which they were brought, not the validity of the
plaintiffs' legal theories. The argument that segregation by race vio-
lated the 14th Amendment was as "nonfrivolous" in 1890 as it was in
1950. It was the political climate in 1890 that made even counsel for
Plessy realize the hopelessness of a favorable outcome in the Supreme
Court, not the weakness of his legal argument. Similarly, our foreign
affairs cases in the 1980s were brought on very sound legal grounds,
and indeed, at times we won in the lower courts. In fact, we were
often attempting to litigate the conflict between existing law and the
courts' refusal to enforce that law.
99 Anthony D'Amato, The Imposition of Attorney Sanctions for Claims ArisingFrom the U.S.
Air Raid on Libya, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1990); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated in Civil
Rights Cases, 36 ViLL. L. REv. 105, 118-19 (1991).
100 D'Amato, supra note 99, at 706.
101 Tobias, supra note 99, at 119.
102 The recent Rule 11 amendments make clear that sanctions are not appropriate
when a party's contentions "are warranted by existing law or by nonfrivolous argument for
the extension, modification or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law."
FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (b) (2); Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 580 (1993).
103 The Advisory Committee's notes to the 1993 Rule 11 Amendments provide gui-
dance as to the meaning of nonfrivolous arguments for extensions, modifications, or rever-
sal of existing law or for the creation of new law. A court should consider whether the
litigant has support for its theories "even in minority opinions or law reviews" before deter-
mining that a position is frivolous. FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993).
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The litigation described in this Article was brought to provoke
public debate and agitation precisely because the attorneys and clients
involved thought they had both justice and a correct interpretation of
the law; yet, the courts were likely to be unsympathetic to their claims.
The main aim of these litigations was to provoke enough debate and
dialogue to force either the Court or Congress to support their per-
spective: litigation was but one tool to achieve that result.
B. Pentimentos of Law
Even when prophetic litigation loses in court, it often functions,
like important dissenting opinions, as an appeal to future genera-
tions.10 4 These losing cases keep alive an oppressed community's vi-
sion of the law, which collides and interacts with the state's law,
sometimes ultimately transforming the state's law, albeit decades, or
even centuries later.
The view that losing cases, like dissents, do not affect legal rules,
is ahistorical. To interpret the current normative order as fixed ne-
glects the order's historical roots and potential for growth. However,
law, like art, is best understood as consisting of layers of meaning em-
bedded under the present normative reality.10 5 The pentimentos 0 6
of law are the narratives of struggle throughout the centuries.
104 Justice Hughes argued: "A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the
brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may
possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been
betrayed." CHARLEs E. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1928).
Although at times a dissenting opinion can sway the majority, judges and commentators
have generally concurred with Hughes that the main influence dissents have is on future
generations. See, e.g., Harlan F. Stone, Dissenting Opinions Are Not Without Value, 26 J. AM.
JUDICATURE Soc'Y 78 (1942) ("[T]he dissenting opinion is likely to be without any discern-
able influence in the case in which it is written. Its real influence, if it ever has any, comes
later, often in shaping and sqmetimes in altering the course of the law."). Justice Brennan
noted that often a dissent is "offered as a corrective-in the hope that the Court will mend
the error of its ways in a later case." Brennan, supra note 85, at 430. The best dissents
"seek to sow seeds for future harvest." Id. Justice Stanley Fuld of the New York Court of
Appeals agreed with Justice Douglas that although "it may serve no immediate purpose in
the case at hand, the dissent 'may salvage for tomorrow the principle that was sacrificed or
forgotten today.'" Stanley H. Fuld, The Voices of Dissent, 62 COLUM. L. Rnv. 923, 928 (1962)
(quoting William 0. Douglas, The Dissent: A Safeguard of Demwcracy, 32 J. AM. JUDICATURE
Soc'y 104, 107 (1948)); see also CHARLES P. CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 75 (1947)
(The dissent is a formal appeal by the court to the future.).
105 Scholars thus need to look beyond legal rules, by rediscovering forgotten narratives
to find "what went unsaid in the formal legal texts." Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath
Everything That Grows": Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 819, 826; see also
Hartog, supra note 81, at 1029-33 ("Largely banished from the domain of constitutional
history have been the activities and beliefs of all who were not official interpreters.").
106 Artists use the term pentimento to refer to a change the painter has made in the
painting, which she then covers with a new layer of paint. As the paint ages, the covering
pigment sometimes becomes transparent, and the lower layer shows through, revealing the
artist's first statement and subsequent change. The term is derived from the Italian word
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"Every 'renaissance,' every 'reformation' reaches back into an
often distant past to recover forgotten or neglected elements with
which there is a sudden sympathetic vibration, a sense of empathy, of
recognition."1 0 7 Brown v. Board of Education cannot be fully under-
stood without uncovering the efforts of Charles Houston, Albion
Tourgee, and the radical abolitionists-all of whom contributed in
some way to the Brown narrative-and Brown itself spurs a narrative of
enforcement and disappointment that continues today. Some of
these layers might have directly influenced the decision in Brown:
Charles Houston's strategy and dedication in the 1930s and 1940s
comes to mind. 08 Other layers might have a more indirect, theoreti-
cal link, such as the radical abolitionist theory of equality rediscovered
as an important aspect of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.109 Some layers might influence the path of decision by a circui-
tous and fortuitous route, like Justice Robert Jackson's rediscovery of
and fascination with Albion Tourgee's brief in P/essy during the course
of the Supreme Court's deliberation over the constitutionality of seg-
regation in the 1950s.110 Still other layers might be totally obscured
beneath more recent painting.
Prophetic litigation arises out of an oppressed community and
reflects that community's legal vision and aspirations. When the
state's courts reject that legal vision, the community-if it is commit-
ted to its view-does not acquiesce in the court's ruling, but rather
continues to struggle through various channels to reverse the court's
interpretation. The losing litigation becomes a part of the commu-
nity's understanding of its view of the law and a reflection of the com-
munity's commitment to struggle for its view. The community's law
exists in tension with the state's law. The late Robert Cover argued
that transformative-as well as sectarian-communities could main-
tain law independent from, and in opposition to, the state's law. For
Cover, "within the domain of constitutional meaning," albeit not in
the realm of social control, these communities "create law as fully as
does the judge.""' That law constantly jars with the dominant law,
forcing the state either to adjust its law or to use force to repress the
alternative law.
for repentance. OXFORD DICrIONARY oF ART 378 (N.Y. 1988). Lillian Hellman popularized
the term in her book, PENTIMENTO, A BOOK OF PoRTRArrs (1973).
107 YOSEF H. YERUSHALMI, ZAKHOR: JEWISH HISORY r JEWISH MEMORY 113 (1989),
quoted in Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model
in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 -ARv. L. REv. 813, 813-14 (1993).
108 See RICHARD KLUGER, SiMPLYJuSTICE (1976).
109 See infra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
110 C. Vann Woodward, The Case of the Louisiana Traveler in QuARRELs THAT HAVE
SHAPED THE CONSrrrtnON 158 (J. Garraty ed., 1962).
1I Cover, supra note 18, at 28.
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A community's creation of its own law requires two key ingredi-
ents: narrative and commitment. 1 2 "The narrative is a story of strug-
gle between moral ideals and recalcitrant social reality."" 3 Narratives
represent a community's traditions in which its understandings of the
law are encoded.
Losing prophetic litigation plays a dual role in creating a commu-
nity's legal narratives. First, the litigation itself represents a narrative
of resistance, usually intertwined with a broader political and social
struggle. Our Central American litigation was a secondary, but impor-
tant, part of the struggle against U.S. intervention in that region." 4
The fugitive slave litigation represented a narrative of resistance-in-
tertwined with the heroic narratives of escape, demonstrations, and
election campaigns-of the abolitionist movement. The stories of
these litigation efforts, along with other narratives, contain the legal
principles, visions of justice, and social contexts that constitute a
movement's law, just as the decisions of the courts serve that function
for the state.
Second, prophetic litigation results in judicial decisions that rec-
ord the legal theories and factual narratives of the community. At
times, the court merely describes the complaint and then summarily
dismisses it, as happened in some of our Central American litiga-
tion." 3 At other times, the judicial decision, while denying relief, viv-
idly records the narrative of injustice and resistance and even
expresses sympathy.'1 6 In other cases, the court engages and analyzes
the movement's argument and concludes that no right has been vio-
lated." 7 And sometimes-Pessy being the paradigm-the case results
in a ringing dissent that writes into the United States Reports the argu-
ments and even the phrases proffered by the plaintiffs. In all of these
cases, some record exists to which future generations can look.
Litigation-even losing litigation-can thus be an important fo-
rum for a narrative development that is central to the creation of a
redemptive community's alternative legal meaning. Yet losing litiga-
112 Id. at 7; see also Susan Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. Rzv.
1390 (1992) (explicating Cover's thesis and applying it to professional ethics).
113 Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 1, 61
(1989).
114 The recent Haitian litigation is an example of prophetic litigation that, at least for
one year, became the primary narrative in an overall struggle against the U.S. govern-
ment's Haitian refugee policy. Other components of that narrative were the refugees' own
stories, the work of the refugee advocacy community in the U.S. to publicize the refugees'
plight, the civil disobedience demonstrations against the U.S. government's policy, and
President Aristide's protests against U.S. policy.
115 See infra part IV.A.
116 See, e.g., the Youngstown litigation described infra notes 332-56 and accompanying
text
117 See, e.g., the woman's suffrage case, Minor v. Happersett, 163 U.S. 552 (1896) (dis-
cussed infra notes 242-53 and accompanying text).
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don may also debilitate that process, for the narrative's ending is usu-
ally a judicial decision that attempts to destroy the very legal meaning
the community seeks to create. 118 From this perspective, prophetic
litigation, as a mechanism of creating alternative legal meaning, may
be regarded as self-defeating. A better strategy would be to utilize the
political arena and not to resort to the courts. Even if defeats were
suffered in the political process, those losses would not as definitively
cut off development of the law.
Yet even when a dispositive court decision rejects the substantive
legal meaning the redemptive movement seeks to create, the move-
ment still leaves behind a narrative of resistance. The lesson learned
by future generations is not that the substantive goal was lost, but that
a movement and their lawyers found the courage, energy, and creativ-
ity to resist injustice in the face of overwhelming odds. As I will discuss
in the next section, that narrative of struggle can be more important
than the substantive doctrinal development of legal meaning.
Moreover, judicial decisions, including those of the Supreme
Court, do not always destroy a community's vision of the law. The
Plessy decision did not convince the African-American community that
separate but equal was consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment.
Rather, the decision served as a symbol of injustice that Charles Hous-
ton and others could rally people to fight to overturn. The women
suffragists of the 1870s did not accept the dominant constitutional
ideology after their defeat in the Supreme Court, even as they
refocused their efforts in the legislatures. In 1878, Elizabeth Cady
Stanton still contended that the Fourteenth Amendment had "no set-
fled interpretation."'"19 Similarly, the Vietnam War cases did not deter
us in the 1980s from resorting to the courts to fight U.S. intervention
abroad. Instead, they were symbols of resistance to the activist com-
munity. Cover's work recognizes that court decisions both destroy the
legal meanings of communities who acquiesce in the superior power
of the state and "escalate the commitments of those who remain to
resist."120
Litigation is also a mechanism by which the community may
demonstrate its commitment to its own narrative. Faced with state
118 See MARK DE WoLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNEss 3-5 (1965).
I must remind you however, that a great many Americans... tend to think
that because a majority of thejustices have the power to bind us by their law
they are also empowered to bind us by their history. Happily that is not the
case. Each of us is entirely free to find his history in other places than the
pages of the United States reports.
Howe thus suggests that the narratives of redemptive or insular communities normally de-
velop outside of official sources, particularly the courts.
119 Hartog, sup-ra note 81, at 1032.
120 Cover, supra note 18, at 60.
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conduct that it finds fundamentally wrong, the community can either
acquiesce in the state's view of the law or develop ways to maintain its
own vision of law. Cover discusses civil disobedience and other meth-
ods of struggle that subject the group to the state's violence as strong
methods of demonstrating the group's commitment to its view of the
law.' 21 Often, however, a group develops modes of resistance that re-
quire some accommodation (staying out of jail, for example) while
still challenging the state's law.122 Litigation can be one of those
modes.
Any complex and vibrant political movement offers a variety of
forms of resistance to oppressive state policies. Civil disobedience or
violence "is not the only way in which commitment operates to consti-
tute law for a community."1 23 Opposition may be demonstrated
through simple speech.' 24 The expenditure of time and emotional
and physical energy involved in confronting the state also requires a
commitment, even if the confrontation is not one that is likely to lead
to violence. 125 Demonstrating against U.S. policy and organizing
friendship committees to send material aid to Latin American com-
munities affected by U.S. policies helped to deepen commitment to
the norms prohibiting U.S. intervention, but did not directly provoke
state violence.126 Similarly, litigation entails a significant temporal
and emotional commitment to an alternative vision of the law even
though it conforms with the ruling regime's procedures for expres-
sing dissent.
Litigation is thus a means of demonstrating commitment. For
many people who dedicate their public lives to this form of struggle, it
reflects a commitment that puts them outside of mainstream dis-
course and career paths. Many of the litigators described in Part III of
this Article could have had more prominent careers if they were not
121 Id. at 52.
122 Groups such as the Quakers and the Amish create a "jurisprudence that orders the
forms and occasions of confrontation, ajurisprudence of resistance that is necessarily also
one of accommodation." Id.
123 Robert M. Cover, Bringing the Messiah Through the Law: A Case Study, in RELIGION,
MORALITY, AND THE LAW: NOMOS XXX 201, 204 (J. Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman
eds., 1988).
124 Cover uses Abraham Lincoln's comments on the Dred Scott decision as an example
of a challenge to the Court's authoritative interpretation, one that suffers from its "attempt
to separate completely" the social meaning created by the Court's decision "from the de-
cree that is its direct exercise of power." See Cover, supra note 18, at 53-54 n.146.
125 Cover notes that "[t]hose who would offer a law different from that of the state will
not be satisfied with a rule that permits them to speak without living their law." Id. at 49.
126 For a sample of the articles discussing the protests against U.S. intervention in Cen-
tral America, see Peter Perl, Old Faces, New Groups to Protest U.S. Actions, WAsH. Posr, Oct.
28, 1983, at A9; Peter Perl & Caryle Murphy, Opposing Groups Air Latin America iews at
Vrietnam Memoria WASH. PosTJuly 3, 1983, at Al; Monte R. Young, 6 Arrested atDemonstra-
tion, NEWSDAY, Feb. 18, 1988, at 25.
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committed to action and litigation on behalf of their beliefs. In a
sense, the decision to challenge governmental policy through what is
seen by the profession as hopelessly radical, utopian litigation risks
not death or injury, "but a form of madness."' 27
Even when a movement has kept alive its vision of law through a
strong commitment to its own narratives, one may still argue that the
earlier losing case played no role in the court's later reversal of its
position. Did Tourgee's losing effort in Plessy have any direct influ-
ence on the Brown decision? Scholars question whether even a power-
ful dissenting opinion contributes to later doctrinal change in a causal
sense: "When a new generation of judges engages in overruling, the
historical dissent may provide nothing more than some quotable sup-
port for a decision that would have been the same in any event." 28
Another scholar is more acerbic:
,Was the Supreme Court of 1954 dependent upon, or even substan-
tially influenced by, the wisdom of Mr. Justice Harlan when it dis-
covered that "separate but equal" had become a constitutional non
sequitur? To so frame the question[ ] is to require answers that I
believe to be obviously in the negative. 129
These critics fail to understand the sometimes imperceptible pen-
timento effect of both dissenting opinions and losing litigation. Yet
their critique of the instrumentalist justification has some persuasive
force, and the defense of dissents has been refocused somewhat away
from their role in later judicial reversals towards a structural, process-
oriented justification. Dissents are perceived as valuable in contribut-
ing to our democratic culture by promoting divergent views,130 the
marketplace of ideas,131 and a vision of law "as a mosaic ... of...
127 See Cover, supra note 123, at 204.
128 Maurice Kelman, The Forked Path of Dissent, 1985 Sup. Cr. REv. 227, 255.
129 Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A Histoy ofjudicial Disinte-
gration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 211 n.129 (1959). Moreover, the vast majority of dissents
never become law. Fuld, supra note 104, at 927. Even Justice Holmes, the "Great Dis-
senter," whose dissenting opinions became law to an unusual degree, had fewer than one-
tenth of his 173 dissenting opinions recognized as valid in the substance of later decisions.
ZoBell, supra, at 211.
130 Justice Douglas termed dissents a "safeguard of democracy." Douglas, supra note
104, at 104. For him "disagreement amongjudges is as true to the character of democracy
as freedom of speech itself." Id. at 105. Dissent for Douglas plays a role similar to that of
prophetic litigation: it fosters the concept of law's uncertainty. Divergent readings of the
Constitution do not undermine but rather further respect for the Constitution and are
critical to democratic governance. Id. at 106. Other scholars have echoed Douglas and
referred to dissents as acts of institutional disobedience, akin to civil disobedience, that
seeks to give law new meaning.
131 Justice Brennan believes that dissents perform the function of providing vigorous
debate, thus making the resulting collection of opinions resemble the "product of ajudi-
cial town meeting." Brennan, supra note 85, at 430. Infusing different ideas and methods
of analysis into judicial decisionmaking prevents the process from becoming stale.
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perceptions at variance with the dominant vision."'13 2 So too, the pri-
mary justification for losing prophetic litigation is to be found in its
role in the development of an American culture of constitutional
struggle.
C. A Culture of Legal Struggle
Although each of the litigators I will describe in Part III advanced
an important substantive view of justice, their legacies are not
founded primarily on changes in legal rules-even if their views even-
tually were adopted by the courts. Rather, the prophetic litigator's
main contribution is aiding the development of a culture of legal
struggle that continually informs and inspires future generations to
challenge oppressive practices. This uniquely American legal culture
of struggle, while riot religious, is deeply spiritual and has much in
common with a view of justice articulated by the Old Testament
prophets.
Our society's key metaphor for justice-the traditional scales of
justice-connotes the ideals of balance, equipoise, detachment, and
congruence. 133 In contrast to the tranquil order that the scales ofjus-
tice conjure, the prophetic vision of justice calls forth the image of a
mighty, turbulent, cascading river:
But let judgment roll down as waters,
and righteousness as a mighty stream.13 4
For Abraham Heschel, this central prophetic image expresses
that "U]ustice is not a mere norm, but a fighting challenge, a restless
drive." 135 The mighty stream is "expressive of the vehemence of a
never-ending, surging, fighting movement."136 The Reverend Martin
Luther King, Jr., turned to Amos's stream metaphor in his "I Have a
Dream" speech, employing the imagery of justice as struggle, not
merely a norm. 137 Robert Kennedy also invoked the idea that small,
even futile acts against injustice feed the stream of struggle for justice.
In Capetown, South Africa, almost thirty years ago he said:
It is from numberless diverse acts of courage and belief that human
history is shaped. Each time a man stands up for an ideal, or acts to
improve the lot of others, or strikes out against injustice, he sends a
tiny ripple of hope, and crossing each other from a million different
132 J. Louis Campbell HI, The Spirt of Dissen, 66JUDICATURE 304, 307 (1983) (As pro-
test, dissents reflect the "innate nature and exigence of law in contemporary society as a
mosaic.").
133 HESCHEL, supra note 16, at 212.
134 Amos 5:24 (King James).
135 HESCHEL, supra note 16, at 212.
136 Id.
137 The entire speech is reprinted in the ST. Louis PosT-DIsPATcH,Jan. 15, 1990, at 3B.
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centers of energy and daring these ripples will build a current which
can sweep down the mightiest walls of oppression and resistance.18 8
Justice is not, therefore, merely the technical legal process em-
ployed to reach a judgment, nor even the set of norms that might
constitute ajust society, but the continual, turbulent process of strug-
gle. Substantive justice must be linked to this dynamic movement if it
is to maintain its meaning. If justice is the mighty stream of struggle
against oppression, these losing efforts constitute the myriad rivulets
that constantly feed that stream and inspire further struggle.
Litigators who bring cases that they know are uphill battles must
be able to draw upon some cultural or familial tradition of struggle.'3 9
A complex set of motivations drives them to forsake conventional
goals in favor of social causes. We generally perceive the primary and
often sole motivation to be outrage against the injustice being chal-
lenged. Yet another important motivation for rebels is identification
with a tradition of protest. The spiritual aspect of struggle develops
over generations of difficulty, suffering, losing struggles, and
defeats. 140
It might appear paradoxical that losing causes can inspire hope
and create a culture of struggle. Our intuitive sense is that victory
engenders hope and inspires further struggle. Indeed, the dominant
American culture glorifies success and achievement; we pride our-
selves as a country that emerges victorious. Yet the cultures of op-
pressed peoples are often defined and held together by the memories
of defeats, massacres, or martyrs. 14 1 History offers numerous exam-
ples of martyrs and defeated movements that serve as spiritual symbols
of resistance. The memory of a defeated guerilla fighter who man-
aged to stymie the U.S. Marines for almost a decade before being as-
138 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Foreword to ROBERT KENNEDY, IN His OWN WoRDs at xvii-
xviii (Edwin 0. Guthman &Jeffrey Schulman eds., 1988) (quoting Robert Kennedy's 1966
speech); see also D. Trigonis, Foreword: A Ripple of Hope, 1 TEMP. POL. & Civ. Rrs. L. REV. 1
(1992) (quoting same speech).
139 Louis Brandeis once remarked, in reference to his bitter confirmation battle, that
"eighteen centuries ofJewish persecution must have enured me to such hardships." RoB-
ERT A. BuRT, Two JEWSH JUSTICES 33, 118-23 (1988).
140 KOVEL, supra note 72, at 200-02; see alsoJAMFs LuTrHER ADAms: ON BEING HUMAN
RELGIOUSLY 109 (1976) (a prophetic idea emerged in reaction to the weakness of Israel in
the face of the overwhelming strength of the great powers); FRANKL, supra note 40, at 93
(difficult circumstances often allow people to grow spiritually); Stone, supra note 104, at
883 n.399 (quoting Psalms 45:3, 1 The Midrash On Psalms 450 (William G. Bravde trans.,
1959) ("[W]hen you have gone down to the very bottom of the pit, in that hour I shall
redeem you.")).
141 See, e.g., William Wiecek, Preface to the Historical Race Relations Symposium, 17 RUTGERS
LJ. 407, 412 (1986) (for oppressed people, their past oppression is the "crucible of their
identity and their cohesion"); PatriciaJ. Williams, Alchemical Notes: ReconstructingIdealsfrom
Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401, 417 (1987) ("The individual and unify-
ing cultural memory of black people is the helplessness, the uncontrollability of living
under slavery.").
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sassinated helped to sustain the 1979 Nicaraguan revolution. 42 The
narrative of the Jewish Warsaw Ghetto uprising against the Nazis
might be interpreted as a reminder that overwhelming force prevails
against poorly armed resistance fighters, or that the Jews were aban-
doned by the Poles and Allied nations. However, the prophetic
message of that resistance narrative is that people can struggle even
when faced with overwhelming odds, and that through struggle they
may achieve a spiritual victory over their oppressors. 143 That lesson is
a critical component of the narratives created by the legal movements
discussed in this Article.
Of course, litigation and law are not ideally structured for the
development of that message. But the idea of justice is. And in a
nation like ours, where the idea of justice historically has been at-
tached to courts and judicial proceedings, it is inevitable that lawyers
who are connected with radical social movements will introduce their
struggles into the judicial arena even when they recognize that their
chances of success are small.
I make no special claim for the particular strategic usefulness of
prophetic litigation as compared with other forms of political and so-
cial action. Indeed, it could be argued that the development of a legal
culture around aspirational cases is counterproductive in that it raises
false hopes or encourages undue optimism in thejudicial system.'44 I
142 Augusto Cesar Sandino led a peasant army against U.S. Marines and Anastasio
Somoza's American-trained National Guard. When several students founded an organiza-
tion to revive Nicaragua's national liberation movement, they called in the Sandinista Na-
tional Liberation Front (FSLN) to honor Sandino's struggle. Sandino's memory and ideas
were the basis of the activities of the FSLN. GARY RUCHWARGER, PEOPLE IN POWER, FORGING
A GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACy IN NICARAGUA 8-11 (1987).
143 Yu~i SUHL, THEY FOUGHT BACK 4-6 (1975) (discussing the significance of the Jewish
resistance).
144 See Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1363, 1385-86 (1984) (ques-
tioning whether rights claims actually facilitate social activism); see also THE POLrnCs OF
LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRMTIQUE (David Rairys ed., 2d ed. 1990) (collection of essays on the
role of law and rights in progressive movement); Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist
Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REv. 387 (1984) (discussing statutory rape laws to
examine the struggle for women's rights); President's Page, 36 STAN. L. REv. i (1984) (sym-
posium issue devoted to a collection of articles by Critical Legal Studies scholars); Eliza-
beth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspective From the Women's Movemen
61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589 (1986) (discussing and disagreeing with the Critical Legal Studies
critique of rights). I have sought to address some of those issues in A LEss THAN PERFECT
UNION (Lobel ed., 1988). See also Hartog, supra note 81, at 1015 (discussing the study of
constitutional-rights consciousness). Professor Robin West has recently explored the mer-
its of what she terms progressive constitutional skepticism and progressive constitutional
faith. Robin L. West, Constitutional Scepticism, 72 B.U. L. REv. 765, 792-799 (1992). She
recognizes some of the contradictions inherent in the tradition of progressive constitu-
tional faith-a tradition that I would argue is similar to the prophetic tradition described
herein. It is "at one and the same time, utterly futile, deeply utopian, absolutely necessary,
terribly risky, and one of the most imaginative, fecund, and important shared enterprises
presently ongoing in the legal academy." Id. at 798.
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do not argue that the litigation described herein necessarily had a pos-
itive effect in its era, or that it was more effective than other methods
of resistance. My argument is that from a prophetic perspective, litiga-
tion, like other forms of resistance to oppression, helps build a spiri-
tual or cultural consciousness that motivates people to struggle against
injustice.
The main legacy of prophetic litigators is their contribution to
the uniquely American culture of faith in constitutional rights. Profes-
sor Hendrick Hartog defines such consciousness as: "[A] faith that
the received meanings of constitutional texts will change when con-
fronted by the legitimate aspirations of autonomous citizens and
groups. Such a faith has survived even when aspirations ran contrary
to ruling doctrines of constitutional law."' 45 The emancipatory vision
of natural rights, rooted in the subversive and utopian messages that
people read into constitutional texts "has justified continued struggle
by groups in the face of (presumably temporary) judicial and political
defeats."146
The reasons for the constitutional faith and rights consciousness
of Americans are too complex to be explored fully here.' 47 What does
seem clear is that the tradition of litigating the aspirations of op-
pressed groups is firmly entrenched and long preceded the explosion
of civil rights litigation of the 1960s. The American Revolution's reli-
ance on natural law principles probably gave rise to this tradition.
The Constitution's open-ended clauses and the Supreme Court's rec-
ognition of judicial review of legislative and executive acts certainly
contribute to this tradition. Other factors, such as the decentraliza-
tion of American society and courts, gave hope to groups offering
their own interpretations of the law. That litigators and political
movements continually press their radical views in the courts also
plays an important role in sustaining the American tradition of consti-
tutionally-grounded aspirational struggle.
The abolitionist movement was one of the first major struggles in
this radical constitutional tradition. As one commentator has noted,
"the long contest over slavery did more than any other cause to stimu-
late the development of an alternative rights conscious interpretation
of the federal constitution."148 The nineteenth century women's
movement and the equal rights movement for the former slaves was
built explicitly on the abolitionist tradition. The aspirational visions
developed by these movements have now been accepted as critical
145 Hartog, supra note 81, at 1014.
146 Id. at 1016.
147 See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTrrTTONAL FAITH (1988) (comparing our view of
the Constitution to civic religion).
148 Hartog, supra note 81, at 1017.
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components of our constitutional order. But of equal importance,
the persistent legal-political struggles they embodied helped to create
and nurture the faith in aspirational constitutional struggle that, for
good or bad, continues to thrive. When mainstream constitutional
interpretation falls people, constitutional struggle is a legitimate and
potentially empowering response. As Professor Otto Olsen, the biog-
rapher of Albion Tourgee and editor of a documentary history of the
Pessy case, has argued:
It would be, however, a most limited appreciation of the memory of
these crusaders that would identify their efforts only with a now
popular and much more successful struggle for racial justice....
[T]he tradition of Plessy encompasses a great deal more. That tradi-
tion represents a determined commitment to the rights of all man-
kind in the face of the greatest odds.... The memory of Plessy will
be properly recalled only to the extent that there are still those pos-
sessed of the conscience and the courage to fight for causes that
may not achieve respectability for generations .... 149
The extent to which issues of constitutional interpretation occupy
legal scholars and their publications reflects the American people's
insistence that the Constitution incorporate their aspirations. That in-
sistence may lead Americans to place too much faith, time, and energy
in constitutional litigation. But the continued persistence of constitu-
tional rights consciousness, initiated by the radical abolitionists and
furthered by the women's, labor, and civil rights movements assures
the "essentially contested"15° nature of constitutional interpretation.
The efforts of some legal scholars, politicians, and courts to articulate
conclusive constitutional interpretations based on textual analysis or
the original intent of the Framers' 5 ' are destined to fail in the face of
aspirational struggle, which insists on flexibility and flux. If textual
analysis or originalism was "conclusive of struggles for legal rights,
then those who lost in court should have either accepted the loss as
legal and slunk into passivity or insisted on power through nonlegal
means."' 52 The litigators discussed in Part III of this Article did
neither, and this refusal to give in contributed to the development of
a political-legal culture that views the Constitution as an arena of
struggle rather than a static, determinative text. The Constitution is
thus an "invitation to struggle" in large part because of the efforts of
149 OLsEN, supra note 10, at 27-28.
150 Cover, supra note 18, at 17.
151 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY THE JUDICIARY. THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL.
L. REV. 979, 982 (1987); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1 (1971) (discussing the Supreme Court and the demand for
principles).
152 Hartog, supra note 81, at 1031.
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the political movements and the prophetic litigators discussed in the
next Part of this Article.
III
PROPHETIC LITIGATION IN AMERICAN HISTORY
Radical reform litigation did not commence in the 1950s and
1960s, as many people believe; it is deeply ingrained in the American
legal culture. This discussion presents the narratives of four such liti-
gation campaigns: the radical constitutional abolitionists of the 1840s
and 1850s; a subset of the post-Civil War women's movement known
as the New Departure, which flourished in the 1870s; Plessy v. Fergu-
son153 in the 1890s; and the litigation against plant closings in Youngs-
town, Ohio in the 1980s.
This Part has several purposes. The first is to preserve four im-
portant narratives of resistance for future litigators and movements.
The second is to illustrate how each exemplified prophetic litigation.
The third is to explore how the litigators in each case resolved the
conflict between focusing narrowly on a winnable legal issue and
bringing an ideological attack on injustice. The final purpose is to
analyze the campaigns in terms of the values of prophetic litigation:
instigating political action; preserving legal arguments for future gen-
erations; and inspiring a culture of legal struggle.
A. Radical Constitutional Abolitionists
During the late 1830s and early 1840s, abolitionists developed a
radical theory of the Constitution as an antislavery document.154 They
developed this theory primarily to spur antislavery political agitation
and sentiment in the North. While attracting relatively few followers,
they contributed to an enormous growth in antislavery law that was
ultimately incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Their con-
stitutional arguments also provided an important foundation for the
great equal rights struggles of the latter part of the nineteenth
century.
The radical constitutional theory of the abolitionists drew heavily
on natural rights ideas, supported by the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. Their constitutional interpretation maintained that only clear
and unequivocal textual support for slavery could override natural
153 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
154 WiLLIAM GOODELL, VIEWS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1845); Alvan Stewart,
A Constitutional Argument on the Subject of Slavery (1837), reprinted in JOsHuA TENBRoEK,
EQUAL UNDER LAW 281-95, app. B (1965); LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSrrrTIONALrr,
OF SLAVERY (1845).
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law.155 Their theory has been termed "so extreme as to appear triv-
ial,"156 "a questionable theory at best,"157 and "flawed and
disingenuous."' 5 8
The radical abolitionist wing designed its constitutional argument
to sway popular opinion against slavery.15 9 Lysander Spooner, one of
the most prominent radical theorists, argued that five percent of
Northerners were slavery supporters, five percent were abolitionists,
twenty percent were opportunists who would side with the strongest
party, and the remaining seventy percent disliked slavery, but were
unwilling to defy the Constitution. 160 Spooner concluded that the
most important political task facing abolitionists was demonstrating
that the Constitution outlawed slavery.' 6'
Fredrick Douglass, the most famous convert to the radicals' posi-
tion, articulated a similar perspective. Douglass had been a follower
of William Lloyd Garrison, who believed that the Constitution was an
evil, pro-slavery document and opposed participation in the federal
system it established. Douglass later adopted the radical constitu-
tional position because he believed that only dramatic political reform
of the national government would eradicate slavery. A political move-
ment against slavery required a constitutional interpretation that un-
dermined the lawfulness of slavery. To Douglass, Northerners were a
"law abiding people... [who] love order."' 62 The great respect that
155 The constitutional abolitionists developed their position in opposition to two other
widely held abolitionists positions: Garrison's argument that the Constitution was pro-slav-
ery, and a moderate Free Soil abolitionist position that viewed the Constitution as permit-
ting slavery only where the local or state law supported it. See generally WILLIAM WiECEK,
THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 1760-1848, at 202-75 (1977)
(discussing the three antislavery factions and their respective constitutional theories).
156 COVER, supra note 8, at 156.
157 THEODORE C. SMITH, LIBERTY & FREE SOIL PARTIES IN THE NORTHWEST 89 (1967).
158 WiECEK, supra note 155, at 249. William Lloyd Garrison wrote that the radical the-
ory was "ingenious-perhaps as an effort of logic unanswerable." But the radical's theory
ignored the Framers' clear intent to permit slavery in America and for Garrison and the
Taney Court, "Fact is to be preferred to logic; intention is mightier than legal interpreta-
tion." William Lloyd Garrison, Chattel Slavery and Wages Slavery, THE LIBERATOR, OCt. 1,
1847, quoted in ARL.E KRADITOR, MEANS AND ENDS IN AMEICAN ABOLITIONISM 195-96
(1967); see also Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (original intent of Framers out-
weighed any new sense ofjustice developed subsequently).
159 Other abolitionist theories were also based on their political perspectives. The
moderate free soilers developed a constitutional theory designed to win over moderate
Northerners and allay Southern fears. KRAsrrOR, supra note 158, at 188-89. Garrison's
view of the Constitution as a pro-slavery compact furthered his political program of disu-
nion. Id. at 188.
160 Id. at 195. Spooner was merely following John C. Calhoun's characterization of
northern public opinion. Id.
161 Id.
162 Fredrick Douglass, The Dred Scott Decision: An Address Delivered in Part; in New York,
N.Y. inMay 1857, reprinted in3 THE FREDRICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 174 (John Blassingame ed.,
Yale University Press 1985) [hereinafter DOUGLASS PAPERS].
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American society accords the law made it important for Douglass to
argue that slavery was unlawful. He could then say that "all I ask of
the American people is, that they live up to the Constitution, adopt its
principles, imbibe its spirit and enforce its provisions." 63 He de-
manded that the document "be wielded in behalf of
emancipation." 64
The development of a radical constitutionalist theory also coin-
cided with abolitionists' increasing utilization of litigation as an ave-
nue for antislavery action. Until the mid-1830s, antislavery litigation
was treated as a "practical necessity, not as an ideological opportu-
nity."' 65 The gradualism of the more mainstream antislavery move-
ment generally disfavored broad legal attacks on slavery. Moreover,
abolitionists often faced mobs and riots and needed to garner their
precious legal resources to defend themselves from specious
charges.' 66
The rise of militant abolitionism and the changing public climate
in the North encouraged the radicals' broad, ideological attack on
slavery. Lawyers of all the various factions eventually pursued this tac-
tic.' 67 In New Jersey, for example, a group of militant constitutional
abolitionists brought a legal challenge to the constitutionality of slav-
ery in that state. They genuinely hoped to win in court, but their pri-
mary goal was to focus the attention of an indifferent public on their
cause.
168
The case was brought under NewJersey's constitution, ratified in
1844, which stated, "All men are by nature free and independent, and
163 Id. at 188; see also id. at 365-66 (noting that the Constitution does not prohibit the
abolition of slavery).
164 WiLLiAM S. McFEELY, FREDRICK DOUGLASS 169 (1991). The radical constitutionalist
theory also provided an opportunity for abolitionist participation in the political system.
To Robert Cover, the real purpose of what he termed the utopian argument was not to
prove that slavery was unconstitutional, but to convince abolitionists to become judges so
that they could use their power to free slaves. COVER, supra note 8, at 156. The position
that the United States Constitution opposed slavery permitted abolitionists like Fredrick
Douglass to argue that the movement should run candidates for Congress and other
elected offices. DOUGLASS PAPERS, supra note 162, at 866. Spooner's book on the unconsti-
tutionality of slavery was sent to every member of Congress, and Spooner himself sought to
have it distributed to the nation's 30,000 lawyers. LEIis PERRY, RADMAL ABOLITIONISM,
ANARCHY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD IN ANTISLAVERY THOUGHT 204 (1973).
165 COVER, supra note 8, at 160.
166 Paul Finkelman, Introduction to ABOLITONISTS IN NORTHERN COURTS iv (Paul
Finkelman ed., 1988); TENBROEx, supra note 154, at 87.
167 COVER, supra note 8, at 161. While the fugitive slave cases typified the abolitionist
litigation of the two decades prior to the Civil War, id., the abolitionist bar also pursued
other litigation opportunities.
168 David Ernst, Legal Positivism, Abolitionist Litigation and the New Jersey Slave Case of
1845, 4 LAW AND Hisr. REV. 337, 338 (1986). The NewJersey Slave Case of 1845 was really two
cases that were combined and litigated as one case. COVER, supra note 8, at 56.
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have certain natural and unalienable rights .... "169 Shortly after the
adoption of the new New Jersey constitution, the New Jersey State
Anti-Slavery Society resolved to initiate a test case to "settle the ques-
tion of the existence of slavery under the new Constitution."170 The
Society retained Alvan Stewart, a noted New York abolitionist lawyer,
to argue the case. 171 He convinced the Society to argue broadly that
the U.S. Constitution prohibits slavery, and not to base the case solely
on the New Jersey constitution.
The Trenton State Gazette characterized Stewart's argument as re-
markable for "its powerful though disjointed reasoning, its warm ap-
peals to the best feelings of human nature and its ingenious and
copious accumulation of terms of abhorrence and contempt of slav-
ery."'172 Indeed, Stewart's argument was a rambling discourse based
on natural law, the common law, the Preamble to the Constitution,
the Ten Commandments, European and ancient history, the require-
ment of a republican form of government, the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, the New Jersey constitution, and the Treaty of Ghent of
1814.173
Stewart made two key arguments that were to be repeated almost
verbatim by the suffragist movement in the 1870s and the anti-segrega-
tion advocates of the 1880s and 1890s. First he stressed an interpre-
tive method arguing that broad constitutional phrases such as "all
men are by nature free and independent" or "due process of law," or
"Republican form of government" be read consistently with a higher
law, such as the law of nature. 174
Second, Stewart claimed that the law of nature was more than a
set of abstract moral precepts. He claimed that the 1844 New Jersey
constitution had recognized the natural law principle of freedom "in
the most solemn form as a rule of action."'175 Similarly, the Declaration
of Independence was not a mere "rhetorical flourish,"176 but a partic-
ularized mandate, a rule on which courts could act. Finally, Stewart
eschewed legal formalism in favor of a broad political-moral argu-
ment. While he purported to be arguing a dry legal question, 7 7 his
argument reads like a political speech. In his request for relief, he
asked that the "Court set the nation the shining example of doing
169 Ernst, supra note 168, at 342.
170 Id. at 343.
171 Id. 845-48. Stewart had developed a theory that slavery violated the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution.
172 Ernst, supra note 168, at 349.
173 Stewart's argument is reproduced in ABoLmONiTss iN NORTHERN COURTS, supra
note 166, at 442-92.
174 Id. at 463, 478, 482.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 469-70 (emphasis added).
177 Id.
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right on this question, by acting up to the full measure of theirjudicial
and moral power."' 78
The New Jersey Supreme Court, by a three-to-one vote, rejected
Stewart's plea. The justices chose to follow the formalistic reasoning
of the defense counsel, Joseph Bradley, who was later appointed to
the United States Supreme Court.179 Stewart's arguments were, ac-
cording to one member of New Jersey's highest court, "addressed to
the feelings rather than to the legal intelligence of the court."180 The
court interpreted the "free and independent" clause of the state con-
stitution as a mere hortatory provision, which did not provide individ-
ual rights.' 8 ' Only the antislavery Justice Hornblower dissented, and
he did so without writing an opinion.' 82 The New Jersey Slave Case was
thus consigned to history as a loser. The case did, however, accom-
plish the abolitionists' aim of initiating a political debate on slavery,
eventuating in the NewJersey legislature's formally abolishing slavery
in that state.'8 3
Robert Cover has demonstrated that litigating the antislavery
cause led the mainstream abolitionists to constant battle over formal
legal principles instead of the broad moral imperatives: "Instead of
arguing about slavery, the antislavery man found himself arguing
about state court habeas corpus jurisdiction; the appellate authority of
the United States Supreme Court over state court decisions; the
proper bounds of judicial interpretation; and the deference due to
imperfectly articulated legislative policy."18 4 As the New Jersey Slave
Case illustrates, the radical constitutional abolitionists avoided such
"sidetracks" by demanding that public law conform to some moral
ideal, in the absence of explicit defeasance by express legislative ac-
tion. 8 5 They sought to challenge slavery directly, without getting
178 Id. at 470.
179 Justice Bradley's most famous civil rights decision was his opinion in The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), in which he articulated a formalistic reading of the Four-
teenth Amendment to deny Congress the power to prohibit segregation in public inns,
accommodations, and transportation.
180 State v. Post, 20 N.J.L. 368, 369 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1845).
181 Id. at 372.
182 The abolitionists appealed to the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, which
affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court by a 7-1 vote without issuing written opinions.
State v. Post, 21 N.J.L. 699 (N.J. 1848).
183 In Massachusetts, Charles Sumner litigated and lost the Boston School desegrega-
tion case, Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (1 Cush.) 198 (1849). In both NewJersey and
Massachusetts, abolitionists eventually obtained politically through legislative action what
they failed to win in the courts. HAROLD H. Hat As & WiLLIAM M. WIEcEI, EQUALJusTIcE
UNDER LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at 96 (1982) (racial segregation
was prohibited in Boston by statute in 1855); Ernst, supra note 168, at 364 (Abolitionists
won a partial victory in 1846 when the NewJersey legislature formally abolished slavery but
declared the slaves to be apprentices for life.).
184 COVER, supra note 8, at 198.
185 Id.
1362 [Vol. 80:1331
LOSERS, FOOLS & PROPHETS
bogged down in technical questions about jurisdiction and statutory
interpretation. In avoiding such obstacles, however, the radical con-
stitutionalists risked having their theories viewed as too extreme to be
relevant. They made it easy for the courts and the American people
to dismiss them.
As William Wiecek has observed, "In the short run, radical consti-
tutionalism was a failure."'1 86 Although the radicals' program was en-
dorsed by a number of abolitionist conventions and political
organizations such as the Liberty League and attracted several notable
adherents such as Fredrick Douglass, the radicals became more iso-
lated and sectarian as the Civil War drew closer. Their theory never
articulated what most Americans felt to be the essential nature of the
Constitution, and thus it failed as a rallying call. No significant section
of the political, economic, or legal elite adopted the radicals' legal
interpretation. Northern opposition to slavery was increasingly at-
tracted to the more moderate Free Soil and Republican efforts, and
the radical constitutional program had little impact on the great con-
stitutional debates leading to the Civil War.' 8 7
Despite this, the radical constitutionalists had a significant long-
term impact on the law. Robert Cover has argued that:
Their pamphlets, arguments, columns, and books constitute an im-
portant part of the legal literature on slavery, which, I believe,
would substantially eclipse contemporaneous writings in, say, Ameri-
can tort law. Their work reveals a creative pulse that proliferates
principle and precept, commentary and justification, even in the
face of a state legal order less likely to hold slavery unconstitutional
than to declare the imminent kingship ofJesus Christ on Earth. In
the workings of a committed community with common symbols and
discourse, common narratives and interpre [ta] ions, the law unde-
niably grew. 188
Although both the courts and the mainstream antislavery movement
rejected the "law" of the radical constitutionalists, it did not die.
Scholars now recognize that the doctrines developed by this small
band of radicals influenced concepts and clauses that constitute Sec-
tion I of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 9 The doctrines of substantive
due process, equal protection of the laws, paramount national citizen-
ship, and privileges and immunities all have roots in ideas that the
radicals introduced. 90 The natural law theories of the radicals were
given a solid basis in positive law.
186 WIECEK, supra note 155, at 274.
187 Id.
188 Cover, supra note 18, at 39-40 (footnotes omitted).
189 TENBROEK, supra note 154, at 89; see also COVER, supra note 8, at 155.
190 See TENBROEK, supra note 154, at 150.
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Throughout the nineteenth century, radical political movements
continually rearticulated the radical abolitionists' theories. Both the
women's and the civil rights movements after Reconstruction sought
to use the Declaration of Independence and natural rights to inform
their interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The perspec-
tives of these other movements also failed to take root in nineteenth-
century law, but were eventually adopted in the twentieth century. 91
Moreover, several academic theorists in the 1950s resurrected the con-
stitutional abolistionists' theories in their attacks on Plessy v. Ferguson
and its restricted view of the Fourteenth Amendment.192 The aboli-
tionist view of the Constitution prevails among mainstream thinkers
today.193
B. The 1870s Campaign for Women's Suffrage
The post-Civil War women's suffrage movement developed a radi-
cal interpretation of the Constitution that drew upon, and in many
respects mirrored, the radical abolitionists' theory. Each relied heav-
ily on natural law and the Declaration of Independence. Each consti-
tutional interpretation developed as a means to galvanize a political
movement. The key difference between the movements is that the
passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments
and the post-Civil War political climate gave the women's rights consti-
tutionalists a greater aura of legitimacy. Because the suffragists' con-
stitutional interpretation gained more respect than that of the radical
abolitionists, it was able to inspire considerably more political action.
Their interpretation was taken up by thousands of women and, for a
brief moment in the 1870s, played an important role on a national
stage. Ultimately these women, like their abolitionist predecessors,
failed, and their main legacy lies in the construction of a culture of
rights consciousness.
By the end of 1869, the post-Civil War women's movement was at
a strategic and tactical watershed. The movement had failed to gain
the express ratification of women's suffrage in the Reconstruction
Amendments enacted after the Civil War. The abolitionist-women's
movement coalition of pre-war years had collapsed during the bruis-
ing fight over the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, with most
of the prominent pre-war abolitionists placing women's rights on the
back burner to avoid complicating and possibly derailing the fight for
191 See discussion of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965), infra text accompanying notes 256-58.
192 TENBROEK, supra note 154, at 7-26.
193 WIECEK, supra note 155, at 274-75.
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black suffrage.' 94 Congress passed the Fifteenth Amendment in 1869
without mentioning gender discrimination in voting, thus creating
what appeared to be a "strategic dead end for woman suffrage."' 95
At a women's suffrage convention later that year, a husband and
wife team of Missouri suffragists, Francis and Virginia Minor, pro-
posed a radical new approach. The Minors argued that, rather than
continue to agitate for a new constitutional provision granting women
the right to vote, feminists should assert that they already had the con-
stitutional right to vote.196 The suffragists had been criticizing the Re-
construction Amendments, but the Minors saw a way to use the
Amendments to their advantage. The argument's key premise was
that voting was a "privilege or immunity" of U.S. citizenship, protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
The strategy that women need not demand more rights, but
merely take what was already theirs, galvanized a flagging women's
movement. As Francis Minor put it, "we no longer beat the air-no
longer assume merely the attitude of petitioners. We claim a right,
based on citizenship.'u9 7 The leaders of the women's movement
changed their tactic from complaining about women's oppression to
demanding respect for their rights.'98 The new approach "changed
the tone of the speeches in our conventions," Elizabeth Cady Stanton
proudly proclaimed, "from whinings about brutal husbands, stolen ba-
bies and special laws, to fundamental principles of human rights."1 99
This new direction, known as the "New Departure" movement, repre-
sented a basic turn toward a rights-conscious women's movement. 200
"Individual rights," declared Stanton, "are a great American achieve-
ment, underlying our whole political and religious life."20'
This rights strategy inevitably led to the courthouse. The Minors
urged a combination of direct action and litigation. " 'I am often jeer-
194 Despite opposition from feminist leaders such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan
B. Anthony, the Fourteenth Amendment contained the Constitution's first sex-based dis-
tinction, providing that congressional representation would be based on the number of
"male citizens." Feminists also opposed the Fifteenth Amendment because it provided
only that the states could not deny a citizen the right to vote because of "race, color or
previous condition," but did not mention sex. Ellen C. DuBois, Outgrowing the Compact of
the Fathers: Equal Rights, Woman Suffrage, and the United States Constitution, 1820-1878, in A
LEss THAN PERFEcr UNION 104, 116-17 (Jules Lobel ed., 1988).
195 Id. at 121.
196 Id.
197 Letter from Francis Minor to The Revolution (Oct. 14, 1869), reprinted in 2 THE His-
TORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 408 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., 1882) [hereinafter
SUFFRAGE].
198 Id. at 485.
199 Id. at 511.
200 JOAN HOFF, LAw, GENDER, AND INjusTcE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 146-50
(1991).
201 SUFFRAGE, supra note 197, at 508.
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ingly asked,' Virginia Minor explained, 'If the Constitution gives you
this right, why don't you take it.' "202 In response, she and other
movement leaders urged women to attempt to vote and, if prevented,
to sue the officials who had denied them that right.20 3 Hundreds of
women around the country tried to vote.204 Some succeeded, but
most were turned back. Susan B. Anthony and several other women
succeeded in voting in Rochester, New York in 1872, but were arrested
shortly thereafter by federal marshals and charged with "criminal vot-
ing."205 Later that year, Virginia Minor attempted to register to vote
in Missouri and sued the election official who refused to register
her.2 06
In 1871, the New Departure movement dramatically entered the
political arena. Victoria Woodhull, a well-known advocate of sexual
liberation and free love,20 7 presented a memorial to Congress and se-
cured a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee.208 She ar-
gued that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments secured
women's right to vote, and that Congress should therefore enact legis-
lation enforcing that right and nullifying state laws to the contrary.20 9
Woodhull's dramatic appearance before Congress electrified the
women's suffrage movement. The New Departure leaders immedi-
ately adopted Woodhull's arguments and urged Congress to pass a law
declaring women's inalienable right to vote under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. Although the House Judiciary Committee re-
jected Woodhull's position, a strong dissent on the Committee contin-
ued to give hope to the New Departure leaders.210
In January 1872, a year after Woodhull's appearance before the
House Judiciary Committee, the National Women's Suffrage Associa-
tion (NWSA) leaders secured a hearing before the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Hundreds of women attempting to gain entrance to the
hearing filled the corridors of the Capitol. Elizabeth Stanton told the
senators that Woodhull's statement had "roused wise men to
thought," opened up a "new and fruitful source of litigation," and in-
202 DuBois, supra note 194, at 122.
203 In early 1871, the National Women's Suffrage Association enacted a resolution urg-
ing women "to apply for registration at the proper times and places, and in all cases when
they fail to secure it to see that suits be instituted in the courts havingjurisdiction and that
their right to the franchise shall secure general and judicial recognition." Id.
204 Id. at 126.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 128.
207 Id. at 124-25.
208 Id. at 123.
209 Victoria Woodhull, Address to the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives (Jan. 11, 1871), reprinted in SUFFRAGE, supra note 197, at 444-48.
210 HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICLARY, REPORT No. 5, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. (1871), re-
printed in SUFFRAGE, supra note 197, at 464-89.
1366 [Vol. 80:1331
LOSERS, FOOLS & PROPHETS
spired women with "fresh hope that the day of [their] enfranchise-
ment was at hand."2 1' Newspaper accounts of the National Women's
Suffrage Convention of 1871 reported that the suffragists' new inter-
pretations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments lent "an air
of novelty [to] the proceedings, indicating healthy life in the move-
ment."212 The consequence was "that the cause of women's en-
franchisement made a new, sudden and profound impression at
Washington." 213
That the demand for women's suffrage should attract national
attention when clothed in the rhetoric of existing constitutional rights
is consistent with the experiences of social movements throughout his-
tory. To be effective in developing a political movement, the invoca-
tion of existing rights must be believable. The leaders of the
movement must see their claim not as merely an instrumentalist tactic,
but as a valid textual interpretation. The NWSA leaders and
thousands of women developed a strong conviction that their consti-
tutional reading was correct. Francis Minor argued that the New De-
parture view "will stand the test of legal criticism."214 The NWSA
leaders wrote in their appeal to women, "The interpretation of the
Constitution which we maintain, we cannot doubt, will be ultimately
adopted by the courts."215 The women and their male supporters lo-
cated themselves within traditional Republican post-war ideology, ar-
guing that they were not making any great constitutional innovation,
but only restoring the historical connection between the theory of
American constitutionalism and its practice. The suffragists looked
backward to the fundamental principles of republican government to
construe the post-war Amendments.
Despite much optimism, the New Departure's argument was deci-
sively rejected by the courts. The first decided case involved seventy
putative women voters in Washington, D.C. The court unanimously
held that despite plaintiffs' "ingenious argument," there was no natu-
ral or inherent right to vote. "[T] he legal vindication of the natural
right of all citizens to vote would,"2 16 said Judge Cartter, "involve the
destruction of civil government."217 The Fourteenth Amendment's
211 SUFFRAGE, supra note 197, at 511.
212 Id. at 442.
213 Id. at 442.
214 Letter from Francis Minor to The Revolution (Oct. 14, 1869), repinted in SUFFRAGE,
supra note 197, at 408.
215 SUFFRAGE, supra note 197, at 487. The new departurists did recognize that the
courts were "cautious and conservative" and that therefore temporary setbacks could be
expected.
216 Id. at 424, 481.
217 Id. at 598.
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citizenship clauses simply distinguish citizens from aliens, making all
citizens capable of becoming voters at the discretion of Congress.
As more women attempted to register and vote, the number of
cases increased. In California, Pennsylvania, and Illinois, women sued
state officials who refused to let them vote and register, and the courts
invariably dismissed their suits. 218 But the most celebrated case of the
period was the criminal trial of Susan B. Anthony in 1873 for having
illegally voted in Rochester, New York.
On November 1, 1872, an editorial in the morning newspaper
inspired Susan B. Anthony to vote.219 The inspectors, according to
Anthony, were young men "entirely unversed in the intricacies of con-
stitutional law" and "utterly incapable of answering her legal argu-
ment."220 The two Republican inspectors agreed to register her over
the lone Democrat's objections. Eventually, Anthony and thirteen
others voted.221
This novelty apparently created quite a stir in Rochester. Three
weeks later, the federal marshal asked the women voters to turn them-
selves in to be prosecuted for violating an 1870 federal statute
designed to prevent ex-Confederates from voting illegally or intimidat-
ing blacks from voting. Ironically the statute was entitled: "An Act to
enforce the Right of Citizens of the United States to vote. '2 22 As
Anthony colorfully tells the tale, "The ladies, refusing to respond to
this polite invitation, Marshal Keeney made the circuit to collect the
rebellious forces. '223 Eventually, all fourteen women and the three
inspectors were indicted.224
Anthony immediately launched a broad speaking campaign to
educate the people of Rochester on the right of all citizens to have
equal access to the ballot. Over the course of the next several months,
she spoke in twenty-nine of the post-office districts in the county, "in
order to make a verdict of 'guilty' impossible."225 The district attorney
then moved to change venue to another county, and the court
granted his motion. In the twenty-two days between the change of
venue and the opening of the trial, Anthony made twenty-one
speeches in the county to which the action had been transferred. An-
218 Id. at 600-01.
219 Id. at 627-28.
220 Id. at 627.
221 Id. at 627-29.
222 Act of 1870, ch. 113-14, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
223 SUFFRAGE, supra note 197, at 628.
224 After two months under a peculiar sort of house arrest under which she was free to
fulfill her speaking obligations, Anthony's bail was set at $1,000. She objected to paying,
but her lawyer insisted on it because his "sense of gallantry made him feel it a disgrace to
allow his client to go tojail." Id. at 629. Anthony regretted her decision to comply with her
lawyer, as it made it impossible for technical reasons to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
225 Id. at 630.
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other suffrage leader, MatildaJoslyn Gage, spoke in an additional six-
teen townships. Together they covered the whole county. The two
defendants took the offensive, arguing: "The United States [is] on
trial, not Susan B. Anthony."226 Anthony argued that she had commit-
ted no crime, but had simply exercised her "citizen's right" to vote as
guaranteed by the Constitution. "Our democratic republican govern-
ment is based," she claimed, "on the idea of the natural right of every
individual member thereof to a voice and a vote in making and exe-
cuting the laws." 227 The Declaration of Independence, the Preamble
to the Constitution, and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
all secured this basic right of national citizenship.
Anthony's trial opened on June 18, 1873 before Circuit Court
Judge Hunt, whom the suffragists described as "a small-brained pale-
faced, prim-looking man," who had the "remarkable forethought" of
having written his decision before hearing the case. 228 The packed
courtroom included such notables as ex-President Millard Fillmore,
Senator Charles Sedgwick, and former Congressman E.G. Lapham.229
Immediately after the opening statements, Judge Hunt read his pre-
pared opinion that Anthony had no right to vote under the Constitu-
tion and that any mistaken belief she may have had as to such a right
did not excuse her criminal action.23 0 As a matter of law, he directed
the jury to find Anthony guilty and discharged the jury.2 31
The court then moved to sentence Anthony and asked her if she
had anything to say. When she launched into her arguments defend-
ing women's suffrage, Judge Hunt ordered her to sit down and shut
up, insisting that she had been "tried according to the established
forms of law."232 Anthony responded tellingly by analogizing Hunt's
verdict to the decisions ofjudges who decided the fugitive slave cases,
thus highlighting the connection between the radical constitutional
abolitionists and her own constitutional struggle for women's
suffiage.233
The Anthony case generated substantial public controversy. The
Albany Law Journal, although agreeing with the guilty verdict, criti-
226 Id. at 630.
227 Id. at 631.
228 Id. at 647.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 675-79.
231 Id. at 680.
232 Id. at 688.
233 Another example of the affinity between the suffragist and radical abolitionist theo-
ries is found in Isabella Beecher Hooker's testimony before Congress: "Having attempted
a strictly legal view of this question [the 14th and 15th Amendments] permit me, gentle-
men, to say that in my heart my claim to vote is based upon the original Constitution,
interpreted by the Declaration of Independence." Id. at 505.
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cized the judge's decision to remove the case from thejury.23 4 Several
newspapers and pamphlets reprinted the legal arguments of
Anthony's counsel on women's constitutional right to vote.23 5
Another round of political agitation commenced when the three
inspectors who allowed Anthony and her cohorts to vote were tried by
ajury and convicted. 23 6 The inspectors' case became a national cause
when Anthony, fulfilling a prevote promise to the inspectors, per-
suaded New York Senator Sergeant to intervene. Sergeant appealed
directly to President Grant and on March 3, 1874, Grant pardoned the
inspectors. During the week that the inspectors languished in jail
before the pardon, hundreds of local supporters visited the "boys" in
jail, and the women voters of Rochester cooked dinner daily for the
prisoners.
The Anthony case represents a successful use of losing litigation as
political agitation. Anthony and her compatriots spoke to thousands
of people, engaged prominent figures, such as the President of the
United States and a New York senator, and initiated debate in legal
and popular journals.
The most decisive and devastating legal setbacks suffered by the
New Departure movement came as a result of affirmative litigation
brought under the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause. In 1873, the Supreme Court turned down Myra
Bradwell's request to be admitted to the bar of Illinois, 237 citing the
Slaughter-House Cases, decided the same day.238 The Court held that
the right to a license to practice law in a state was not a privilege or
immunity of U.S. citizenship. 239 Justice Bradley, joined by Justices
Swayne and Field, concurred in the judgment because the "natural
234 The Journal also "suggested that if Anthony was dissatisfied with 'our laws... she
would better adopt the methods of reform that men use, or, better still, migrate.' " HoFF,
supra note 200, at 159.
235 On January 22, 1874, Anthony unsuccessfully petitioned Congress for remission of
the fine. SUFFRAGE, supra note 197, at 698-702. The HouseJudiciary Committee did report
out a bill recommending that Congress pay the fine, but the Senate Judiciary Committee
refused to take similar action. Judge Hunt never enforced the fine against Anthony, and
thus she could not technically appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. The prosecuting attor-
ney dropped the charges against the women who voted with Anthony. Id.
236 Judge Hunt instructed the jury to find them guilty. When the defense counsel.
asked the court why he was submitting the case to the jury when he had charged the jury
that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment, Judge Hunt answered that it
was "a matter of form." Id. at 695. The jury, after lengthy deliberations in which at least
one juror was in favor of acquittal, eventually voted to convict.
237 Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
238 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
239 Bradwell retained Matt H. Carpenter of Wisconsin, an eminent republican U.S.
Senator and one of the best known Supreme Court advocates of his era, to argue the case.
Carpenter commenced his argument before the Supreme Court with a long discourse ar-
guing that while women had no right to vote, they did have a right to practice a profession.
Perhaps Carpenter felt that the potential explosiveness and radical nature of the New De-
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and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evi-
dently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life."240 Only Jus-
tice Chase dissented.
The Bradwell and Slaughter-House cases were devastating blows to
the New Departure's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nevertheless, legal advocates for women suffrage still maintained, at
least in public, an optimistic view of the legal possibilities. Francis
Miller, the attorney for the Minors, wrote to Susan B. Anthony that
there was nothing in the Slaughter-House and Bradwell opinions that
was "necessarily conclusive of the suffr-age cases."24' Maybe not, but as
a practical matter there was no way that the New Departure voting
argument would win in the Supreme Court.
In 1875, the Supreme Court dealt the definitive defeat to the New
Departurists' legal strategy in Minor v. Happersett.242 The Minors had
set up an affirmative test case by attempting to register and vote in
Missouri. The case reached the Supreme Court in 1874, one year af-
ter the Slaughter-House and Bradwell cases. Defeat seemed a foregone
conclusion. Indeed, the state of Missouri did not even submit a brief
to the Court. ChiefJustice Chase, the only dissenter in Bradwell, had
left the Court, replaced by Justice Waite. Reconstruction was waning.
By 1874, the Minors must have sensed that defeat was inevitable.
Their strategy was to rely on broad political-constitutional arguments
instead of narrow legalistic positions. Knowing the Court would al-
most certainly rule against them, they sought at least to force the
Court to confront the basic issue of women's status as citizens. As one
commentator has noted, "The language in all the Minors' briefs is
both so constitutionally and politically extreme for the time that it
leads one to wonder whether the briefs were written to win in court or
for posterity. '243 Their strategy's chief success was in engaging the
Court.
Francis Minor's brief opened by arguing that women were citi-
zens at the time the Constitution was ratified and that voting in na-
tional elections was a fundamental right of such citizenship. The
Minors rejected the possibility of "halfway citizenship":244
Either we must give up the principles announced in the Declaration
of Independence, that governments derive their just powers from
parture suffrage interpretation required him to start his argument by distinguishing
Bradwell's claim.
240 Bradwell 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141.
241 Letter from Francis Miller to Susan B. Anthony (May 5, 1873), in SUFFRAGE, supra
note 197, at 536.
242 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875).
243 HoFF, supra note 200, at 171.
244 Plaintiffs Argument and Brief, Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875), in SUF-
FRAGE, supra note 197, at 720.
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the consent of the governed... ; or we must acknowledge the truth
contended for by the plaintiff, that citizenship carries with it every
incident to every citizen alike. 245
Tied, but subordinated, to this broad argument was a strong but
narrow claim: that federal rather than state law must govern the issue
of the plaintiffs' right to vote in national elections.2 4 6 The states could
regulate the voting process, but could not arbitrarily deprive persons
of their ability to vote for President and Vice President, because to do
so was to interfere with the functioning of the federal government.
The Fourteenth Amendment merely supported this proposition,
which according to the plaintiffs was established with the Constitu-
tion's ratification.
The Court unanimously rejected the plaintiffs' arguments. 247
ChiefJustice Waite started his opinion by noting that the Court could
have dismissed the case on technical grounds, but instead chose to
address the central issue of whether women could be denied the right
of suffrage.2 48 The Court must have been tempted to follow the tack
taken in Bradwell and tersely dismiss the case with perhaps a short ref-
erence to the Slaughter-House Cases. The Court, however, perhaps
troubled by the Minors' charge that to establish a group of second-
class citizens was despotism, spent most of the fourteen-page decision
responding to the Minors' broad arguments.
Waite first agreed that women have always been U.S. citizens.
The Fourteenth Amendment therefore "did not affect the citizenship
of women." 249 The Court then undertook a lengthy analysis of the
historical practice to demonstrate that:
For nearly ninety years the people have acted upon the idea that the
Constitution, when it conferred citizenship, did not necessarily con-
fer the right of suffrage. If uniform practice long continued can
settle the construction of so important an instrument as the Consti-
tution of the United States confessedly is, most certainly it has been
done here. Our province is to decide what the law is, not to declare
what it should be.2 50
Although the Court was clearly troubled by the prospect of im-
posing second-class citizenship, it rationalized its decision by resort to
history, original intent, and the usual positivistic platitudes. Its self-
245 Id. at 730.
246 Id. at 719-21.
247 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875).
248 Id. at 165.
249 Id. at 170.
250 Id. at 177-78. The Court also rejected plaintiff's argument that federal supremacy
necessarily implied that a state could not arbitrarily deny a class of U.S. citizens their right
to vote. All officers of the United States are chosen by "state voters." The power of the
state to decide who would vote was "certainly supreme until Congress acts." Id.
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described duty was to decide "rights as they exist" and not to look "at
the hardship of withholding" those alleged rights. 251 If the law ought
to be changed, the power to do so lay elsewhere. The Minors had
forced the Court to adopt ajurisprudential rationale for withholding
women's rights similar to the one that the Court had used twenty years
earlier in the Dred Scott decision.2 52
The New Departure strategy that had commenced with such fan-
fare died with a whimper. The Minor decision received little attention
at the time and to this day is virtually unnoticed outside of a small
circle of feminist scholars. 253 Indeed, in hindsight the views of Con-
gressman Loughridge of Iowa seem prescient. He argued that it was a
"mistake" to follow a litigation strategy.
In this country, on questions involving political rights the courts are
generally in the rear rank; the people are mostly in advance of the
courts. In my opinion the most speedy and certain victory will be
acquired through the political departments of the government. 254
Yet the New Departure movement did achieve a certain success.
Positing a constitutionally guaranteed right to vote spurred a half-dec-
ade of tremendous political activity. The Anthony case was an impor-
tant state trial of the latter part of the nineteenth century and received
a great deal of public attention and notoriety. That the Anthony case
achieved more prominence than Minor v. Happersett is probably due to
several factors: Anthony's stature and her ability to attract members
of the elite to her defense; the massive political organizing she and
her associates undertook; the rapid resolution of the trial, unlike the
years-long Minor litigation; and the fact that Anthony's trial ended in
1873, when the New Departurists still had strong support, while the
Minor case was decided in 1875, after the movement had been de-
feated on virtually every front and their constitutional interpretation
had been rejected.
Probably the broadest impact of the New Departure movement
was not to be felt for almost a century. The movement's articulation
of an "unwritten constitution" incorporating certain "natural" or fun-
damental rights resurfaced in the 1960s and 1970s feminist challenge
to restrictive contraceptive and abortion laws. Elizabeth Cady Stanton
asserted that "the numerous demands by the people for national pro-
251 Id. at 178.
252 The Court in Dred Scott also based its decision on the purported original intent of
the Framers, arguing that "[i]t is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice
or injustice, the policy or impolicy of these laws," but merely to discern the intent of the
Framers. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 405 (1856).
253 Feminist writers such as Joan Hoff and Ellen DuBois have discussed Minor v. Hap-
persett and the political and legal movement behind the case. See HoFr, supra note 200, at
170-74; DuBois, supra note 194, at 120-29.
254 SurrAoE, supra note 197, at 720.
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tection in many rights not specified by the Constitution, prove that
the people have outgrown the compact that satisfied the fathers. '255
That same view, while unsuccessful in the 1870s, was vindicated 100
years later in Griswold v. Connecticut256 and Roe v. Wade257
Yet the arguments made by Stanton and the other New Departure
leaders appear to have had no direct impact on the 1960s and 1970s
feminist litigation. There is no mention of either the earlier litigation
or the New Departurist theories in either the Griswold or Roe due pro-
cess litigation. And indeed, it is hard to see how that earlier litigation
would have been relevant. Minor v. Happersett and United States v. Su-
san B. Anthony were simply losing cases, with not even a stirring dissent
for successor litigators to cite to.
The main contribution of the New Departure movement to the
twentieth century movement was its role in developing a culture of
rights. Scholars now recognize that the New Departure movement
played a crucial role in launching the women's movement on a rights-
oriented mode of struggle.258 In 1876, Anthony and other leaders of
the NWSA formally presented a "Women's Declaration of Rights" dur-
ing the official proceeding of the centennial celebration of the Ameri-
can Revolution.259 Elizabeth Cady Stanton devoted enormous
emphasis after the 1870s to speaking and agitating about women's
concerns as a human rights issue. Quoting the radical abolitionist
Charles Sumner, Stanton argued that the true interpretation of the
Constitution "is that anything for human rights is constitutional.'2 60
Some commentators have suggested that the movement's focus on the
struggle for constitutional rights, as opposed to women's happiness
and well being, diluted the radical demands of the early feminists. 261
Others have praised the approach.262 Its importance, however, can-
not be questioned. The rights-based women's movement has engen-
dered enormous political and legal struggle over the past century,
even though its focus has led to significant dilemmas and constraints
on the radical potential of feminism. 263
255 DuBois, supra note 194, at 131.
256 381 U.S. 479 (1969).
257 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
258 HoFF, supra note 200, at 174-77 (critiquing the New Departure's use of male dis-
course of rights); DuBois, supra note 194, at 121-31.
259 HoFF, supra note 200, at 178.
260 Elizabeth Stanton, Address to the judiciary Committee of the U.S. Senate (Jan. 10,
1872), reprinted in SUFFRAGE, supra note 197, at 513.
261 HoFF, supra note 200, at 179-82.
262 DuBois, supra note 194, at 104-06, 129-31 (Dubois views positively the women's
movement's pursuit of rights not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution.).
263 Rhonda Copelon, Unpacking Patriarchy, Reproduction, Sexuality, Originalism and Con-
stitutional Change; in A LEss THAN PERFEcr UNION, ALTERNATIVE PERSPECrIVES ON THE U.S.
CONSTrrUTON 303, 320-24 (Jules Lobel ed., 1988) (discussing contradiction of focusing on
a negative right to privacy).
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When surveying the discouraging results of their efforts, the lead-
ers of the New Departure considered the inspiration their efforts
might provide for future generations. "Although defeated at every
point, woman's claim as a citizen of the United States to the Federal
franchise is placed upon record in the highest court of the Nation,
and there it will remain forever."264
C. Plessy v. Ferguson
In 1891, Albion Tourgee agreed to be counsel to a committee of
New Orleans blacks who wanted to challenge Louisiana's recently en-
acted law requiring segregation of railroad cars. Tourgee, a former
Reconstruction-era carpetbagger and "vociferous white champion of
full racial equality,"265 encouraged blacks to maintain a militant fight
against segregation. Despite an environment that discouraged pro-
gressive change, he argued that it was only "by constant resistance to
oppression that the race must ultimately win equality of right[s] .266
Tourgee's life reflected the tension between a foolhardy charge
into certain defeat and the prophetic vision of a more egalitarian
America. Tourgee moved to North Carolina after fighting in the
Union armies during the Civil War. Troubled by insecurity and self-
doubt, Tourgee nonetheless had the brilliance and ambition to be-
come a leader of the Radical Republicans in North Carolina. He
played a central role in drafting the Reconstruction Constitution of
North Carolina in 1868 and was later elected ajudge.267 His fearless
stands against the Ku Klux Klan and in support of racial equality led
even his enemies to praise him.268
Tourgee's greatest fame came, however, when he returned to the
North in 1879 after the defeat of Reconstruction. That year he pub-
264 . SUFFRAGE, supra note 197, at 755.
265 OLSEN, supra note 10, at 11.
266 Id. (citation omitted).
267 Tourgee was elected delegate to the Constitutional Convention on a platform that
included equal civil and political rights for all citizens, no property qualification for jury-
men, blanket voter eligibility for every office, popular election of all state legislative, execu-
tive and judicial officials, free public schools from the primary to university level,
equalization of property taxes, and abolition or at least reduction of poll taxes. Orro H.
OLSEN, CARPETBAGGER'S CRUSADE: THE LIFr OF ALBION WINEGAR TOURGEE 89 (1965).
268 As one leading conservative newspaper later wrote:
His was a striking personality, and none the less so because of the fact
that he was for many years the most thoroughly hated man in North Caro-
lina ..... He was open, bold, determined, fearless and self-reliant. .... He
had convictions, and with them the courage and the resources with which
to proclaim and maintain them .... With full knowledge of the dangers
attending his mad course, in the face of the dire threats that were daily
thrown in his face, consciously aware that there was dynamite under every
foot of earth he trod, . . . he displayed the nerve of a martyr in his wild,
mistaken attempt to make an Ohio of North Carolina.
Id. at 182 (quoting AndrewJoyner, Raleigh News and Observer, May 28, 1905).
1995] 1375
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
lished a novel based on his experiences in the South, entitled A Fool's
Errand, whose author was originally only identified as "One of the
Fools."269 The novel was a powerful critique of both the national gov-
ernment for its failure to come to grips with the fundamental issue of
equality for the former slaves after the war and of the South for its
persistence in racial prejudice and violence against anyone who sup-
ported change.
Underlying Tourgee's social critique of northern vacillation and
southern obduracy during Reconstruction lay a psychological self-
study: the study of the fool. Tourgee's brilliant preface, entitled Letter
to the Publishers is a witty, profound analysis of the nature of the honor-
able and ancient order of fools. 2 70 Fools are prophets who are not
historically vindicated. Noah, one of the earliest of the fools, was
laughed at by his peers until the "Deluge saved his reputation, and
made his Ark a success. But it is not often that a fool has a heavenly
voice to guide him, or a flood to help him out."
2 71
The conflict between the arrogant prophet and the humble fool
was a continuing theme in Tourgee's life.272 His voice of post-war rad-
ical Republican idealism was overcome by a long wave of racism, mate-
rialism and cynicism. While A Fool's Errand, notes Edmund Wilson,
"was received as a sensation in its day,"273 Tourgee has been aptly con-
sidered as "perhaps the most neglected figure in American litera-
ture. '274 He was influential as a civil rights lecturer and columnist, yet
he was never part of a successful reform movement and operated pri-
marily on "a decisive but unjustly neglected social level."275 He con-
stantly fluctuated between optimism and despair.276
269 TOURGEE, supra note 37. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of.Tourgee's thesis.
270 Both fools and martyrs act on principle: the martyr willingly accepts ostracism or
death, but the fool maintains the blind faith and hope that "in some inscrutable way the
laws of human nature would be suspended, or that the state of affairs at first presenting
itself would be but temporary." TOURGEE, supra note 37, at 134-35.
271 Id. at 6.
272 Tourgee's work after 1879 continued to reveal both hope and frustration. He met
James Garfield at the Republican National Convention in 1880, and the then Presidential
candidate agreed to implement certain key programs urged by Tourgee. Garfield wrote to
Tourgee expressing the "hope that the day may come when our country will be a paradise
for all such fools." John H. Franklin, Introduction to TOURGEE, supra note 37, at xxii. How-
ever, shortly after being elected President, Garfield was assassinated.
273 EDWARD WILSON, PATRIOTIC GORE 536 (1962).
274 GJ. Becker, Albion W. Tourgee: 'Tioneer in Social Criticism," in AMERIcAN TERATURE
XIX, at 59-72 (Mar. 1947).
275 OLsEN, supra note 267, at 294.
276 The diary kept by Tourgee's wife Emma is constantly punctuated with despair. "Al-
bion [is] in despair over his work. Life does not seem worth the struggle anyhow," she
wrote. OLSEN, supra note 267, at 267. After one of the magazines he had started failed, she
wrote that Tourgee's "life was embittered, ruined, by his trying to do what he had no
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The Pessy case was the last major battle for the Fool. Shortly after
Tourgee agreed to challenge Louisiana's law, a local New Orleans ac-
tivist, Louis Martinet, wrote him that "[t] he fight we are making is an
uphill one."2 77 Martinet did not foresee a "favorable result," and in a
despondent tone stated, "but perhaps it is best that the battle be
fought."278
Indeed, the political, social, and legal developments preceding
the P/essy litigation were ominous. During the 1880s, at least four
southern states had enacted segregation statutes, and the Interstate
Commerce Commission had endorsed the principle of separate but
equal.2 79 In the one-and-a-half-year period following the passage of
Louisiana's law, additional segregation measures were adopted in at
least six southern states and lynching soared toward a new peak.280
Moreover, the lower federal courts generally had applied the sep-
arate but equal doctrine.28' So too had most state courts.28 2 And the
Supreme Court had, in a series of decisions beginning with the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases in 1873, adopted a very narrow reading of the rights
granted by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.28 3 Indeed, a
number of prominent commentators, including Jack Greenberg, for-
mer General Counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, have ques-
tioned whether it was a mistake to bring the Plessy test case in such a
hostile environment.28 4
capacity to do." Id. at 263 (quoting letter from Emma Tourgee to Mr. Moot (June 17,
1905)).
277 Letter from Louis A. Martinet to Albion W. Tourgee (July 4, 1892), reprinted in
OLSEN, supra note 10, at 61, 64.
278 Id. at 63.
279 OLSEN, supra note 10, at 8. See generally C. VANN WooDWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER
OFJIM CROW 69-71 (1957) (discussing the social, political, and legal background of Pessy).
280 OLSEN, supra note 10, at 11. The civil rights community was encouraged by a
number of victories in the North against racial injustice in the early 1890s. Between 1891
and 1895, at least 11 northern states improved or established civil rights laws, and in 1892,
New York and Michigan state courts had ruled against public segregation.
281 Stephen J. Riegel, The Persistent Career of im Crow: LowerFederal Courts and the "Sepa-
rate but Equal Doctrine" 1865-1896, 28 AM.J. LEG. Hisr. 17, 27-28 (1984). Riegel writes that
"[d]istrict and circuit court rulings in other public accommodations cases showed a re-
markable uniformity of principle summed up by a phrase in Logwood. 'Equal accommoda-
tions do not mean identical accommodations.' " Id. (quoting Logwood v. Memphis & C.R.,
23 F. 318, 319 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1885)).
282 LOFGREN, supra note 6, at 79 ("the judicially defined Amendment, as it emerged in
the state and lower federal case reports, remained quite hospitable to the principle of
separate-but equal").
283 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
36 (1873).
284 Greenberg, supra note 42, at 326 ("We can only wonder whether Tourgee was right
or wrong in proceeding in the face of such inauspicious omens."); see also LOFGREN, supra
note 6, at 4.
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Nonetheless, Albion Tourgee and Louis Martinet eagerly urged
the case forward in 1891-1892.285 The Plessy case thrust upon Tourgee
the conflict between the prophetic visionary and the practical litiga-
tor. He recognized that technical legal arguments had a greater
chance of success in the courts, but believed in a broad-based vision of
the affirmative grant of equality contained in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. For that reason, Tourgee was initially skeptical about his co-
counsel's 286 proposal that the person arrested in the test case should
hold a ticket for an out-of-state destination, thereby enabling them to
challenge the Louisiana statute as a state infringement on the con-
gressional power to regulate interstate commerce. "What we want,"
Tourgee wrote his co-counsel, "is not a verdict of not guilty, nor a
defect in this law but a decision whether such a law can be legally
enacted and enforced in any state and we should get everything off
the track and out of the way for such a decision."287 Eventually, he
agreed with his co-counsel's approach, admitting that he "may have
spoken too lightly of the interstate commerce matter."288 In fact, the
first test case did involve an out-of-state traveler, and the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that the statute applied only to intra-state travel.
Only after that decision did Plessy buy his intra-state ticket.
Tourgee did not, however, totally eschew narrow grounds in his
challenge to the Louisiana statute.289 Over the objections of Louis
Martinet and some other members of the New Orleans Citizens Com-
mittee, Tourgee urged that a Negro whose complexion was nearly
white be selected to test the statute. 290 Such a test case would both
highlight the arbitrariness of the statute and provide a claim that
whiteness was a property right protected by the Due Process Clause,
an argument that might move a property-minded Supreme Court 291
In addition, Tourgee and his co-counsel included various other nar-
row challenges to the Louisiana law, such as an attack on the statute's
immunization of railways and train officials from liability for damages
285 OLSEN, supra note 267, at 310 (suggesting that Tourgee and Martinet were en-
couraged by Supreme Court Justice Harlan's dissents, which read the post-Civil War
Amendments more broadly than did the majorities).
286 Tourgee's co-counsel was Jas C. Walker. OLSEN, supra note 10, at 74.
287 C. Vann Woodward, The Case of the Louisiana Traveler, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE
SHAPED THE CONSTrUUON 145, 150 (J. Garraty ed., 1962).
288 Id.
289 Jack Greenberg has suggested that the critical problem Tourgee had with the inter-
state commerce approach was that someone else had thought of utilizing that strategy.
Greenberg, supra note 42, at 325.
290 Letter from Louis A. Martinet to Albion W. Tourgee (Oct. 5, 1891), reprinted in
OLSEN, supra note 10, at 55, 56-57.
291 LOFGREN, supra note 6, at 31; Greenberg, supra note 42, at 324.
1378 [Vol. 80:1331
LOSERS, FOOLS & PROPHETS
for refusing to carry passengers who objected to their assigned
seats.29
2
Tourgee's argument to the Supreme Court highlighted both the
broad and narrow approaches. Tourgee's central argument, placed
first in the Assignment of Errors, was that the segregation statute was a
"badge of servitude" that, inter alia, "abridges the rights, privileges and
immunities of citizens on account of race and color."293 This argu-
ment, elaborated in Plessy's brief to the Court, focused on (1) the
affirmative provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly the
conferral of national citizenship and the rights accruing thereto, and
(2) the Thirteenth Amendment, which according to Plessy's brief was
designed to destroy the "estate and condition of subjection and inferi-
ority of personal right and privilege." 294 Tourgee also resurrected the
abolitionist and suffragist argument that the Declaration of Indepen-
dence is not a mere rhetorical flourish, but that "all-embracing
formula of personal rights on which our government is based."295
Tourgee virtually repeated Alvan Stewart's position on the Declaration
in the New Jersey Slave Case.296 He also returned to the abolitionist and
suffragist model of constitutional interpretation, arguing that the
Fourteenth Amendment must be interpreted "in strict accord" with
the Declaration, which "has become the controlling genius of the
American people."297
The brief's Fourteenth and Thirteenth Amendment arguments
directly attacked the Court's recent record and were unlikely to suc-
ceed.298 As one commentator has noted, "Hopes of so drastically al-
tering the judicial mind would have been unrealistic .... "299 Tourgee
probably recognized the futility of these arguments because he chose
to begin his brief to the Supreme Court with the much narrower argu-
ment that Plessy's reputation in being white was property which had
292 Assignment of Errors, ex parte Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), reprinted in
OLSEN, supra note 10, at 74, 76; see also LOFGREN, supra note 6, at 56. In addition, Plessy
challenged a train official's legal ability to determine a person's race.
293 Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 3, Plessy v. Ferguson, 168 U.S. 537 (1895), reprinted in
13 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CON-
sTrrUTONAL LAvw 27, 3 (Philip Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter
LANDMARK BRIEFS].
294 Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 33, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1895), reprinted in
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 293, at 60.
295 Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 34, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1895), reprinted in
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 293, at 61.
296 See supra notes 172-78 and accompanying text.
297 Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 34, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1895), reprinted in
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 293, at 61.
298 Tourgee's brief admitted that "Cruikshank's case (a Supreme Court decision on
equal rights) is squarely against us... and cannot stand." Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 26,
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1895), reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 293, at 53.
299 OLSEN, supra note 10, at 85.
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been denied without due process. Only at Point VI did Tourgee set
forth his central contentions based on equality.
By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, Tourgee and
his associates were deeply pessimistic about their chances. In a letter
written nine months after filing the Assignment of Errors to the court,
Tourgee expressed serious doubts about the case. He now realized
that there were five Justices against Plessy.3 00 "The court has always
been the foe of liberty," according to Tourgee, "until forced to move
on by public opinion."30' Moreover, Tourgee now realized that "[i]t
is of the utmost consequence that we should not have a decision
against us," since the Court had "never reversed itself on a constitutional
question."30 2
He therefore counseled Martinet's committee in New Orleans to
delay the case and "l[t] o bend every possible energy to secure the dis-
cussion of the principle in such a way as to reach and awaken public
sentiment."303 The only hope for the case was to mobilize broad pub-
lic support against segregation. Tourgee believed that one Justice
could be swayed "if he 'hears from the country.' "304
The Supreme Court did delay. It decided Plessy v. Ferguson on
May 18, 1896, more than three years after the appeal was filed. How-
ever, far from intensifying pressure on the Court as Tourgee had
hoped, public opinion became even more unfavorable. The nascent
social sciences added a veneer of expert opinion to the fast-develop-
ing racism.30 5 In 1895, Frederick Douglass, symbol of militant African-
American struggle for equality, died. That same year, Booker T.
Washington delivered his famous Atlanta address that was "widely in-
terpreted as a sign of Negro acceptance of an inferior status."306 Be-
tween 1892 and 1896 lynchings reached new peaks, new segregation
laws were adopted, and Congress repealed a host of Reconstruction-
era statutes protecting equal rights.307 In New Orleans, Louis Marti-
net and his newspaper were on the verge of collapse. The political
and social climate boded ill.
300 Letter from Albion W. Tourgee to Louis A. Martinet (Oct. 31, 1893), reprinted in id.
at 78.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id. at 79.
304 Id. at 80.
305 A speech given to the American Association for the Advancement of Science by its
president, Daniel G. Brinton, typified the prevailing attitude on the eve of the Supreme
Court's decision in Pessy. Brinton argued that each race and ethnic group had its "own
added special powers and special limitations and were not 'equally endowed.'" LOFGREN,
supra note 6, at 104-05.
306 OLSEN, supra note 267, at 328.
307 Id. There were some major protests and victories, particularly in the northern
states in the period between 1895-1896. OLSEN, supra note 10, at 24; WOODWARD, supra
note 278, at 153.
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The Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, rejecting virtu-
ally all of Plessy's arguments,3 08 received surprisingly little national at-
tention. The typical press reports only routinely mentioned the
case.30 9 C. Van Woodward reports that
the country as a whole received the news of [the Court's] momen-
tous decision upholding the "separate but equal" doctrine in rela-
tive silence and apparent indifference. Thirteen years earlier the
Civil Rights cases had precipitated pages of news reports, hundreds
of editorials, indignant rallies, congressional bills, a Senate report
and much general debate. In striking contrast, the Pleasy decision
was accorded only short, inconspicuous news reports and virtually
no editorial comment outside the Negro press.310
The New York Times included the decision in its regular page three
Tuesday column on railway news, along with one other very minor
railroad decision. 31' Unlike PMessy v. Ferguson, three Supreme Court
decisions rendered on May 18, 1896 did receive front page coverage:
a federal contract labor law dispute involving a sugar plantation
owner, a challenge to a portion of an heiress's multi-million dollar
inheritance, and a playwright's claim of plagiarism, which the court
refused to review.312 It was small solace that the few newspapers that
did editorialize about the case generally supported Harlan's
dissent.31 3
Nor was the media alone in its silence. The Democratic and Pop-
ulist party platforms in 1896 contained strong anti-Supreme Court
planks criticizing the decisions of the Court in the income tax, sugar
monopoly, and Pullman strike decisions. Neither platform made
mention of the recently decided Plessy case.314 The fact that P/essy did
not spark the broad public discussion and dialogue Tourgee had
308 The Court agreed that the section of the Louisiana statute that immunized railway
officials from liability for mistaken judgments about a person's race was unconstitutional,
but that infirmity had no bearing on the requirement that railways provide separate accom-
modations. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The Court also conceded that one's
reputation of belonging to the dominant race was property, but that also was irrelevant to
the question of whether Louisiana could segregate the races. Id. at 549.
309 LOFGREN, supra note 6, at 196; OLSEN, supra note 10, at 25; Riegel, supra note 281, at
17.
310 C. Vann Woodward, The Birth offim Crow, 15 Am. HERITAGE 103 (1964).
311 LOFGREN, supra note 6, at 196-97.
312 Id. at 196-97.
313 OLSEN, supra note 10, at 25. Lofgren writes that "[a]mong editors outside the
South who judged the judges, hostility to the decision overshadowed approval by perhaps
three to one." LOFGREN, supra note 6, at 196.
314 OLSEN, supra note 10, at 25. Early twentieth century scholars also generally ignored
the case. Charles Warren's 1926 book, The Supreme Court in United States History, did not
discuss Pessy, nor did other constitutional histories published before 1950. Even Henry
Steel Commager's Documents of American History, released in 1934, omitted P/essy. LOFGREN,
supra note 6, at 5.
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hoped for,3 15 while still furthering segregation, 1 6 adds legitimacy to
the question of whether it should ever have been brought or appealed
to the Supreme Court.3 17
Louis Martinet, Albion Tourgee, and their compatriots thus had
little impact on their era; the only significant justification for this liti-
gation effort is its possible impact on history. Tourgee's arguments
were incorporated into Harlan's dissent, which prevailed in another
age. As Charles Lofgren has noted, P/essy is "more than a tale of
losers. Besides having their years in court, Martinet and his associates
had their arguments displayed on the record-indeed memorialized
in Justice Harlan's dissent-to instruct later generations."3 1 8
Tourgee's statement that justice is "color blind" became one of the
most important quotations in constitutional law, used by both liberals
and conservatives for different purposes.
Moreover, Tourgee's original brief was read by at least one mem-
ber of the Court that decided Brown v. Board of Education. In 1950,
segregation was again before the Court. Justice Robert H. Jackson dis-
covered that Albion Tourgee had lived in a town close to Jackson's
home in upstate New York. Struck by Tourgee's connection to Plessy,
he wrote friends that
I have gone to his [Tourgee's] old brief, filed here, and there is no
argument made today that he would not make to the Court. He
says, 'Justice is pictured blind and her daughter, The Law, ought at
least to be color-blind." Whether this was original with him, it has
been gotten off a number of times since as original wit. Tourgee's
315 LoFGREN, supra note 6, at 5. The primary reason that Plessy was ignored for so long
was that for white America, its holding was not controversial. Most whites accepted the
compromise of 1877 ending Reconstruction, and the lower federal courts and state courts
had virtually unanimously adopted the "separate but equal" doctrine. Tourgee's central
and most radical arguments on the meaning of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments had already been rejected by the Supreme Court in the preceding two decades. Id.
316 Many scholars have viewed Plessy as triggering a second wave ofJim Crow segrega-
tion. SeeJOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 65 (1976); see also Riegel, supra
note 281, at 19 n.10 (citing other sources that support this proposition). One scholar has
argued that it was only after the Court's decision in Pessy "that rigid segregation in fact
began to run rampant." Paul Oberst, The Strange Career of Plessy v. Ferguson, 15 Amiz. L.
REv. 389 (1973). Another commentator agrees, maintaining that Pessy and the Civil Rights
Cases "constitutionally encouraged the Jim Crow laws." Charles A. Miller, Constitutional Law
and the Rhetoric of Race, 5 PERSPECrnVES ON AMERICAN HISTORY 147, 196 (D. Fleming & B.
Barlyn eds., 1971). More recent scholarly commentary treats the effect of the Pessy deci-
sion more modestly, as merely encouraging existing trends. LOFGREN, supra note 6, at 203
("[T]he evidence of Plessy's direct role is slight."); Riegel, supra note 281, at 39 (PLessy was
"not a turning point... [but] rather an affirmation of the dominant legal concept.").
317 Charles Lofgren argues that even if Pssy had not been brought, cases challenging
segregation would have probably reached the Supreme Court within a few years, and with
the same result. LOFGREN, supra note 6, at 200. Indeed, four years later, Chesapeake &
Ohio Railway Co. v. Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388 (1900), involving the Kentucky separate car
law, was similarly decided by an 8-1 vote, with only Justice Harlan dissenting.
318 LOFGREN, supra note 6, at 208.
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brief was filed April 6, 1896 and now, just fifty-four years after, the
question is again being argued whether his position will be adopted
and what was a defeat for him in '96 be a post-mortem victory.
319
Plessy became a symbol of injustice and resistance for twentieth
century African-American activists. Charles Thompson, the dean of
Howard's School of Education, argued in the 1930s that resort to the
courts was important and that "[e]ven unfavorable decisions by the
courts had some value: they dramatized Negro discontent."3 20 The
New Orleans Citizens Committee was accurate when it declared,
shortly after the decision, "In defending the cause of liberty, we met
with defeat.., but not with ignominy."3 2 1
History vindicated Tourgee's and Martinet's position. But the im-
port of the Pessy case cannot be measured in the ultimate vindication
of Homer Plessy's claims.
[T]radition represents a determined commitment to the rights of
all mankind in the face of the greatest odds .... The memory of
Plessy will be properly recalled only to the extent that there are still
those possessed of the conscience and the courage to fight for
causes that may not achieve respectability for generations and to
resist injustices even when sanctioned by their own national leaders
and law.3 22
Plessy thus represents the prophetic tradition that looks not primarily
at concrete substantive improvement in the law, but as law as a power-
ful, ongoing struggle that speaks to future generations about justice.
Louis Martinet wrote Tourgee, in a moment of deep pessimism, that
he had asked himself "a thousand times" why he fought this battle in
which he would gain nothing but expend "time, labor [and]
money."3 23 His answer to his own question, which almost 100 years
later is still the best one I can offer, was that " [1]ike you, I believe I do
it because I am built that way."3 24
D. The Plant Closing Movement in Youngstown, Ohio
The labor movement has a long tradition of radically invoking
rights derived from sources similar to those of the movements already
discussed in this Part. The Gilded Age labor leaders asserted repeat-
edly that the " 'wage labor system' fell afoul of the republican Consti-
tution. '3 25 Those labor leaders, like the feminists of the 1870s, argued
319 Woodward, supra note 287, at 158.
320 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLEJUSTIcME 171 (1976) (paraphrasing Thompson).
821 LOFGREN, supra note 6, at 208.
322 OLSEN, supra note 10, at 27-28.
323 Id. at 64.
324 Id.
325 William Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age,
1985 Wis. L. REv. 767, 813.
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that the existence of inequality compromised the idea of a republic.
The Knights of Labor premised their arguments on the Declaration of
Independence and natural rights.3 26 In the early twentieth century,
the AFL attacked court injunctions against strikers by invoking the
Thirteenth Amendment. That amendment, claimed AFL leaders, "en-
shrined not only self-ownership, but also labor's dignity and indepen-
dence."3 27 The AFL borrowed the language of the abolitionist
movement to support its Thirteenth Amendment argument.3 28 More
recently, the community challenges to plant closings in Youngstown
and Pittsburgh also developed a radical community-oriented notion of
rights, which had its roots in a similar concept of republicism that
motivated abolitionists, suffragists, and Albion Tourgee.3 29
Between 1977 and 1987, the steel industry in the two leading
steelmaking cities of the nation, Pittsburgh and Youngstown, declined
precipitously. A wave of plant shutdowns ended all steelmaking in
Youngstown and decimated the once vibrant industry in Pittsburgh,
resulting in the direct loss of approximately 80,000 jobs in basic steel
in the two metropolitan areas.330 A broad coalition of workers,
churches, and community activists emerged to fight these mill
closings.331
Litigation played an important role in this struggle. The major
legal challenge to plant shutdowns was a 1979 lawsuit filed by five local
steelworker unions, an incumbent Republican Congressman, the
Lordstown Local of the UAW, sixty-five individual steelworkers, and
the Tri-State Conference on Steel. The suit sought to prevent U.S.
Steel's announced shutdown of its Youngstown plants.33 2 The broad
coalition of plaintiffs reflected the wide array of social forces opposing
the plant closings.
326 Leon Fink, Labor, Liberty, and the Law: Trade Unionism and the Problem of the American
Constitutional Order, 74 J. Am. HIST. 904, 912 (1987). Terrence Powderly, a leader of the
Knights of Labor, later recalled that "[m]aybe we placed a too implicit faith in what the
Declaration of Independence held out to us." Id. at 914.
327 WILIAM FORBATH, LAW & THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 136-87
(1991).
328 Id. at 136.
329 Staughton Lynd, The Genesis of the Idea of a Community Right to Industrial Property in
Youngstown and Pittsburgh, 1977-1987, 74J. AMER. HisT. 926, 929 (1987). Lynd states that
the Constitutional argument against plant-closings is "best understood as a variant of the
artisan republicanism espoused in earlier epochs by Thomas Paine and the mechanics of
the American Revolution, by the working men's parties of the 1820s and 1830s, by the local
labor parties associated with the Knights of Labor in the 1880s, and by (less well known)
local labor parties active betweerl 1929 and 1936."
330 LYND, supra note 11, at 6-9; see also 10,000 Jobs Lost in Youngstown, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 1987, at A8 (steel industry jobs declined from 90,000 to 22,000 in Pittsburgh).
331 LYND, supra note 11, at 9-11.
332 Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1 (N.D.
Ohio 1980).
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The complaint articulated in legal terms the feelings of ordinary
steelworkers and a substantial section of the community. U.S. Steel
had made a promise to keep the Youngstown mills open if they could
be made profitable.338 The workers had agreed to a variety of conces-
sions, worked hard, and relied on that promise to their detriment,33 4
yet U.S. Steel had breached its promise. The workers' contract theory
was promissory estoppel. The complaint later added a second, more
radical theory, actually suggested by the district court judge trying the
cases, that a community "property right has arisen from [the] lengthy,
long-established relationship between United States Steel, the steel in-
dustry as an institution, the community in Youngstown, the people in
Mahoning County and the Mahoning Valley in having given and de-
voted their lives to this industry."33 5 The contract theory could cer-
tainly be viewed as falling within well-established law;3 3 6 the
community right to property was a more radical interpretation and
revamping of property law.3 37
The Youngstown elite generally viewed the lawsuit as futile. The
mayor of Youngstown thought it was a ridiculous, silly, pathetic, and
contemptible lawsuit.33 8 The International Steelworkers Union did
not join the plaintiffs, and one important reason for that failure may
have been the Union's perception that the lawsuit could not
succeed.339
Much of the community, however, supported the litigation.
Other methods short of litigation had been tried in prior plant clos-
ings, and the workers felt that there was virtually no other
alternative.340
In a preliminary hearing before District Court Judge Lambros,
the plaintiffs won a preliminary injunction against the plant clos-
333 492 F. Supp. at 4; Local 1330, United Steelworkers v. United States Steel Corp., 631
F.2d 1264, 1270-1273 (6th Cir. 1980).
334 631 F.2d at 1274-76.
335 Proceeding Heard Before The Honorable Thomas D. Lambros on Feb. 28, 1980,
quoted in 631 F.2d at 1280.
336 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACS § 90 (1981).
337 Both theories, however, were based on the same basic notion that the workers and
community had some reliance interest built up over many years of interaction with the
company. CompareJoseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Prpen, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611
(1988) with Daniel A. Farber &John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law
and the Invisible Handshake, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 903, 93842 (1985). For this reason the two
theories were often intermingled and confused even in the minds of the litigators at the
time.
338 Interview with Staughton and Alice Lynd, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (Aug. 1993).
339 Id.
340 The workers petitioned, demonstrated, and negotiated unsuccessfully with the
companies to avert shutdown. Interview with Staughton and Alice Lynd.
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ing.3 41 Judge Lambros responded to the plaintiffs' argument with a
rambling discourse in which he (1) proclaimed sympathy for the
workers' plight; (2) expressed grave doubts about the court's ultimate
jurisdiction over the case; (3) suggested the radical idea, as yet unpro-
posed by the plaintiffs, that the workers and community might have a
property right to the U.S. Steel mills; and (4) granted the
injunction.3 42
The trial was held in Youngstown in early March. The judge dis-
missed the plaintiffs' claims in a thirty-seven-page opinion that ex-
pressed great sympathy for the workers' situation, but rejected the
promissory estoppel claim3 43 and found no community property right.
Although he himself had suggested the argument, the judge's opinion
held that "this new property right[] is not now in existence in the
code of laws of our nation."' 4
By the time of the trial, the workers' activist movement to keep
the mills open had dissipated, and the lawsuit represented the only
significant resistance to the company's decision. An appeal to the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, argued by Arthur Kinoy and Staughton
Lynd, also failed. Before the argument, Kinoy felt that they had no
chance, but as always happens to litigators in such situations, when he
got up to argue, a wave of hope and faith overcame his pessimism.345
Unfortunately, his initial instincts were correct. The Sixth Circuit's
Chief Judge Edwards, who, like Judge Lambros, was considered a lib-
eral, wrote the appellate court's decision denying relief. The opinion
characterized the workers' suit as "a cry for help from steelworkers
and townspeople in the City of Youngstown," 346 but found no basis for
granting their claim.3 47
341 The plaintiffs' case was argued at trial by Staughton Lynd along with former Attor-
ney General Ramsey Clark.
342 Interview with Staughton and Alice Lynd, supra note 338.
343 See Farber & Matheson, supra note 337, at 938 (summarizing Local 1330, United
States Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1, 4-10 (D. Ohio 1980):
(1) no definite promise was made; (2) the company statements plaintiffs relied on were
made by lower-level company officials; and (3) the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that
the condition precedent to keeping the plants open-the mills renewed profitability-had
indeed been achieved).
344 492 F. Supp. at 10.
345 Interview with Arthur Kinoy, New York, N.Y. (Oct. 1993).
346 Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264, 1265
(6th Cir. 1980).
347 Id.; see also Steel Valley Authority v. Union Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006 (3d
Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 484 U.S. 1021 (action to prevent the closing of a factory before a
governmental authority could formulate a plan of acquisition); Serrano v. Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Co., 790 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir. 1986) (challenge to shutdown of Campbell Works
Coke Ovens in Youngstown, in which the court also denied relief); Fran Ansley, 81 GEo.
LJ. 1757, 1813-18, 1834-35, 1848-51, 1853-55 (1993). Yet the court affirmed Lambros's
decision. Although Staughton Lynd and the Youngstown and Pittsburgh communities
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Some of the legal services lawyers who had worked on the case
were devastated by the legal defeat 3 48 Lynd was, of course, saddened
and distressed, but had recognized that defeat was probably in the
offing. He remembers a recurring image that visited him throughout
the legal battle: "Soviet tanks were rolling into Hungary in 1956, and
kids were picking up bricks and throwing the bricks against the tanks.
I saw myself as one of the kids."49
Despite the legal loss, the litigation left a legacy. It generated a
significant amount of publicity. It allowed the steelworkers of Youngs-
town to gain the nation's attention, to "make a claim on the reason
and conscience of the community."350 The lawsuit was "one more
voice asserting that the mill closings were wrong."35' 1
The lawsuit also gave voice to the steelworkers' own stories and
aspirations. It was important to Lynd that the legal theory articulate
the injustice felt by the ordinary people of Youngstown. For Lynd, the
most important thing that a lawyer for a marginalized group of people
could do was to articulate their stories and aspirations and to help
define their issues in court. He and the other lawyers gave voice to
the victims of Youngstown. Both the district court and court of ap-
peals decisions left a strong narrative record of the injustice of the
plant closings.3 52
Moreover, the lawsuit provided a focus for a community's affirma-
tion of its identity. As Bob Vasquez, one of the workers' leaders, said,
"It saved people's dignity that they made that fight for the mill."3 53 Or
as John Barbaro put it, 'Youngstown sure died hard."3 54
A decade later, another devasting plant closing sparked a simi-
larly radical litigation. General Motors, after obtaining years of tax
abatements from the town of Ypsilanti, Michigan in return for a prom-
ise to keep its auto factory located in that town open, nevertheless
closed the plant. The community sued GM in state court, making the
same claim that the Youngstown steelworkers had raised in their suit.
would bring subsequent cases challenging mill closings over the next five years, the legal
battle had been lost.
348 Interview with Staughton and Alice Lynd, supra note 338.
349 Id.
350 Id.
351 Id.
352 See, e.g., Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d
1264, 1270-77 (6th Cir. 1980) (reproducing verbatim the plaintiffs' complaint, which pro-
vided a vivid and detailed document of the breach of trust the company had committed).
353 Dorry Kraus & Carol Greenwall, Shout Youngstonm (Media Works 1984) (video pro-
duced on Youngstown struggle).
354 Interview with Staughton and Alice Lynd, supra note 338.
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This time, the plaintiffs won a judgment enjoining General Motors
from shutting the plant down.355
It is possible that the trial courtjudge in Charter Township of Ypsi-
lanti v. GM was simply more courageous than Judge Lambros had
been in the Youngstown case. However, the facts of the Ypsilanti case
were also much better for the plaintiffs' case: the company's promise
was clearer; the town's provision of tax abatements was stronger evi-
dence of detrimental reliance; and the plant was more profitable. In
addition, the decade of dramatic decline in the United States' indus-
trial base that followed the Youngstown case may have disproved an
earlier perception that the plant closing was a local problem or an
isolated incident. Whatever the complex mix of reasons, the Ypsilanti
community was able to persuade at least one judge that it had both
justice and the law on its side.
Ypsilanti's victory was reversed by the appellate court, and the
Michigan Supreme Court denied Ypsilanti leave to appeal.356 Never-
theless, the Ypsilanti case demonstrates that the Youngstown vision
lives on in other communities, despite the defeat suffered by the
Youngstown workers. Furthermore, one trial court judge saw suffi-
cient merit in their legal arguments to grant their claim.
The Youngstown litigation helped to create a narrative, an alter-
native legal vision, supported by communities that are committed to
fighting for that vision. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court
used an argument similar to that put forth by the Youngstown plain-
tiffs in a case involving dairy farmers5 57 This case was decided during
the pendency of the Ypsilanti case. While the Michigan Court of Ap-
peals distinguished that case from Ypsilanti,35 8 the tension between
the application of the Youngstown plaintiffs' legal theory to the dairy
farm context but not to plant closings will probably spark further
struggle. In addition, several prominent law review articles have criti-
cized the decision in Local 1330 v. United States Steel359 Youngstown
may have died hard, but in its death it created legal meaning and a
narrative of resistance that will live on in the struggles of other work-
ers and communities for decades and generations to come.
355 Charter Township ofYpsilanti v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL
132385 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1993).
356 Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich.
App.), leave denied, 509 N.W.2d 152 (Mich. 1993).
357 State Bank of Standish v. Curry, 500 N.W.2d 104 (Mich. 1993).
358 506 N.W.2d at 559 n.2.
359 See, e.g., Farber & Matheson, supra note 337, at 939-42.
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IV
THE SISYPHEAN QUEST: FoREIGN PoLIcY LITIGATION IN THE
1980s
In the 1980s, I participated in litigation that challenged interven-
tionist United States foreign policy in Central America. That effort
shared some characteristics with the four narratives of Part III. We
articulated a fundamental critique of an imperial United States un-
justly intervening abroad, and we expressed a vision of a redemptive
future in which popular revolutionary movements in Latin America
would throw off the yoke of empire and establish just societies. We
viewed our lawsuits as a means to educate and mobilize a complacent
American population, and we challenged the present reality by invok-
ing tradition. Our vision of the future was premised on legal symbols
from America's revolutionary past and its recent, searing experience
in Vietnam. However, in certain important respects, our litigation was
different. The term that seems best to capture the essence of our
struggle is "Sisyphean," not "prophetic."
The first notable difference between our litigation and those al-
ready described was in our invocation of tradition. The litigators dis-
cussed above relied on alternative legal symbols to inform the
constitutional text: natural rights, the Declaration of Independence,
and notions of republican government. Their key dilemma was how
to reconcile the Framers' toleration of slavery, women's second-class
citizenship, and limited employee rights with their radical interpreta-
tions. In virtually all of these cases the judiciary responded with posi-
tivistic reserve: a court must uncover the law as it is, not as it should
be.
Conversely, we appealed to symbols rooted in the mainstream of
constitutional law: the text of the Constitution, early congressional
enactments, and a series of reform statutes such as the War Powers
Resolution and the International Economic Emergency Powers Act
that Congress enacted in the wake of the Vietnam War. Most of our
cases were premised on textual analysis of the Constitution with refer-
ence to the post-Vietnam War legal framework by which Congress im-
plemented the constitutional design. Our arguments relied heavily
on the original intent of the Framers of these legal instruments. We
invoked Article I, Section Eight's explicit provision to Congress of the
power to declare war,360 the War Powers Resolution's 60-day limitation
of executive authority to introduce troops into hostile situations, 361
360 See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), affd, 770 F.2d 202
(D.C. Cir. 1985), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 384-96; see also Dellums v.
Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990) (challenging President Bush's constitutional au-
thority to go to war against Iraq without congressional authorization).
361 See infra notes 867-83 and accompanying text.
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and the Neutrality Act's command that "whoever" conspires to attack
another country with which the United States is at peace is guilty of a
crime. 62
A number of my friends questioned what they saw as the inher-
ently conservative nature of our arguments. We adopted essentially
the jurisprudence articulated by the Reagan Administration at the
time. However, while the cases presented themselves as conservative
ventures to enforce past law and not to create new legal meaning, they
in fact posed a radical threat to the contemporary social order. This
apparent paradox made clear that the "conservative" social order had
no commitment to the original constitutional design or to the laws
that attempted to reinforce it. It was equally heedless of the nation's
history. The post-Vietnam statutes that we claimed had been violated
represented the culmination of intense political struggles. Our task as
lawyers was to force society to remember the anti-intervention strug-
gles over the Indochina War despite the government's collective am-
nesia. As Cornel West has written, lawyers are well-suited to the
struggle against such amnesia because we "have close contact with the
concrete traces and residues of the struggles and battles of the
past."3 63 We were seeking to invoke historic lessons that the govern-
ment wanted to forget and to enforce statutes and constitutional pro-
visions that the government was unwilling to enforce.
If the prophetic litigations described in Part III were attempts to
bridge the gap between the written law "that is" and the law "that
ought to be," our litigation focused more heavily on the contradiction
between the law "that is" and the state's lack of commitment to that
law. Our challenge to the political reality came not from a utopian
vision of law but rather from the subversive nature of litigating the
conflict between the law as is and the law as enforced. Both strategies
force society to confront the divergence between law's myth and its
reality, but in different ways.
The difference between litigating "law that is" and litigating "law
that ought to be," is not as clear as the preceding paragraph suggests.
For the "law that is" almost always can be subject to different interpre-
tations, and history is never as clear as the distinction drawn above
may suggest. Yet there does seem to me to be an important distinc-
tion between relying on laws and constitutional provisions that most
mainstream scholars would agree were intended to limit Executive
power and the radical abolitionist argument that the Constitution was
an antislavery document which assaulted the fundamental precepts of
most lawyers and political leaders of the age.
362 See infra notes 401-32 and accompanying text.
363 West, supra note 65, at 473.
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This basic difference in the use of history led to differences in the
judicial response. The New Jersey Slave Case, Minor v. Happersett, Plessy
v. Ferguson, and Local 660 v. U.S. Steel all were resolved on the merits.
The courts denied the radical claims by invoking a positivistic jurispru-
dence that distinguishes law from justice. With a few exceptions, the
courts that heard our cases abstained on the merits, invoking judicial
incompetence. Indeed, in a number of cases, the courts admitted that
our view of the law's requirements was correct, but still withheld a
remedy.
More importantly, the pursuit of narrow, technical arguments
threatened to take us further from our vision ofjustice than any of the
prophetic litigators had in their cases. We had a very strong substan-
tive argument, but faced difficulty in forcing the courts to deal with
the merits rather than treating the case as a political question. As the
decade of the 1980s proceeded, we narrowed our claims and argu-
ments. The courts often would abstain in one case, but leave us an
opening for the next case. We would then try to fit within the open-
ing the prior court had left, only to be blocked by some new proce-
dural issue. The ongoing battle resembled a journey through a
Kafkaesque maze, instead of a clarion call for justice. The question
increasingly became how to navigate through the maze rather than
how to articulate our vision of justice. Ironically, it seemed that our
entire goal became procedural: forcing the court to engage our
claims.
This procedural maze, combined with several other factors, di-
luted the passion and pathos in our legal argument, features that are
central to the prophetic vision of law. Our clients were thousands of
miles away, far removed from the courtroom, and we were often argu-
ing not about their basic rights but about some abstract, technical pro-
cedural or separation-of-powers issue. While we attempted in various
ways to overcome this dilemma, we never were able to reach the emo-
tional appeal of a slave case, of Susan Anthony being deprived the
right to vote, or of workers in danger of losing theirjobs. At times, we
appeared more like the lonely Sisyphus pushing his rock up the hill
than emotional agitators stirring a crowd to action.
That many of our cases primarily raised separation-of-powers is-
sues and not individual rights made it difficult to engage both the
courts and nation. The culture of rights that Americans have con-
structed was not easily transferable to separation-of-powers claims,
although it is possible that our cases, like the Vietnam War litigation
of the 1960s and 1970s are part of a process of including separation-
of-powers issues in that culture of legal struggle. We did have a broad
alternative prophetic vision of the law in which international law and
democratic principles of governance would bind the political
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branches' conduct of foreign policy, and in that respect our cases
were similar to the prophetic cases discussed in the previous part. We
also attempted to connect individual rights to that vision, often by in-
tegrating a rights-based claim into a broad attack on U.S. foreign pol-
icy. We were moved by the human suffering U.S. policies were
causing in Central America, and tried to connect that human dimen-
sion of the case with the legal principles we were litigating. But the
fact that in many of our cases the individual rights aspect was secon-
dary, did make it harder for the lawsuits to serve as a prophetic vehicle
of passionate engagement with the broader community.
Finally, our cases clearly demonstrate the role that the political
environment can play in judicial decisionmaking. Unlike the aboli-
tionist and suffrage cases, there were few persuasive arguments that
the substantive law did not support us. Although the Court's jurisdic-
tion and propriety of judicial intervention were often hotly contested
issues, our position, like Albion Tourgee's in Pessy, proved untenable
mainly because of the political climate rather than the state of the law.
Judges were not about to halt U.S. intervention abroad because they
accepted the general elite consensus that the political branches
should be free to decide such issues on their own.
A. Nicaragua and El Salvador: The Early Cases
In 1981, Ronald Reagan took office as the fortieth President of
the United States. He was committed to defeating the revolutionary
forces in El Salvador and overturning the Nicaraguan, Cuban, and
Grenadian revolutions, but his international policy had constitutional
implications: a strongly interventionist policy led to the evasion and
evisceration of the legal restraints on Executive power enacted in the
wake of the Vietnam War.
The Reagan Administration's immediate plan was to escalate U.S.
military involvement in the Salvadoran civil war and to arm, train, and
direct counterrevolutionaries to attack Nicaragua.36 In early 1981,
without the approval of Congress, the Reagan Administration pro-
vided twenty-five million dollars in military aid and fifty-six U.S. mili-
tary advisors to the government of El Salvador.365 Later that year, the
CIA began covertly to arm Nicaraguan Contras based in Florida and
Honduras.3 66
364 SeeJim Morrell, Back Door Aid Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1981, at A31.
365 Morrell, supra note 364, at A31; U.S. Envoy Stresses Commitment to SalvadorJunta N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 1981, atA13.
366 U.S. Said to Authorize Anti-Nicaragua Forces, N.Y. TMcS, Mar. 10, 1982, at A7; The
Worst-Kept Secret War, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1982, at A30; Florida Reported Site of Anti-Sandinista
Action, Dec. 20, 1982, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file.
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The Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) reacted to these de-
velopments by filing two broad, highly politicized challenges to U.S.
foreign policy in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Both cases combined
claims alleging executive usurpation of congressional war powers with
claims that the Executive was aiding the commission of human rights
violations in the two Latin American nations. Both cases were
brought to help spur the anti-interventionist movement in the United
States.
1. Crockett v. Reagan
Michigan Congressman George Crockett, a prominent member
of the National Lawyers Guild with a history of involvement in popular
movements, called the Center for Constitutional Rights regarding the
dispatch of fifty-six U.S. military advisors to El Salvador without con-
gressional approval. The CCR lawyers were at first reluctant to pursue
the case, knowing full well the failure of the courts to strike down
executive unilateral war-making during the Vietnam War era. It did
seem, however, that the Reagan Administration was violating the War
Powers Resolution. That Resolution, enacted over President Nixon's
veto in 1973,867 imposed a sixty-day limit on Executive authority to
introduce U.S. troops into hostilities, after which the President must
obtain congressional authorization or withdraw the troops. 368 The ad-
visors in El Salvador were drawing "hostile fire pay," accompanying
Salvadoran troops on combat missions and aiding one side in an
ongoing, bloody civil war.369 Yet the Administration had not sought
congressional approval as required by the War Powers Resolution.
The CCR agreed to file what would be the first major test of the War
Powers Resolution.
The CCR also wanted to challenge the United States' provision of
military aid to a country in which violations of human rights had
reached epidemic proportions.370 Section 502B of the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1961 prohibited the provision of any security assistance "to
any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern
of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."371
While the CCR lawyers knew that the human rights claim would be
367 Pub. L No. 93-148, § 7, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548
(1988)).
368 50 U.S.C. § 1545(b) (1988) (giving the President the power to extend the authority
for one additional 30-day period, after which it would automatically terminate).
369 See RAYMOND BONNER WEAKNFSS & DECEIT U.S. Pouc"v AND EL SALVADOR 274-75
(1984).
370 For a description of the wave of terror unleashed by the Salvadoran government,
see ROBERT ARMSTRONG & JANEr SHENK, EL SALVADOR: THE FACE OF REVOLUTION 137-81
(1982).
371 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (1988).
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even more difficult to litigate than the war powers claims, they felt
that an important part of the lawsuit was educating the public about
the atrocities occurring in El Salvador.
Crockett v. Reagan,3 72 was filed by eleven members of Congress,
who were ultimately joined by eighteen others.3 73 The complaint in
this first case requested extremely strong relief in the form of an in-
junction ordering the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. troops, weap-
ons, military equipment, and aid from El Salvador. Some have argued
that requesting narrower relief, such as simply requiring the President
to file a report pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, would have
made the case easier to win.3 74 Indeed, it was unthinkable that a court
would order immediate withdrawal, and the intrusiveness of the re-
quested relief may have politicized the case in the judge's mind. The
CCR's interest, however, went beyond winning to publicizing illegal
conduct. Likewise, the members of Congress who joined the suit were
able to convey a strong political position, regardless of the outcome.
District CourtJudgeJoyce Hens Green granted the government's
motion to dismiss the case.3 75 Green, a fairly liberal judge, held that
the human rights claim based on the violation of the Foreign Assist-
ance Act was barred by the equitable discretion doctrine, which coun-
sels judicial abstention where a congressional plaintiff's dispute is
primarily with his or her fellow legislators.376 Congress had enacted
another statute allowing aid to El Salvador if the President certified
that the Salvadoran government was making a concerted effort to
comply with internationally recognized human rights.377 The Presi-
dent had done so twice, although those certifications had been chal-
lenged by some members of Congressas "akin to calling night, day or
a duck, an eagle."378 In these circumstances Judge Green found plain-
tiffs' dispute to be primarily with their fellow members of Congress.3 79
372 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982).
373 The lawyers and some of the congressional plaintiffs held a press conference the
day the lawsuit was filed. The members of Congress were surprisingly militant. Future
senators Barbara Mikulski and Tom Harkin attacked the human rights record of the Salva-
doran government while Congressmen Crockett, Frank, and Lowry focused on the War
Powers Resolution violation. Although local TV and the major wire services attended the
press conference, the CCR failed to attract the national papers like the New York Times and
The Washington Post or network TV. Conversation with Michael Ramer, Lawyer for the
Plaintiffs (Sept. 1993).
374 John H. Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 1379, 1416-17 (1988) (relying on Crockett in reaching the conclusion that a suit for
immediate withdrawal of troops requires an inquiry that is inappropriate for judicial
determination).
375 Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982).
376 Id. at 902.
377 Id.
378 Id.; see also Barbara Crossette, Congress Sends Three Study Teams to El Salvador, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 1982, at Al.
379 558 F. Supp. at 902.
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The War Powers Resolution claim was more difficult for the court
to resolve. Green agreed that the complaint's factual allegations were
"at a minimum disturbing."38 0 The court however could not engage
in the fact-finding necessary to determine whether U.S. forces had
been introduced into hostilities in El Salvador. Therefore, the case
presented a nonjusticiable political question.38 '
Nonetheless, Judge Green left the door slightly ajar for a future
case. According to Green's opinion, were the United States to be in-
volved in a major military conflict, a court could enforce the War Pow-
ers Resolution, at least to the extent of ordering the President to
report to Congress. 382 Attempting to get any case through that crack,
however, would prove to be a Sisyphan venture.
The court of appeals affirmed the next year in a brief per curiam
opinion agreeing with the district court.38 3 The Crockett decision sig-
naled that the courts would not enforce the War Powers Resolution
absent a full-scale war.
What had the litigation gained? It had helped build the popular
movement against intervention in El Salvador. Despite the absence of
national media coverage, the CCR used the lawsuit as a vehicle for
organizing a major effort against U.S. intervention in El Salvador.
The CCR published a pamphlet detailing the Executive's violations of
law; spoke at fora and bar association meetings around the country;
and collaborated with the National Lawyers Guild to form a lawyers
group against U.S. intervention in Central America and in favor of
self-determination for the countries in that region.
Crockett v. Reagan was a bold case, challenging the legal order to
live up to its post-Vietnam statutes. That the plaintiffs lost was no sur-
prise; they had stood on a principle the courts were simply unwilling
to enforce. Moreover, the Crockett court had not totally closed the
door, although the crack it left open seemed to be more theoretical
than real.
2. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan
The case of Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan38 4 was brought by Nicara-
guan citizens, members of Congress, and U.S. citizens to enjoin the
covert war against Nicaragua and to recover damages for the Nicara-
guan plaintiffs who were tortured, raped, murdered, kidnapped, or
380 Id. at 898.
381 Id. at 899.
382 Id. at 898, 900. The Court thus rejected the plaintiffs' claim for strong relief in the
form of U.S. withdrawal.
383 Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1261
(1984).
384 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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wounded by the Contras. The case was like the Crockett litigation in
that it requested broad relief that a court was unlikely to grant.
Although the lawyers at the CCR were no more optimistic about
their chances of winning Sanchez than they had been about prevailing
in Crockett, the Sanchez case also served some valuable goals. First, the
case was one of the earliest attempts to tell the story of what was hap-
pening in Nicaragua and to portray the Contras as a ruthless band of
murderers and rapists who terrorized the civilian population. Michael
Ratner and other lawyers at the CCR had undertaken a substantial
human rights investigation, making several trips to Nicaragua to un-
cover the facts of the brutalities committed by the Contras. The com-
plaint setting forth those facts was republished in a book on
Nicaragua 85 and got the Nicaraguans' story heard in the United
States.
Second, the complaint was a springboard for political organizing.
The CCR in conjunction with various artists, filmmakers, and poets
organized a multimedia event about the case at New York University
in the summer of 1983. Ratner and others spoke about the case
around the country and used it to mobilize the National Lawyers
Guild and other lawyers against the covert war.
Third, the case had an impact in Nicaragua. While the main-
stream U.S. press paid little attention to the case, Sanchez was front
page news in Nicaragua. That U.S. lawyers had filed a legal challenge
to U.S. policy in U.S. courts served, at least in a small way, to
strengthen the resolve of the Nicaraguans fighting the Contras.
Fourth, the CCR lawyers creatively linked the Contra human
rights violations committed in Nicaragua to the problem of aggressive
and unilateral executive war-making. There were two basic claims
raised in Sanchez. First, that the U.S. government and its Contra
agents were committing human rights violations in Nicaragua that
were actionable under the Alien Tort Act; and second, that the Execu-
tive was conducting a covert war in Nicaragua in violation of the Con-
stitution and applicable statutes.
Sanchez, like Crockett, raised both human rights and separation-of-
powers issues. The CCR was criticized for presenting too many claims
in one case, thus allowing the court to sidestep the Nicaraguan plain-
tiffs' human rights tort claim.38 6 However, the CCR was developing an
important theory that the two issues were in fact linked. The Reagan
Administration intervention in El Salvador and Nicaragua had no re-
spect for law: constitutional law, statutory law, or international human
rights law. Moreover, and more importantly, U.S. intervention was
385 THE NICARAGUA READER: DocuMENs OF A REVOLUTION UNDER FiRE 228-36 (Peter
Rosset &John Vandermeer eds., 1983).
386 Human Rights Conference, supra note 42, at 137, 140.
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fundamentally undemocratic, as evidenced by its lack of popular sup-
port.3 87 Continuation of the intervention therefore required both cir-
cumventing the democratic process here and terrorizing the
population there. Human rights violations and war powers subterfuge
were integral and related aspects of the policy.
Finally, Sanchez tested "the limits of the independent authority of
law."388 In 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had
held in Filartiga v. Pena-rala38 9 that a Paraguayan citizen could bring a
civil action in a U.S. court against the Paraguayan police chief for tor-
ture committed in Paraguay. The plaintiffs in Filartiga had invoked
the 1789 Alien Tort Act, which allows foreign nationals to sue in U.S.
courts over violations of international law. The Sanchez plaintiffs struc-
tured their claims similarly to the claim upheld in Filartiga. Only the
defendants were different: the plaintiffs in Sanchez were suing Ameri-
can rather than Paraguayan officials. It seemed "a common sense
proposition... that United States courts should apply principles of
international law as rigorously to United States officials as to foreign
officials."39 0
The courts avoided responding to that proposition. The district
court dismissed all of the claims as presenting nonjusticiable political
questions.39 ' To adjudicate those claims would require the court to
"determine the precise nature and extent of the U.S. government's
involvement in the affairs of several Central American nations."392 Be-
cause the "covert activities of CIA operatives in Nicaragua and Hondu-
ras are perforce even less judicially discoverable than the level of
participation by U.S. military personnel in hostilities in El Salvador,"
the court relied on Crockett to dismiss.393 Apparently, the CIA may
engage in widespread covert torture, murder and rape abroad with
judicial immunity, since covert activities are inherently judicially un-
manageable. The court's analysis was not altered by the fact that the
plaintiffs' human rights were involved: the war powers and tort claims
were equally subject to the political question doctrine's broad sweep.
The court of appeals affirmed, using different language but none-
theless articulating the same basic principle.3 94 Then-Judge Scalia
found that the doctrine of sovereign immunity protected the federal
387 Lou Cannon, Two Objectives, Polls Apart, WASH. POST, June 10, 1985, at A2.
388 David Cole, Challenging Covert War. The Politics of the Political Question Doctrine, 26
HARV. INT'L LJ. 155, 158 (1985).
389 680 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
390 Cole, supra note 388, at 156; see also Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power.
Conflicts Between Foreign Policy & International Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1071 (1985) (discussing
the Filartiga decision).
391 Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1988).
392 Id. at 601.
393 Id. at 600.
394 Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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officials from suit for damages under the Alien Tort Statute.a95 Scalia
denied plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief because in "so sensitive a
foreign affairs matter as this"8 9 6 a court should exercise its discretion
to withhold equitable relief. Even in the absence of the sovereign im-
munity defense, the plaintiffs' damages action would have failed be-
cause the sensitive nature of the challenged conduct precluded a
private right of action.
The defeat in Sanchez was total. At no point in the litigation did
the courts look at the human consequences of U.S. policy in Central
America.3 97 And, unlike Crockett, Sanchez left not even a slight crack
through which future plaintiffs might attempt to wriggle.
Moreover, many in the human rights community questioned
whether Sanchez should have been brought. They focused on the bad
precedent created and questioned, "[H] ow successful is a highly pub-
licized case if the legal result presents a new hurdle for future liti-
gants?"a98 After Sanchez, some opined that a broad range of questions
formerly open for adjudication could be considered nonjusticiable.3 99
As one participant in a 1985 human rights conference argued, "If the
primary goal of those who brought the suit was simply to direct public
and media attention to the situation in Nicaragua... , congressional
trips to Nicaragua could have produced a positive dramatic effect
without creating bad precedent."400 Despite such criticism, the law-
yers at the CCR still felt that the lawsuit had been valuable for pub-
licizing the human rights abuses committed by the Contras.
The Sanchez and Crockett cases displayed important aspects of the
prophetic litigation discussed in the prior section. By intertwining
395 Id. at 206. The opinion relegates to a foomote its response to the troubling Far-
tiga analogy:
Since the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity is quite distinct from the
doctrine of domestic sovereign immunity that we apply here, being based
upon considerations of international comity rather than separation of pow-
ers it does not necessarily follow that an Alien Tort Statute suit filed against
the officer of a foreign sovereign would have to be dismissed. Thus, noth-
ing in today's decision necessarily conflicts with the decision of the Second
Circuit in Filartiga ....
Id. at 207 n.5 (citations omitted). Scalia's attempt to construct a legalistic distinction be-
tween Filartiga and Sanchez made no sense. Why should considerations of international
comity be less weighty than those presented by separation of powers? Nor is it obvious that
U.S. courts ought to be less reluctant to adjudicate damages against foreign officials ac-
cused of torturing aliens abroad than to adjudicate similar actions against executive branch
officials, with whom the courts share the task of governing. Scalia had simply come up with
a distinction without content.
396 Id. at 208.
397 Gibney, Courts as Teachers in A Vital National Seminar on Human Rights in Gib-
ney: World Justice, U.S. Courts and International Human Rights.
398 Human Rights Conference, supra note 42, at 149.
399 Id.
400 Id.
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human rights and war powers claims, each case radically critiqued
U.S. policy as not merely violative of separation of powers, but anti-
democratic and inhumane as well. The broad relief requested made
clear that redemption, not minor reform, was the goal. Only an ab-
rupt halt to U.S. intervention in the two countries would remedy the
alleged infractions. The litigators were deeply involved in the popular
struggles both here and in Latin America, and the complaints re-
flected the passion of their involvement. The courts' refusal to adjudi-
cate these cases, their sterile decisions avoiding any discussion of the
human tragedy in Latin America, pointed the CCR in the direction of
narrower cases in which we might induce the courts to engage our
claims.
3. Dellums v. Smith
In Dellums v. Smith,4° 1 the CCR brought a narrower challenge to
the covert war against Nicaragua that sought more limited relief. Our
clients' aim was to avoid the broad political question problems raised
in Crockett and Sanchez, and to obtain a court ruling declaring that if
the facts alleged in press accounts were accurate, the President was
violating the law. Three of the Sanchez plaintiffs-Congressman Ron
Dellums, a Nicaraguan doctor, Myrna Cunningham, who had been
kidnapped and raped by the Contras, and Florida ACLU President
Eleanor Ginsberg, who lived close to the contra training camps-
wrote a letter to Attorney General Smith requesting an investigation
of whether top administration officials had violated the Neutrality Act
in aiding the Contras.4° 2 The Neutrality Act, enacted in 1794, de-
clares that:
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot
or provides or prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or
takes part in, any military or naval expedition or enterprise to be
carried on from thence against the territory or dominion of any
foreign... state... with whom the United States is at peace, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years,
or both.403
From a literal reading, it appeared that the Administration had
violated the Neutrality Act. Administration officials had provided at
least nineteen million dollars to finance covert paramilitary opera-
tions against the Nicaraguan government and had trained and organ-
ized the Contra forces, at least in part, in Florida.40 4 Thus, unless
401 573 F. Supp. 1489 (N.D. Cal. 1983), mot. denied, 577 F. Supp. 1449 (N.D. Cal. 1984),
rev'd on other grounds, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986).
402 See id. at 1492 (reproducing part of plaintiffs' letter).
403 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1988), as amended by Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2147 (1994).
404 Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1492.
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Congress had implicitly repealed or superseded the Neutrality Act,
CCR had a good claim.40 5
The procedural device CCR employed to get the case to court was
the Ethics in Government Act.40 6 That Act, passed in the wake of
Watergate to ensure that "no one, regardless of position, is above the
law,"407 required the Attorney General to conduct a preliminary inves-
tigation upon receipt of specific information from a credible source
that a high-level executive official had engaged in non-petty criminal
conduct.408 Dellums, Cunningham, and Ginsberg sent a letter detail-
ing their allegations and requesting preliminary investigation of seven
high government officials, including President Reagan, Secretary of
State Alexander Haig, and CIA Director William Casey. When the Jus-
tice Department refused to initiate the requested investigation, the
plaintiffs sued in the Northern District of California, Dellums's home
district.
The Administration argued that this case, like Sanchez, presented
a political question.40 9 However, the court was able to distinguish
Sanchez because we had structured the complaint to avoid the political
question pitfalls.410 District CourtJudge Wiegel held in his opinion in
Dellums.
Unlike the complaints in Crockett and Sanchez-Espinoza, the com-
plaint in the case at bar does not directly challenge the legality of
any action taken by the President.... The case before this Court
does not require any assessment by the Court as to the accuracy of
the data reported by plaintiffs to the Attorney General. The sole
issue is whether the report is sufficient to trigger the preliminary
investigation plaintiffs contend is required by the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act. The limited task requested of the Court is thus judicially
manageable, unlike those requested in Crockett and Sanchez-Espinoza.
Should plaintiffs prevail, the Attorney General, not the Court, will
investigate the allegations and then determine whether any prose-
cution is warranted as a matter of fact and law. There is conse-
quently no danger of "multifarious pronouncements" such as the
court feared in Sanchez-spinoza.... Nor is the Court asked to de-
clare any Presidential action illegal.41 '
405 I had written a law review article arguing that the Administration was violating the
Neutrality Act, and the case was structured along the lines suggested in that article. Jules
Lobel, The Rise and Decline of the Neutrality Act: Sovereignty and Congressional War Powers in
United States Foreign Policy, 24 HArv. INT'L L.J. 1 (1983).
406 28 U.S.C. §§ 591 et seq. (1988), as amended by Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 735, 736
(1994).
407 H.R. REP. No. 1307, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (quoting President Carter).
408 28 U.S.C. § 591 (1988).
409 Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1493.
410 Id. at 1493.
411 Id. at 1502 (footnote and citations omitted).
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The court ordered the Attorney General to conduct a preliminary
investigation.41 2
The Justice Department, probably confident that it would win on
jurisdictional grounds, had not argued the merits-namely whether
the Neutrality Act applied to covert paramilitary activities undertaken
with the President's approval. After Wiegel's opinion came out, the
government made a motion to alter the court'sjudgment, arguing for
the first time that the Neutrality Act does not apply to actions author-
ized by the President.413 The district court rejected that argument,
holding that the conclusion that the Neutrality Act requires universal
obedience and applies to the President is "well supported by the his-
tory" of the Act. 414 The language, history, and judicial precedents
made plaintiffs' reading of the Act "at least as persuasive as defend-
ants",415 and demonstrated the "reasonableness of the view that the
Act applies to all persons, including the President."416
The Attorney General appealed, and the Ninth Circuit stayed the
lower court judgment and ordered an expedited appeal. Almost two
and one-half years after the emergency appeal was argued, the court
issued a terse opinion dismissing the case. 417 The court declined to
address the district court's ruling on the scope of the Neutrality Act
and failed to respond to the government's political question argu-
ment. Instead, it held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge
the Attorney General's refusal to investigate. 418 The court relied on
two analogous D.C. Circuit cases419 to find that Congress "did not in-
tend to create procedural rights in private citizens sufficient to sup-
port standing to sue."420
The panel, composed ofJudges Fletcher, Fairchild,42 1 and Canby,
left a small opening in its opinion for future litigation. The court
stated that its opinion did not render the Ethics in Government Act
meaningless because the Attorney General's compliance with the Act
412 Id. at 1505.
413 Dellums v. Smith, 577 F. Supp. 1449, 1451 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
414 Id. at 1453.
415 Id. at 1452.
416 Id. at 1454.
417 Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986). A year after the Ninth Circuit
issued its decision, I received information that the delay was due to a dispute over the
rationale. Presumably, there was some sentiment on the court supporting a broader hold-
ing than the narrow dismissal based solely on standing.
418 Id. at 823.
419 Id. at 819, 823 (citing Banzhaf v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1984), and Na-
than v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
420 Id. at 823.
421 The Honorable Thomas E. Fairchild, Senior Circuit United States Judge for the
Seventh Circuit, sat by designation.
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remained subject to oversight by members of the congressional judici-
ary committees.422
We never had an opportunity to try that opening. On April 9,
1984, while Dellums was still pending in the court of appeals, a majority
of the Democratic members of the House Judiciary Committee in-
voked section 595 (e) of the Ethics Act and requested the appointment
of a special prosecutor to investigate violations of the Neutrality Act.
The Attorney General refused to do so. When the court of appeals
issued its opinion in Dellums, we urged the committee members to
renew their request. On October 17, 1986, two months after the court
of appeals' decision, a majority of Democrats on the House Judiciary
Committee again requested the appointment of a special prosecutor.
Had the Attorney General again denied their request, we would have
sought to intervene with the committee members to request reargu-
ment in the court of appeals or to start anew at the district court.
However, by this time, the allegations in our lawsuits had received
unwelcome confirmation. The Nicaraguans had shot down a plane
carrying an American, Eugene Hasenfus, and evidence was mounting
that the Administration was evading congressional restrictions on aid
to Nicaragua in addition to those imposed by the Neutrality Act.423
Attorney General Edwin Meese was forced to set in motion the investi-
gation that led to the Iran-Contra scandal and the appointment of
Special Prosecutor Lawrence Walsh. We declared political victory and
ended the Dellums v. Smith case.
What had been achieved by this lawsuit? First, for over two years
during the height of U.S. aid to the Contras, a district court ruling
strongly suggesting that the President was violating the Neutrality Act
stood untouched. As supporters of the Contras recognized, the Del-
lums case was "widely cited by opponents of U.S. policy in Central
America"424 as demonstrating the illegality of U.S. policy. The deci-
sion was prominently reported in Nicaragua. It also received signifi-
cant attention in the U.S. mainstream media, meriting attention by
the New York Times, The Washington Post, The McNeil-Lehrer News Hour,
and other smaller papers and broadcasts around the country.425 The
case also prompted two House Judiciary Committee requests for a spe-
422 797 F.2d at 823. Dellums, although a member of Congress, was not on the judiciary
committee and was suing as a private citizen.
423 See Milt Freudenheim et al., Trial of America in Managua Stirs Allegations on Aid, N.Y.
Timas, Oct. 26, 1986, at E2.
424 John N. Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World Orden 80 Am.
J. INT'L L. 43, 92 n.197 (1986).
425 Lawsuit on Contras Dismissed in California, N.Y. TIMm, Aug. 22, 1986, at A5; Stuart
Taylor, Jr., War Powers: Back in Court, N.Y. TiMs, Jan. 13, 1984, at A9; Nicaragua Aid Probe
Resisted, WASH. Posr, Jan. 18, 1989, at A17.
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cial prosecutor and contributed to the growing demand for accounta-
bility that eventually exposed the Iran-Contra scandal.
The Dellums case also focused attention on the question of the
lawfulness and legitimacy of covert warfare. Stuart Taylor, a New York
Times legal correspondent, wrote an in-depth story on the case and
noted that while there was "virtually no chance that Mr. Reagan or
anyone else will be prosecuted" for Neutrality Act violations, the Del-
lurs case illustrated the "legal ambiguities that arise whenever the
President supports guerrilla operations amid dispute as to whether
Congress has authorized them."426 To Taylor, the "ultimate issue" in
the case was not whether the President was violating the Neutrality
Act, but whether a covert war violates the "exclusive power of Con-
gress under the Constitution to declare war."42 7 Indeed, asJudge Wei-
gel recognized, one of the Neutrality Act's "major purposes was to
protect the constitutional power of Congress to declare war or author-
ize private reprisal against foreign states.1428 The observations that
arose from resolution of our case thus influenced the course of public
discussion of the Executive's power and responsibilities.
Moreover, Weigel's opinion on the Neutrality Act still survives,
despite the court of appeals' dismissal of the case. Because the Ninth
Circuit dismissed solely on jurisdictional grounds, Weigel's decision
remains the most prominent recent judicial interpretation of the
meaning of the Neutrality Act.429
The Sanchez and Dellums cases contain several of the important
indicia of prophetic litigation discussed in Part I. Both cases critiqued
U.S. policy, sought to exhort the population to debate that policy, and
were based on a history and tradition rooted in our country's found-
ing. We were recalling our early history just as the civil rights litigators
of the 1960s sought to uncover the equalitarian roots of radical recon-
struction and the prophets of the Old Testament exhorted the popu-
lation to return to historical tradition. In our case, we were focusing
426 Taylor, supra note 425, at A9.
427 Id. The National Law Journal also did a similar article. John Riley, Neutrality Act
Vwlated in Nkcaragua; Controversy Looms on Enforcement NAT'L LJ., Nov. 3, 1986, at 3.
428 Dellums v. Smith, 577 F. Supp. 1449, 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd on other grounds,
797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986).
429 But cf United States v. Terrell, 731 F. Supp. 473 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (dismissing a
Neutrality Act prosecution because the United States was not "at peace with Nicaragua").
As Professor John Hart Ely has written, "unless the Neutrality Act has been implicitly re-
pealed at least in part by the post-Viemam legislation-Delums v. Smith held that it was
not-'covert wars' not approved by Congress are not simply beyond the authority of the
executive branch, they are criminal." JOHN H. ELY, WAR AND REsPONSlBILrr 220 n.8 (1993)
(citations omitted). While Ely concludes that the recent congressional toleration of covert
wars implicitly does repeal criminal liability for Administration officials acting under the
president's direction, he recognizes the continued viability of the Neutrality Act's criminal
sanctions where the Congress has prohibited the particular war involved, as was the case
during different periods of time vis-i-vis Nicaragua. Id.
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on very early statutes whose purpose was to ensure that America was
not drawn into foreign conflict.430
Framing the Dellums case narrowly and requesting minimal re-
lief4' 3 had several consequences, however. First, it allowed us to win
in the district court, which thrust the case into the mainstream media,
gave our arguments much more legitimacy, and allowed us more ac-
cess to the broader community. Yet to a certain extent, the Dellums v.
Smith case lost the passion, human connectedness, and prophetic
quality of Sanchez and Crockett. We were drawn into an argument
about citizen standing under the Ethics Act and the meaning of the
obscure 1794 Neutrality Act. While all our public pronouncements
sought to emphasize the basic proposition that the President was not
above the law and that our policy toward Nicaragua was illegal, our
connectedness to the situation in Nicaragua was becoming more at-
tenuated. In a real sense, Dellums was a more academic case than
Sanchez.432 We had found a technical handle to get somewhere in the
courts-albeit not very far-but it came at the cost of diluting our
basic critique of U.S. policy and our compassion for and solidarity
with the Nicaraguan people.
The cases discussed so far demonstrate the failure of the courts to
address the issues we sought to litigate, whether we chose to litigate
those issues narrowly or broadly. In Crockett, we expected that by rely-
ing on positive law we could force a court to enforce the constitutional
and congressional design, but the courts declined our invitation with
limiting constructions. The Sanchez court rejected the plaintiffs'
broad claims by invoking broad doctrines ofjudicial abstention. The
Ninth Circuit panel in Dellums could not use the broad political ques-
tion doctrine to reject the plaintiffs' claims; we had jumped through
430 For example, the 1794 Neutrality Act at issue in Dellums and the Alien Tort Act
utilized by the plaintiffs in Sanchez were both designed to avoid Americans harming for-
eigners and thus offending foreign nations in a manner that could give rise to warfare.
431 The relief we sought was embarrassingly minimal, Dellums v. Smith, 577 F. Supp.
1449 (1984). We did not seek the appointment of a special prosecutor, merely the con-
ducting of a preliminary investigation. We virtually admitted that if the Attorney General
conducted a preliminary investigation, we could not challenge the outcome. We were es-
sentially asking the court to declare what the law was, without interfering with U.S. foreign
policy. I never understood why the Attorney General didn't just conduct an investigation
concluding that the Neutrality Act was inapplicable. Perhaps the Reagan Administration
wanted the challenge, was confident of the ultimate outcome and sought to demonstrate
concretely its utter disregard for respecting legal forms. Better to demonstrate the Ethics
in Government Act's impotency and the court's lack of resolve than to comply meekly with
Weigel's order and dispose of the issue.
If the Attorney General had conducted an investigation, that investigation itself might
have become part of a political debate on the Neutrality Act, a political debate the Admin-
istration wanted to avoid.
432 In Sanchez and Crocket the CCR had been drawn into a long legal argument about
justiciability, yet the human rights and war powers issues were more closely connected to
the heart of our efforts against the contras than was the Neutrality Act of 1794.
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that hoop by narrowly framing what was in fact a radical case. Thus,
in that case we suffered a narrow, technical defeat.
The Dellums court did leave us an opening, by suggesting that the
Judiciary Committee might have standing even though individual
members of Congress did not. But I suspect the opening was simply
theoretical; the appearance of the Judiciary Committee at the court's
doorstep undoubtedly would have led to the invocation of some other
doctrine-perhaps Executive discretion-to avoid confrontation with
a popular president over foreign policy. The quest for judicial relief
was appearing more Sisyphean with each passing case. But we were
not dissuaded by the mounting losses.
4. Barnes v. Kline and Beacon Products v. Reagan
Between 1984 and 1987, the CCR brought several other lawsuits
challenging U.S. involvement in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Partly in
reaction to the defeats suffered in Crockett and Sanchez, this later litiga-
tion tended to be more legalistic and procedurally oriented. Present-
ing narrow legal issues to avoid the jurisdictional and prudential
barriers to the early cases, these efforts were in many respects deeply
dissatisfying, because the arguments often strayed far from the under-
lying issue of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua. The later cases demon-
strated the weakness of using this kind of litigation as a tool for
organizing. In part because the issues were so legalistic, the cases
proved incapable of sustaining popular activism. The cases also took
so long to litigate that, by the time we reached a higher court, they
were generally moot. Moreover, our continuing campaign, while co-
ordinated and systematic, was reactive to the Administration's policy.
We thus had little control over when and where to fight our legal
battles.
The CCR revisited the Salvadoran human rights issue in Barnes v.
Kline,433 which challenged President Reagan's pocket veto of legisla-
tion that would have required a certification that human rights were
improving in El Salvador.434 This lawsuit, which the entire House of
Representatives and Senate eventually joined as plaintiffs, was a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of a presidential pocket veto. Unlike
Crockett v. Sanchez, the complaint in Barnes raised only the separation
of powers issue of the constitutionality of the President's pocket veto,
and not the broader political-legal question of the human rights viola-
tions being committed by the Salvadoran government with our aid.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled in the plaintiffs'
favor, but refused to expedite the case. The legislation expired after
433 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as moot sub nora. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361
(1987).
434 759 F.2d at 24.
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the Supreme Court agreed to hear the government's appeal, thus
mooting the case.43 5
Barnes v. Kline was an important case when filed because the
human rights community in the U.S. viewed the congressional man-
date that the President certify human rights improvement in El Salva-
dor as critical. The CCR's challenge to Reagan's pocket veto initially
attracted considerable interest and support both from members of
Congress and the activist community. The case did initially highlight
the Administration's utter lack of concern with the human rights rec-
ord of the Salvadoran government and helped spur debate on that
issue.
Eventually, however, despite the victory in the court of appeals,
the case was dissatisfying not only in its, result, but in its relationship to
the political movement. As the lawsuit dragged on, the abstract con-
stitutional question of whether a president could pocket veto legisla-
tion became paramount, and the political nature of the legislation he
had vetoed was rendered virtually irrelevant. Lead counsel Michael
Ratner felt that when the case reached the Supreme Court it
presented an abstract constitutional question disconnected from the
issue of whether our government should be permitted to foster
human rights violations abroad. 436 There was much less mass organiz-
ing around Barnes v. Kline than had been undertaken in the Crockett
litigation. Moreover, the litigation did not result in even a temporary
cessation of U.S. aid to El Salvador because it was mooted prior to any
final resolution.
In 1984 President Reagan declared that a state of national emer-
gency existed with Nicaragua, imposed an embargo on that country,
and terminated our Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
with Nicaragua.43 7 The CCR challenged the embargo and the termi-
nation of the Treaty in Beacon Products v. Reagan.438 As with Barnes v.
Kline, our main claims were very legalistic, and the effects of U.S. pol-
icy on the ordinary Nicaraguan were nowhere to be found in our com-
plaint or other documents. Unlike Barnes, we lost both in the district
court43 9 and the court of appeals.440
The filing of the Beacon Products complaint was important both to
the anti-intervention movement in the U.S. and the Nicaraguans. The
435 479 U.S. 361 (1987). Michael Ramer, the CCR lawyer for Congressman Barnes,
tried to expedite the appeal so that the Court could rule on the issue prior to the U.S. aid
being dispensed, but the Circuit refused to do so.
436 Conversation with Michael Ramer (Sept. 1993).
437 Exec. Order No. 12,513, 3 C.F.R. 342 (1986).
438 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987).
439 Beacon Prods. Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Mass. 1986), affd, 814 F.2d 1
(1st Cir. 1987).
440 814 F.2d at 1.
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embargo was a major issue, and our case did touch a chord with many
anti-U.S. intervention activists. At oral argument the district court was
packed with spectators, reflecting the interest in the case among polit-
ical activists. Moreover, our legal claims were strong, and challenged
imperial Executive power.
After losing in the district court, the case dragged on and activists
lost interest. Moreover, Congress amended the relevant statute to re-
move its unconstitutional aspect and forced us to make more techni-
cal arguments that were totally divorced from any important political
controversy. In hindsight, we should not have appealed after losing in
the district court.
Probably the only significant result of the Beacon Products litiga-
tion was to demonstrate conclusively that two key reform statutes of
the post-Vietnam era-the National Emergencies Act and the Interna-
tional Economic Emergency Powers Act-had been eviscerated by
Congress and the courts. However, that result certainly does not jus-
tify the expenditure of hundreds of hours of legal work that could
have been devoted to other projects.
B. Cuba
While the Reagan Administration had at first focused on shoring
up the tottering regime in El Salvador, by 1982 it was ready to strike at
what it saw as the "source of the problem"44' in Central America:
Cuba. Direct military intervention would have been too costly; in-
stead, the United States tightened the embargo against Cuba. Know-
ing that Cuba was expanding its tourist facilities, the Administration
announced on April 19, 1982, that it was imposing new restrictions on
travel to Cuba, effectively banning the average American from going
there.442
Many of the parties involved in framing our challenge to the ban
sympathized with the Cuban revolution and wanted to challenge this
extension of the policy of isolating Cuba and strangling its economy.
Furthermore, we all felt strongly about Americans' right to travel. But
we knew that a broad, principled challenge to the embargo as an un-
lawful interference with Cuba's sovereignty would be quickly dis-
missed by the courts, as would a broad First or Fifth Amendment
argument. In Haig v. Agee-43 the Supreme Court had held that "the
freedom to travel abroad.., is subordinate to national security and
foreign policy considerations; as such, it is subject to reasonable govern-
441 Excerpts from Haig's Briefing About El Salvador N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 21, 1981, § 1, at 6.
442 Barbara Crossette, U.S., Linking Cuba to rolence,' Blocks Tourist and Business TDips,
N.Y. TIME, Apr. 20, 1982, at Al.
443 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
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ment regulation."4 " The freedom to travel abroad was thus not par-
ticularly high on the Court's pantheon of rights.
However, a post-Vietnam War reform statute offered us hope.
The 1977 International Economic Emergencies Powers Act
(IEEPA)" 5 requires the President to declare a national emergency,
subject to congressional oversight, before imposing an economic em-
bargo on another nation. But in enacting the IEEPA, Congress had
decided not to address the divisive question of whether to terminate
the long-standing, and no longer emergency-based, 4 6 embargoes
against Cuba, North Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Korea. Therefore, the
IEEPA grandfathered those embargoes. 4 7 The legislative history
clearly indicated that this grandfather clause was a limited exception,
applicable only to allow the continuation of "existing uses" and not to
give the President "authority to expand what has already been
done."448 When the IEEPA was enacted in 1977, Americans were free
to travel to Cuba. The Reagan Administration had expanded the re-
strictions already in effect, but President Reagan had not declared a
new national emergency as required by IEEPA.
Uncovering the legislative history of IEEPA led us into a di-
lemma. Our perception that the courts were hostile to broad human
rights or anti-interventionist claims involving foreign policy had led us
to search for a procedural device with which challenge the President's
policy. The IEEPA seemed a strong candidate for such a challenge.
But tension existed between the broad values and constitutional prin-
ciples we and our clients wanted to vindicate, and the crabbed, techni-
cal terrain the courts were forcing us into. The prophetic vision of
presenting a radical challenge to the United States' imperial approach
to Cuba clashed with the search for a narrow space through which to
enter the legal maze.
This tension characterized the entire litigation of Wald v. Re-
gan.44 9 We were forced to spend a substantial portion of our briefs
and oral argument discussing the meaning of the obscure grandfather
clause in IEEPA. Moreover, the relief we sought under IEEPA was
444 Id. at 806 (emphasis added).
445 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1988).
446 In 1977 even the Administration agreed that there was no national emergency basis
for these continuing embargoes. Emergency Controls of International Economic Transactions:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on
International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 193 (1977) (remarks of L. Santo); see also id. at
110, 117, 119 (remarks of Rep. Bingham).
447 Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(b), 91 Stat. 1625 (1977).
448 Emergency Controls of International Economic Transactions: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., 147, 167, 189 (1977).
449 708 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1983), reu'd, 468 U.S. 222 (1984), reh'g denied, 469 U.S. 912
(1984).
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very narrow: We asked the court to order the President to comply
with the statutory requirements by declaring a national emergency
and submitting that declaration to Congress for review. While a court
was much more likely to order that relief than the relief sought in
Crockett or Sanchez, our clients wanted much more.
We attempted to resolve that tension by tying our technical
IEEPA argument to a broad attack on both the executive misuse of
emergency power against Cuba and the deprivation of the fundamen-
tal right to travel. When the case came before the Supreme Court,
Leonard Boudin, a great constitutional litigator, had planned to open
his argument with a broad discussion of the importance of affirming
the right to travel, and to tie the IEEPA argument into that point. But
at the last moment he, as many excellent litigators do, got an intuition
from listening to the Court's questions, and felt they wanted to hear
about the technicalities of IEEPA.
The case attracted a lot of publicity which almost always empha-
sized the broader issues at stake. After the Supreme Court decision,
New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis called it "the Court's most
important judgment of this or any recent terms" because underneath
the "dry lawyers' language" was a "worshipful view of executive power
... virtually assuming that anything the executive branch does under
the label 'foreign policy' is lawful."450
Our strategy of litigating a narrow legal issue and seeking limited
relief worked to an extent We lost in the district court, but won a
unanimous decision in the First Circuit Court of Appeals.45' Then-
Judge Breyer rejected the government's argument that because trade
with Cuba was already prohibited when the IEEPA was passed, regulat-
ing travel was not a new restriction but simply a restriction on the
trade of services rather than commodities. 45 2 The constitutional
dimensions of the freedom to travel distinguished the Reagan Admin-
istration ban from the preexisting trade embargo.45 3 After an exhaus-
tive search of the legislative history, the court concluded that the
government had not been regulating travel to Cuba on July 1, 1977,
and that the Reagan Administration had acted unlawfully by imposing
the new restrictions without complying with the IEEPA requirements.
The Supreme Court, by a bare five-to-four majority, overturned
the court of appeals' decision.454 Justice Rehnquist-writing for Jus-
tices O'Connor, Burger, White, and, surprisingly, Stevens-adopted
the government's arguments. "[T]he authority to regulate travel-re-
450 Anthony Lewis, Royal Prerogative (1), N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1984, at A15.
451 708 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1983).
452 Id. at 796.
453 Id. at 797.
454 Regan v. WaId, 468 U.S. 222 (1984), reh'g denied, 469 U.S. 912 (1984).
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lated transactions," said the Court, "is merely part of the President's
general authority to regulate property transactions." 455 Rehnquist ac-
cepted the government's argument that the government was regulat-
ing travel to Cuba in 1977 by exempting travel-related transactions
from the general prohibition on trade with Cuba. By permitting
travel, the government was in fact exercising its authority over travel
(certainly a counterintuitive notion of the government's exercise of
authority).
The Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that there was no na-
tional emergency and consequently no justification for the restriction
on the constitutional right to travel. The Court responded by saying
that it must defer to the Executive's judgment about when such re-
strictions are necessary. 456 It would not make an independent inquiry
as to whether an emergency actually existed.
Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by Justices Powell, Brennan,
and Marshall. 457 The only surprise among the four dissenters was
Powell, a conservative Justice not known to take on the government in
foreign policy matters. Even more curious was his separate, pithy, dis-
senting opinion,458 with the disclaimer that its author was not ques-
tioning the political wisdom of President Reagan's policy. Powell
agreed that the majority's opinion might be in the best interests of the
United States, but maintained that an inquiry into the nation's best
interests was not the question before the Court. The Court's role,
rather, was "limited . .. to ascertaining and sustaining the intent of
Congress."459 The President and Congress were empowered to deter-
mine the political wisdom of a particular foreign policy, but the nine
Justices were empowered only to uphold the law. As Powell read that
law, "Congress intended to bar the President from expanding the ex-
ercise of emergency authority."460
Only much later did I discover what probably triggered Justice
Powell's curious, short discourse on the relationship between law and
politics. The Supreme Court clerks that year heard Justice Rehnquist
state that, although the plaintiffs probably had presented a more per-
suasive legal interpretation of IEEPA, the Court should not enjoin the
Executive action toward Cuba. Powell's dissent may have been a re-
sponse to Rehnquist's comment. Politics, not a narrow legal interpre-
tation of the law, lay behind the Court's decision in Regan v. Wald, and
Powell knew it.
455 Id. at 232.
456 Id. at 243,
457 Id. at 244.
458 Id. at 262.
459 Id.
460 Id.
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Today, the right to travel to Cuba has again become a focus of
controversy, as hundreds of Americans have flagrantly violated the
ban on such travel.461 For those involved in such disobedience, Wald
v. Regan serves as a symbol of the Court's insensitivity to the rights of
Americans. The continuing opposition to the ban will certainly revive
the broad legal issues raised in Wald. The Wald plaintiffs' legal vision,
although rejected by the Supreme Court, lives on in a new generation
of activists.
C. CUSCIN v. Reagan: The World Court Judgment
On April 9, 1984, the Nicaraguan government brought an action
against the United States in the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
alleging that U.S. support for the Nicaraguan Contras constituted
both an impermissible intervention in Nicaragua's internal affairs and
a use of armed force that contravened the UN and OAS charters and
general principles of international law. The United States contested
ICJ jurisdiction. After considering extensive briefs filed by both sides
and hearing several days of oral argument, the court ruled that it had
jurisdiction and competence to adjudicate Nicaragua's claims. 462 The
United States thereupon formally withdrew from the proceeding.46 3
The case went forward, however, and onJune 27, 1986, the ICJ issued
its opinion on the merits. By a 12-3 vote, the court found that by
training, arming, equipping, financing, and supplying the Contra
forces, the United States had violated its obligations under interna-
tional law not to use force against another state and not to intervene
in the internal affairs of another state.46 Nevertheless, Congress
thereafter authorized $100 million in new aid.465
The World Federalist Association, a national organization
founded in the aftermath of World War 11466 to advocate the abolition
of war through just and enforceable world law, wanted to pursue a
case against the U.S. government for violating the ICJ decision.
461 Medea Benjamin, Cuba Travel Will Continue Despite U.S., Helms's Sanctions, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 15, 1995, at A23 (In 1994 over 600 people traveled to Cuba openly and
illegally.).
462 Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States) 1984 I.CJ. 392.
463 Statement of United States on Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by Nica-
ragua at the International Court of Justice, reprinted in 24 INT'L LEGAL MATERLALS 246
(1985).
464 Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States) 1986 I.CJ. 14.
465 Act of Oct. 18, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 206(a) (2), 100 Stat. 1788-800 (military
appropriations).
466 Among the World Federalist Association's early members were Albert Einstein, Os-
car Hammerstein, William O'Douglass, and Norman Cousins. Ironically, Ronald Reagan
served on the advisory board of the Association's California branch in the late 1990s. Inter-
view with Walter Hoffman, former Executive Director of the World Federalists (Nov. 1993).
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Clearly the World Federalist Association had no standing to bring this
lawsuit; in United States v. Richardson46 7 and Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church & StateW 8 the Supreme
Court rejected standing for generalized injuries suffered by all citi-
zens. Injury to its organization's goals and purpose probably would
not suffice to give the World Federalists standing.
But another group of Americans was suffering a grave, particular-
ized injury from their government's violation of the ICJ's decision and
order. This group consisted of the thousands of American citizens
living in Nicaragua, particularly those who lived in the dangerous
northern region where Contra activity was heavy. Several had been
shot at or kidnapped by the Contras and agreed to be plaintiffs in a
lawsuit.
In this latest case, Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v.
Reagan469 ("CUSCLN'), we claimed that (1) the Executive was violat-
ing both Article 94 of the UN Charter, which mandates obedience to a
decision of the ICJ, and customary international law; and (2) that the
Executive had violated the Fifth Amendment by providing aid to the
Contras, whose policy and practice is to kill, wound, kidnap, and de-
tain civilians, thus threatening the lives and liberty of plaintiffs living
in Nicaragua. Moreover, that imminent threat was arbitrary and un-
reasonable in that it violated Article 94 of the UN Charter and custom-
ary international law as set forth by the ICJ decision. 470 The American
plaintiffs living in Nicaragua not only had standing, but the threat to
their individual, constitutional rights would make it more difficult for
a court to dismiss the case as presenting a political question for "an
area concerning foreign affairs that has been uniformly found appro-
priate for judicial review is the protection of individual or constitu-
tional rights from government action."471
467 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
468 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
469 No. CIVAL. 86-2620, 1987 WL 9238 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1987), appeal dismissed, 859
F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
470 Plaintiff's Complaint at 1 34, CUSCLIN v. Reagan, No. 86-2620 (D.D.C. Mar. 24,
1987).
471 Flynn v. Shultz, 748 F.2d 1186, 1191 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830
(1985); see also Pangilinan v. INS, 796 F.2d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 1986) (individual rights
claims justiciable in immigration context), rev'd, 486 U.S. 875 (1988); Eain v. Wilkes, 641
F.2d 504, 516 (7th Cir. 1981) (courts are cautious when invoking political question doc-
trine where individual rights involved), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); American Jewish
Congress v. Vance, 575 F.2d 939, 950 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Robinson, J., dissenting in
part) (the fact that a case deals with international affairs does not preclude judicial review
if the claim is one of unconstitutional action); Allende v. Shultz, 605 F. Supp. 1220, 1223
(D. Mass. 1985) (judicial review particularly appropriate in cases involving fundamental
rights of U.S. citizens); Sharon v. Time, 599 F. Supp. 538, 552-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (political
question doctrine improperly invoked when individual rights involved and absent clear
guidance from a political branch); 13A CHARs.Es ALAN WIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACrICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3534.1 (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1995); Warren F. Schwartz & Wayne McCor-
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From a legal perspective, CUSCL1N was probably the most uto-
pian case we brought in our whole campaign. The Executive was at
this point aiding the Contras pursuant to an explicit congressional
appropriation of $100 million in aid.472 Thus, the President's power
was "at its maximum, for it include[d] all that he possesses in his own
right plus all that Congress can delegate." 473 In addition, we re-
quested bold relief: the enjoining of a major foreign policy initiative
supported by both the President and a majority of Congress. Of the
several cases we had brought, this one most directly criticized the en-
tire U.S. policy toward Nicaragua. To say that the case would be an
"uphill battle," as I conceded at the press conference announcing the
suit's filing, was a serious understatement.
From a prophetic standpoint, CUSCUN directly evoked the ten-
sion between law as it is and law as it ought to be. For over a century,
the federal courts had given effect to congressional statutes even when
those statutes conflicted with U.S. treaty obligations474 or customary
international law.475 Like the nineteenth-century prophetic litigators,
we relied heavily on fundamental principles ofjustice to argue for an
exception to the general rule. We utilized tradition to criticize the
present reality and to pose an alternative vision of the future in which
the U.S. government would obey international norms.
In fact, we had rejected a possible technical ground for arguing
the case. In appropriating the $100 million, Congress had not directly
mentioned the ICJ decision. We might have argued that Congress's
appropriation had to be construed consistently with our treaty obliga-
tion to obey the ICJ.476 Indeed, a leading human rights casebook
questions why we did not take that approach.477 However, our clients
wanted to challenge directly the U.S. policy violating the ICJ decision,
mack, The Justidability of Legal Objections to the American Militay Effort in Vietnam, 46 Tax. L.
REv. 1033, 1044 (1968). Indeed, the very quote upon which the government relied, from
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803), applies by its terms only to "polit-
ical" questions which "respect the nation, not individual rights."
472 Act of Oct. 18, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 206(a) (2), 100 Stat. 1783-300 (military
appropriations).
473 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
474 Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973);
Whimey v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
475 Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1960).
476 See, e.g., United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 695 F. Supp. 1456
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). The argument would have been that Congress meant to appropriate the
money simply for humanitarian, and not military aid.
477 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAw AND POLicY 627 (Frank Newman
& David Weissbrodt eds., 1990) (questions whether appellants would have had a stronger
case if they had alleged that Congress had not intended to break Article 94 of the UN
Charter).
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and we did not believe that narrowing our claim would significantly
help our chances of success-it might only cloud the issue.
In the district court, the government argued that the plaintiffs
lacked standing and that the suit presented a nonjusticiable political
question. Their standing argument asserted that the plaintiffs were
standing in the shoes of the Nicaraguan government and thus that the
whole case should be dismissed. We countered by arguing that the
plaintiffs' own lives were in danger, and that they simply wanted to
continue to stand in their own shoes. Unfortunately, this argument
was prescient.
Judge Richey, while impressed with the "extensive and learned
briefing" on the issues (a clear indication that we were going to lose),
dismissed the case as presenting a nonjusticiable political question.478
Noting that the court had "never shirked its duty to render decisions
that make bureaucrats more than ordinarily squeamish,"479 the opin-
ion identified the potential for "embarrassment"48° to the political
branches as justifying invocation of the political question doctrine.
The distinction between judicial decisions that simply make bureau-
crats "squeamish" and those that present "embarrassment" was not to
be gleaned from Judge Richey's opinion. While the court was "pain-
fully aware that plaintiffs claim to be in danger because of actions
taken by the United States... the proper forum for airing these griev-
ances is not this Court but the Congress and the voting booth."481
Indeed, the vigorous and widespread opposition to U.S. intervention
in Central America eventually did convince Congress to end aid to the
Contras, but it was too late for one of the plaintiffs.
We appealed. While the appeal was pending, Benjamin Linder
was murdered by the Contras.482 It was a terrible shock to us and
brought home the reality of the war against Nicaragua. I had taken an
academic approach to the case; Ben Linder's death reminded me that
the harm caused by our government's policies was not merely the
abuse of process or disregard of abstract formalities. This human trag-
edy was brought about by our aid to the Contras.
We argued the appeal in November 1987 before a liberal panel of
the D.C. Court of Appeals: Circuit Judges Aubrey Robinson and Ab-
478 Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua, Civil Action No. 86-2620, slip op.
A225, A226 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 6, 1987).
479 Id. at A230.
480 Id.
481 Id. at A231.
482 Alexander Cockburn, The Execution of Ben Linder, American in Nicaragua, NATION,
Oct. 17, 1987, at 402; Stephen Kinzer, Nicaragua Says Contras Kills American Civilian, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 29, 1987, at A3.
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ner Mikva 48 3 and District Judge Gordon, sitting by designation. In a
scholarly forty-six-page opinion, the court dismissed our claims. The
court of appeals did not hide behind the political question doctrine,
as the district court had done.48 4 The court was, in fact, particularly
troubled by the political question dismissal of the individual plaintiffs'
Fifth Amendment claims, for "[a] s Appellants point out, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly found that claims based on such rights are justi-
ciable, even if they implicate foreign policy decisions. '485
As expected, however, the court followed precedent in finding
that a congressional derogation from a prior treaty commitment or
rule of customary international law was binding, as a matter of domes-
tic law, on the judiciary. While ruminating that neither "our republi-
can form of government [nor] our constitutional supremacy clause
requires this subordination of treaties to inconsistent domestic stat-
utes,"48 6 the court was bound by the "dualist" view of international
and domestic law accepted by the Supreme Court.
We had sought to create an exception to this precedent by argu-
ing that certain fundamental norms of international law are binding on
both Congress and the President. The Nuremberg judgment re-
jecting the Nazis' argument that they were only obeying domestic law,
the holding of the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala48 7 that for-
eign officials could be sued in U.S. courts for violations of certain fun-
damental norms, and the views of the Framers of the Constitution all
seemed to require that certain international legal norms be accorded
constitutional stature.
The D.C. Circuit appeared sympathetic to this argument when it
agreed that "if Congress and the President violate a peremptory norm
(orjus cogens), the domestic legal consequences are unclear."48 8 The
court expanded on this idea:
Such basic norms of international law as the proscription against
murder and slavery may well have the domestic legal effect that ap-
pellants suggest. That is, they may well restrain our government in
the same way that the Constitution restrains it. If Congress adopted
a foreign policy that resulted in the enslavement of our citizens or
of other individuals, that policy might well be subject to challenge
in domestic court under international law. Such a conclusion was
483 Judge Mikva had been a liberal congressman before being named to the bench by
President Carter. He had been a member of the World Federalists in its early years. Judge
Robinson had been a NAACP lawyer prior to appointment to the bench.
484 Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929,
933 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
485 Id. at 935.
486 Id. at 937.
487 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
488 859 F.2d at 935.
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indeed implicit in the landmark decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
which upheld jurisdiction over a suit by a Paraguayan citizen against
a Paraguayan police chief for the death by torture of the plaintiffs
brother. The court concluded that "official torture is now prohib-
ited by the law of nations." The same point has been echoed in our
own court. Judge Edwards observed in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Repub-
lic, that "commentators have begun to identify a handful of heinous
actions-each of which violates definable, universal and obligatory
norms," and that these include, at a minimum, bans on governmen-
tal "torture, summary execution, genocide, and slavery."48 9
Ultimately, though, the court concluded that the obligations created
by Article 94 of the UN Charter and customary international law had
not reached the stature of fundamental or peremptory norms of inter-
national law.490 Finally, the court of appeals found that governmental
recklessness could give rise to a constitutional tort, but that in the
foreign policy context the standard for finding reckless conduct was
very high-and we had not met it.491
The court's decision, like the whole case, received little media
attention. Most of the coverage followed the lead of the New York
Times in describing the IGJ decision as purely "hortatory" and unen-
forceable. This foolhardy, radical case brought by organizations of
mostly aging Post-World War II international government types and
American citizens living in Nicaragua was not particularly newsworthy.
On a grass-roots level, we had more success in getting our
message heard. The World Federalist Association organized around
the case, and a group of people not normally sympathetic to the
Sandinista cause became involved in anti-U.S. intervention work.
Many activists around the country looked at the ICJ decision asjustify-
ing their civil resistance to U.S. policy. These activists could draw sup-
port from the Nuremberg Tribunal's statement that an individual's
"international duties ... transcend the national obligations of obedi-
ence imposed . . . by the individual state."4 92 The CUSCLJN case
dovetailed with this civil resistance.
But CUSCLIN clearly had only a very limited impact on the move-
ment to end Contra aid. It received little press attention and was not
the subject of a major organizing campaign. As Walter Hoffman, the
then-Executive Director of the World Federalists, pointed out, "the
main reason for doing the case was for the future." Although we lost
the case, we did receive a serious, analytical opinion that left hope for
the future. The court had accepted our argument that fundamental
489 Id. at 941 (citations omitted).
490 Id. at 942.
491 Id. at 950.
492 1 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: TRIAL OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS (Nuremberg
1943), 223 (1945).
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norms of international law could potentially restrain the President
and the Congress. The CUSCLIN case is one precedent from our era
that a future court might use to overcome the now-prevalent dualist
theory that isolates the tenets of international law from our domestic
legal order. Indeed, other judges and litigators have cited CUSCLIN
for the proposition that norms of international law may restrain the
political branches in their conduct of foreign policy.493
That this development in the case law was a significant achieve-
ment may perhaps be appreciated when one considers that it was also
unexpected. A little before the CUSCI~fN case was filed, I attended a
panel discussion at the annual meeting of the American Society of
International Law on whether the President could violate interna-
tional law. I asked the panel whether Congress and the President-
even acting jointly--should be constitutionally permitted to violate ba-
sic norms of international law. A very well known professor of interna-
tional law answered that he doubted that any court would so hold in
my lifetime.494 I'm now sure he was right, but the CUSCLIN case
comes the closest to such a holding.
The radical nature of the CUSCLINT case illustrates some of the
tensions inherent in such litigation. Our claims were similar to the
constitutional abolitionist theories in that they had so little chance of
winning that the mainstream establishment ignored us totally. Our
outsider status made it difficult to organize around the case. For ex-
ample, Dellums and Crockett generated much more excitement about
the cases themselves. That occurred, in part, because those cases were
perceived as more legitimate, that is, having a greater likelihood of
being accepted by the elite. In addition, CUSCLN was even more re-
moved from the Nicaraguan people than Dellums or Sanchez had been.
In CUSCLIN, none of our plaintiffs were Nicaraguan. We wanted to
avoid the problem raised in Sanchez as to whether aliens living abroad
were entitled to constitutional protection, but this strategic decision
made it all the more difficult for the public to identify with our claims.
Despite its radical critique, CUSCLN was in many respects the most
isolated and academic of all our litigation during the 1980s.
Yet the CUSCLIN litigation also presented the most radical and
far-reaching critique of U.S. interventionist policy. CUSCL1N, unlike
Reagan v. Wald, Dellums, and Beacon Products, directly challenged an
493 ChiefJudge Wald of the D.C. Circuit recognized that CUSCL!N"left open the possi-
bility that 'peremptory' norms might supersede domestic law." Antolok v. United States,
873 F.2d 369, 394 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d
699, 714-17 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing CUSCL/Nextensively for the proposition thatjus cogens
is the highest form of international law and that prohibition against torture had jus cogens
status), ceit. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
494 AMERICAN SociEy OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 80TH ANNuAL
MEETING 306 (1986).
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important norm of current U.S. constitutional law-that the U.S. gov-
ernment can do anything it wants abroad without being subjected to
judicial scrutiny. I may have been fighting a losing battle, but at least
my courtroom arguments in CUSCL1N did not focus primarily on pro-
cedural issues such as standing, ripeness, or mootness.
CONCLUSION
The prophetic vision ofjustice as a constant struggle has a certain
kinship with the Sisyphus myth. Sisyphus overcomes his tragic situa-
tion through a conscious recognition that there is no hope of ever
reaching the summit. Camus once argued, "The struggle itself toward
the heights is enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisy-
phus happy."495
Derrick Bell tells law school graduates that as a radical lawyer you
will often be unable to reach your goals and "will feel less like a cru-
sading reformer than like the mythical Sisyphus. '496 Bell reads Camus
as finding "strength in Sisyphus's course, not because Sisyphus contin-
ues to push the rock to the mountain's top, but because he returns to
the bottom to retrieve it-knowing he will never get it to the top."49 7
Bell argues against instrumentalism: reaching the substantive goal,
having an impact, is secondary. What is crucial is the courage to strug-
gle, the attempt itself to transcend existing reality despite the difficulty
of doing so.
The prophetic Jewish scholar Abraham Heschel used imagery
very similar to the Sisyphian myth.
Sometimes we stand before a wall. It is very high. We cannot scale
it. It is hard to break through it, but even knocking our heads
against the wall is full of meaning. Ultimately, there is only one way
of gaining certainty of the realness of any reality, and this is by
knocking our heads against the wall. Then we discover there is
something real outside the mind.498
An important difference between the Sisyphean and prophetic tradi-
tions is that for the prophets, God offers both a vision of doom and
495 ALBERT CAMUS, THE MY'iT OF SISYPHUS AND OTHER EssAYs 123 (Justin O'Brien
trans., 1955).
496 Bell, supra note 71, at 10. When this Article was in its final stage of editing, I discov-
ered Derrick Bell's excellent book, CONFRONTING AuTHoRiTY, REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT
PROTESTER (1994), which elaborates on the themes of his commencement address at the
University of Pittsburgh.
497 Id.
498 ABRAAM J. HERSCHEL, THE INSECURITY OF FREEDOM: EssAYs ON HuxiAN EXISTENCE
260 (1966), quoted in MAuRICE FRIEDMAN ET AL., You ARE My WITNEsS 87-88 (1987). Martin
Buber, another prominent Jewish philosopher, used the same image when he wrote "I
cannot know how much justice is possible in a given situation unless I go on until my head
hits the wall and hurts." Id. at 88.
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faith in salvation, while Sisyphus's victory lies precisely in his recogni-
tion that there is no hope.499
The prophetic litigators discussed in Part III of this Article were
able to criticize their realities while foreseeing a redemptive future.
Albion Tourgee characterized himself as a fool who understood the
difficulty of the situation he faced, yet "hoped that in some inscrutable
way the laws of human nature would be suspended, or that the state of
affairs at first presenting itself would be but temporary."500 Arthur
Kinoy, who co-argued the Youngstown plant closing case, recounts
how, despite his awareness of the incredible odds against winning, an
incredible feeling of faith and optimism in the steelworkers' cause
came over him when he got up to argue before the court of ap-
peals.50' It is that constitutional faith in the face of a hopeless situa-
tion that characterizes both the fool and the prophetic litigator and
distinguishes them from Sisyphus.
The faith that sustains the constitutional litigator facing a difficult
task often comes from images and symbols taken from past struggles.
Albion Tourgee took his symbols from the bible and the abolitionists.
Susan B. Anthony involved the fugitive slaves' legal struggle to assert
her rights before judge Hunt. Staughton Lynd's most powerful recur-
ring images were drawn from the Hungarian revolt against Soviet
tanks. A recurring image that I was drawn to as the losses mounted in
the litigation I participated in was of a lawyer in Nazi Germany strug-
gling hopelessly to stem the tide of reaction. What attracted me to
that image was obviously not the danger or martyrdom quality of my
work, since the personal risk I took in my litigation was virtually non-
existent and that of anti-Nazi lawyers great. Rather it stemmed from a
recognition that despite the pronouncement of Justice Jackson at Nu-
remberg, the likelihood of United States courts proscribing United
States aggressions against Latin American nations and people was not
substantially greater than German courts enjoining Hitler's aggression
against the peoples of Europe. That an anti-Nazi lawyer could work in
499 The prophets criticized their reality and predicted disaster, yet at the same time
held out a redemptive view of the future. SAMUEL EISENSTADT, THE PROPHETS 45, 92, 134-
35 (1971). The prophetic faith bears a "short range pessimism and a long range opti-
mism." OLAN, supra note 49, at 117. While Amos prophesied that "Fallen, not to rise
again, is Maiden Israel abandoned on her soil with none to lift her up," Amos 5:1-2, he went
on to say "seek the Lord and you will live... I will restore my people Israel. They shall
rebuild ruined cities and inhabit them, they shall plant vineyards and drink wine; they shall
till gardens and eat their fruits." Amos 9:14. The juxtaposition of doom and salvation is
associated with other important biblical prophets. See, e.g., J. LINDBLOM, PROPHECY IN AN-
CIENTr ISRAEL 188 (1962) (discussing tension in Isaiah).
500 TOURGFE, supra note 37, at 135.
501 Stephen Wexler recounts the conflict between waking up in the middle of the
night screaming "we can win" yet knowing "realistically, we can't." Stephen Wexler, Practic-
ing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE LJ. 1049, 1061 (1970).
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the face of such hopeless odds fascinated me. I never knew whether
such lawyers existed outside my imagination, although I assumed they
must have. In the course of researching this Article, I came across a
lawyer who actually fit the image that I had.
The lawyer's name was Helmuth James von Moltke.5 0 2 Moltke
was legal adviser to the High Command of the German Armed Serv-
ices during World War II until he was executed by the Nazis in January
1945. He fought many a lonely and courageous battle against Nazi
wartime policy.
I have always wondered what it must have been like to have been
an anti-Nazi lawyer in the Third Reich. Moltke's letters to his wife
provide some answers. After the remarkable fact of singlehandedly
convincing twenty-five military men to moderate a directive on eco-
nomic warfare against Britain in 1939, he wrote home:
Today I won my case. But it was like winning a victory over a hydra.
I chopped off one of the monster's heads, and 10 new ones have
grown in its place.503
The next year, after waging a hard, but losing fight to protect the
rights of Poles, he wrote his wife in despair, "It's no use, unfortunately,
but at least our honour was saved. . "...504 In 1943, after a year in
which he fought hard to save the Jews, and against the various war
crimes being committed by German troops, Moltke feared that his
personal situation and that of the German people would dramatically
deteriorate. For him:
The most irritating part is that I consider all the work being done
now as having no chance. But it has to be done with all due care all
the same, so that others, and we ourselves, can't blame ourselves for
having missed any chance. 505
Moltke'sjustification for his difficult struggle, like that offered by
Albion Tourgee, the New Departure leaders, and Derrick Bell, focuses
on the personal dignity and courage achieved by opposing evil.50 6 Yet
Moltke's legacy, like that of the nineteenth-century litigators who
sought to extend Americans rights beyond the bounds their era could
tolerate, extends much further than vindicating his personal honor.
His example served as an inspiration for others such as George Ken-
502 For a description of Moltke's character, see GEORGE F. KENNAN, MioiRs 1925-
1950, at 121 (1967).
503 HELMUTHJAMES VON MOLTE, LETES TO FREYA 1939-1945, at 47 (Beate Ruhm von
Oppen ed. & trans:, 1990).
504 Id. at 77.
505 Id. at 270.
506 For example, the New Departure leaders quoted Milton in Paradise Lost after the
Supreme Court rejected their claim in Minor v. Happersett, 163 U.S. 552 (1896): "What
though the Field be lost? All is not lost: the unconquerable will and courage never to
yield." SUFFRAGE, supra note 197, at 755.
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nan,50 7 just as Albion Tourgee, Francis Minor, and Alvan Stewart
helped inspire the struggle of future generations to achieve the consti-
tutional rights they had fought vainly to secure.
507 The image of "this lonely, struggling man," provided Kennan with a model "of
moral conscience and an unfailing source of political and intellectual inspiration." See
KENNAN, supra note 502.
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